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ABSTRACT  
 
WENDY L CHEN: State Interventions and Hospital Response in Community Health 
Promotion: A Comparative Study of California, Texas and Florida  
(Under the direction of Shoou-Yih Daniel Lee)  
 
The growth of under and uninsured populations and the corporatization of health care have 
raised concerns about whether not-for-profit hospitals are fulfilling their community-oriented 
mission.  Starting in the early 1990, state governments began instituting laws to regulate not-
for-profit hospitals’ provision of community benefit services in exchange for their tax 
exemption status and subsequent advantages. This study employs a pre-post quasi-
experimental design to investigate the effectiveness of community benefit laws, factors 
influencing not-for-profit hospitals’ abilities to comply with these laws and the potential 
spill-over effects on for-profit hospitals’ community benefit behaviors between 1991 and 
2002.  Results of the study suggest that the process-oriented California community benefit 
law was not effective in promoting not-for-profit hospitals’ community benefit activities.  
The prescriptive approach to state community benefit law, as seen in Texas, significantly 
bolstered not-for-profit hospitals’ provision of charity care.  Hospital size positively 
facilitates not-for-profit hospitals’ response to the laws.  The effects of other contingency 
factors are inconsistent across states.  Finally, the spill-over effects of state community 
benefit laws cannot be characterized uniformly across states.  For-profit hospitals’ reactions 
to increased not-for-profit contribution to community benefit activities vary by state and by 
policy design.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As of year 2005, nearly 46 million people are without health insurance on any given 
day in this country (Schoen et al., 2005; DeNavas-Walt et al., 2004; Friedman, 2005).  
Additionally, at least 16 more million adults with health insurance lack adequate coverage 
(Schoen et al., 2005).  To these 62 million under- and uninsured US residents, access to a 
variety of public health and disease specific medical services is critical to the maintenance of 
their health status.   
As the largest sector of healthcare providers as well as the provider of the last resort 
(Friedman, 2005), community hospitals’ role in meeting the health needs of the indigent has 
become more crucial and controversial than ever before.  Community hospitals have 
historically served a socially benevolent function in caring for the poor and the medically 
fragile (Rosenberg, 1987; Owens, 2005).  As the financial cost of medical care soars and the 
health burden of the indigent climbs, public expectations of community hospitals’ social 
investment and involvement persist.  Yet, hospitals themselves have struggled to maintain 
financial solvency in a turbulent industry and economy in the last two decades (Friedman, 
2005).  In the last two decades, many have experienced closures and consolidations while 
others have downsized their staff, medical services, and unprofitable programs to keep 
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hospital operations afloat (Friedman, 2005).  The tension between the charity and business 
missions of hospitals mounts (Greaney and Boozang, 2005).    
Not-for-profit community hospitals have long enjoyed tax exemptions based on a 
charitable mission.  However, the federal Internal Revenue Services (IRS) does not require 
charity care as a condition of maintaining federal tax-exempt status.  Some argue that the 
virtues of their purpose alone are sufficient to merit their tax advantage, as in all non-health 
related not-for-profit entities (Gray, 1996).  As long as not-for-profit community hospitals 
provide some benefits to the community and do not distribute profits, their tax exempt status 
remains unchallenged (Pauly, 1996; Greaney and Boozang, 2005).  With growing health care 
costs, increases in the under- and un-insured population and shrinking public fundings (Pauly, 
1996; Gray, 1996; Friedman, 2005), policy makers, especially those at the state level, have 
periodically questioned the merits of these tax advantages without evoking any real lasting 
changes until recently.  Litigations have been filed against several not-for-profit hospitals 
based on the allegations of unethical billing and aggressive collection practices used on under 
and un-insured patients in the past two years (Geyer, 2004; Moroney et al., 2004; Maiuro et 
al., 2004; Unland, 2004).  In February 2004, Provena Covenant Medical Center’s tax-
exemption status was revoked, sending shock waves through the hospital industry and 
sparked the attention of federal and state legislators (Maiuro et al., 2004; Unland, 2004).   
Later in the same year, The U.S. Congress held three hearing to examine hospital business 
practices, tax status, charitable activities, and alleged aggressive billing practices (Owens, 
2005).  Currently, the IRS and three congressional committees are devoted to investigating 
these charges against not-for-profit community hospitals (Moreney et al., 2004).    
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In May 2005, the House Ways and Means Committee held a hearing specifically on 
hospitals’ uncompensated care (Healthline, 2005).  The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) was commissioned to produce a report on the provision of uncompensated care in 
hospitals and the extent of differences across hospital ownership types (Congressional 
Quarterly HealthBeat, April 2005; Healthline, 2005).  The study found that government-
owned or public hospitals devoted substantially larger shares of their patient operating 
expenses to uncompensated care than did not-for-profit and for-profit community hospitals.  
Among private community hospitals, not-for-profit hospitals’ share of uncompensated care 
was generally higher than that of for-profit hospitals (GAO-05-743T).  More importantly, 
results of the study suggested that, within each hospital group, the burden of uncompensated 
care costs was not evenly distributed.  Only a small number of not-for-profit hospitals 
accounted for a substantial contribution to uncompensated care costs.  The GAO concluded 
that the current tax policy lacks specific criteria with respect to tax exemptions for charitable 
entities and provided no details on how tax exemptions are determined.   
This struggle with the growing under- and un-insurance problem and the 
responsibility of hospitals in meeting local health needs is most evident at the state level.  
Since the early 1990s, state governments have experimented with policy solutions to ensure 
hospitals’ commitment to community health needs (Gray, 1996). A prominent example of 
such policy solutions is the community benefit law, which requires not-for-profit hospitals to 
uphold their commitment to the public and the medically needy by providing community 
health services and charity care.  Socially, these state laws represent response to the public 
outcry for community accountability in hospitals and policy efforts to take not-for-profit 
hospitals back to their founding philosophies.  Politically, they are a way for not-for-profit 
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hospitals to justify their tax advantages over their for-profit counterparts.  Economically, they 
force hospitals to share states’ burden of the growing uninsured and public health needs. 
This study aims to (1) measure changes in the hospitals’ provision of and financial 
expenditure on community-oriented health services as a result of state community benefit 
laws; (2) assess whether hospital compliance to community benefit laws is contingent upon 
their organizational structure (e.g. size, managed care contracts, membership in health 
systems and networks) and the level of market competition; (3) examine the spill-over effects 
in the provision of and financial expenditure on community benefit by for-profit hospitals as 
a result of sate community benefit laws.    
This study employs a longitudinal design that tracks the change in community benefit 
activities and charity care among hospitals in Texas, California and Florida from 1991 to 
2002.  It provides an in-depth comparative analysis of whether and how community benefit 
laws improve hospital provision of community health services and charity care.  From a 
broader perspective, the study assesses the impact of a state heath policy, the strategic 
responses of hospitals to different designs of policy interventions, and the dynamic 
interactions among hospitals of different ownership types.  Results of the study will inform 
policy debates about not-for-profit hospitals’ charitable tax exemption status—Is it justifiable 
given the level of community health involvement in not-for-profit hospitals vis-à-vis that of 
for-profit hospitals? How effective is state intervention in securing the social investment in 
not-for-profit hospitals?  Ultimately, knowledge gained from this project will inform future 
policy formulation in relation to community benefit laws, in specific, and hospital and 
community relationships, in general. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Hospitals, especially not-for-profit hospitals, are pressured to share the financial and 
care burdens of the under- and uninsured for two primary reasons.  One, hospitals derive 
their social legitimacy from their abilities to care for the poor and the medically needy.  U.S. 
hospitals are evolutionary products of the unique religious culture and class system of this 
society.  In the early 1800s, health care was provided in two separate systems.  That for the 
respectable members of the society was mostly home-based.  On the other hand, care for the 
poor, the destitute, the insane, and the marginally criminal (prostitutes and alcoholics) was 
provided in almshouses—the forerunner of modern hospitals (Rosenberg, 1987; Marmor et 
al., 1987; Raffel and Raffel, 1994; Crimm, 1995; Dowling, 2002).  Later, the first voluntary 
hospitals were established in the late 1700s and early 1800s at the urging of influential 
physicians and with the help of local philanthropists who sought to extend the reach of their 
Christian stewardship (Rosenberg 1987; Dowling 2002).  Even though hospitals were a small 
part of the health care delivery system then, their founding philosophies has instilled a deep 
symbolic value of altruism in the American cultural conscience till today (Giffords et al., 
2005).  Two, private not-for-profit hospitals as a sector enjoys tax exemptions at the local, 
state and federal levels based on their professed commitment to community wellness.   
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Since the first enactment of the federal tax law in 1894, policy debates about how 
NFP hospitals may best qualify for their tax exemption status arise periodically over time.  In 
1956, the IRS issued a Revenue Ruling 56-185 and for the first time set forth affirmative 
requirements that NFP hospitals had to meet in order to be qualified or remain eligible for 
chartable exemption under Section 501(c)3 (Mancino 2001).  These requirements included 
the proclamation of commitment to the care of the sick, prohibition to pay dividends, 
prohibition to restrict use of the facilities to particular groups of physicians, and medical staff 
composition issues (Montoya and Meyer 1998; Mancino 2001). Most importantly, Revenue 
Ruling 56-185 explicitly stated that NFP hospitals must “operate to the extent of [their] 
financial ability for those not able to pay for services rendered and not exclusively for those 
able and expected to pay.”  Soon after the publication of Revenue Ruling 56-185, the factual 
nature of the financial ability test caused quite a few administrative problems for the IRS as 
well as for NFP hospitals.  In 1959, the term “charitable” was then amended to encompass a 
broad concept of community benefit and public interest, not just relief for the poor (Montoya 
and Meyer 1998; Mancino 2001). In 1969, the IRS revised its interpretation of the charitable 
tax exemption standards to enunciate that promotion of community health was now a worthy 
and sufficient charitable purpose.  In Revenue Ruling 69-545, not only did the IRS fall back 
on the “intrinsic” charitable nature of health care, it went so far as to rebuke its earlier ruling 
56-185 by repositioning its interpretation of the word “charity” in section 501(c)(3) to 
include the common law meaning rather than simply the connotation of free care (Fox and 
Schaffer 1991; Potter and Longest 1994; Mancino 2001).  It ruled that hospitals need not 
provide free or below-cost care to those unable to pay in order to qualify for federal tax 
exemption (Fox and Schaffer 1991). The IRS argued that such interpretation of the charitable 
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law was informed and supported by the hospital industry which anticipated a winnowing 
need for free care in view of the expanding Medicare and Medicaid programs (Fox and 
Schaffer 1991).  In 1983, the IRS further eased the requirements for federal charitable tax 
exemption.  While Revenue Ruling 69-545 acknowledged that promotion of health by its 
own virtue was a worthy charitable purpose, it was brought to question whether operating an 
open emergency room was an absolute requirement for tax exempt status.  Revenue Ruling 
83-157 confirmed that no specific types of activities were required of an NFP hospital in 
order to be entitled to exemption (Mancino 2001; Potter and Longest 1994).  Many thought 
this modification was intended to introduce flexibility for NFP hospitals to commit to more 
“community benefits” rather than “charity care” (Nobel et al. 1998).  However, given the 
malleable nature of the concept of “community benefits,” Revenue Ruling 83-157 might 
have introduced more ambiguity than flexibility to the tax policy.  
According to the industry estimate, hospitals provide any where from $25 billion to 
$50 billion on community services and between $10 billion to $30 billion of uncompensated 
care every year (Gaskin, 1997; Thorpe and Spencer, 1991; Community Catalyst, 2003b; 
Vladeck, 2006).  While it is difficult to ascertain the exact amount of tax exemptions incurred 
by, or subsidies distributed to, not-for-profit community hospitals in recent years, the general 
consensus is that not-for-profit hospitals’ contributions to community benefit and charity care 
fall short of their tax advantages (Herzlinger and Krasker, 1987; Morrisey et al., 1996; 
Greaney and Boozang, 2005).  Combined with the currently weak interpretation of federal 
tax-exemption law by the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) that fail to require charity care as 
a condition for maintaining not-for-profit hospitals’ federal tax-exempt status (Greaney, 2005; 
Horwitz, 2003), the fiscal discrepancies have rekindled the policy debate on the tax 
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privileges of not-for-profit hospitals (Pear, 2006).  In addition, concerns over the latest trend 
of consolidations in the hospital industry and about hospitals’ commitment to local 
communities (Young et al., 2000; Reiley, 2003; Lee et al., 2004; Maiuro et al., 2004; Unland, 
2004) have prompted state governments to experiment with regulatory responses in the form 
of legal statutes that require not-for-profit hospitals to justify their tax exempt status and 
uphold their social responsibility to the community by engaging in community benefit 
activities and programs. 
An immediate question about state community benefit laws is how effective such 
state regulations are in propelling hospitals to address community health needs.  In essence, 
these laws establish a standard of community benefit to which not-for-profit hospitals are 
obliged and accountable.  Without such a standard, it is difficult to monitor and regulate 
hospitals’ commitment to the health burdens of local communities, and to stipulate criteria 
and merits for hospital tax exemptions.  However, to date, very little research has been 
devoted to evaluate the impact of community benefit laws.  A significant part of the 
challenge is data availability.  A decade has now passed since the first states enacted the 
statue in the early 1990s.  Thus, sufficient data have been accumulated that will allow an in-
depth examination of the impact of the law.  
This chapter will (1) discuss hospital ownership differences in terms of community 
benefit activities; (2) describe the historical context, in terms of health services research and 
politics, that contributed to the birth of community benefit laws; (3) summarize the 
community benefit laws in California and Texas as examples of two different approaches; (4) 
review prior literature on community benefit laws; (5) define the scope of this study; and (6) 
explain the significance of this study.  
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2.1. Literature on Hospital Ownership Differences  
All hospitals are not created equal.  Their ownership status, differentiated by the 
Internal Revenue Services (IRS) code, dictates a significant portion of their organizational 
goals and functions.  For-profit hospitals are investor-owned and profit driven (Becker and 
Sloan, 1985).  Hospital purchasing and operational decisions are made based primarily on 
stockholders’ or shareholders’ demand for positive returns to their investments (Potter, 2001).  
Hospitals that declare and are accepted for their charitable purposes under Section 501(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code are considered not-for-profit entities and are eligible to be 
exempt from federal and state income taxes, state franchise and sales taxes, and local income, 
sales and property taxes (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990; Mancino, 2001; Pauly, 1996; 
Montoya and Meyer, 1998).  Unlike for-profit hospitals, not-for-profit hospitals are 
prohibited from distributing their profits.  Instead, profits must be reinvested in the hospital 
(Pauly, 1996; Potter, 2001).  A major advantage of the not-for-profit status is that it allows 
hospitals to access low-cost financing tax-exempt bonds as well as charitable donations that 
are tax deductible for donors (Montoya and Meyer, 1998; Potter, 1994).   
Despite these legal and missionary differentiations, health services researchers have 
long disputed the practical and functional differences between for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals (Herzlinger and Krasker, 1987; Sloan et al., 2001; Norton and Staiger, 1994; Sloan, 
2000; Arrington and Haddock, 1990; Gray, 1993; Shortell et al., 1986; Sloan and Vraciu, 
1983; Boscarino and Chang, 2000).  A brief and focused literature review on hospital 
ownership and provision of community benefit, in terms of uncompensated care and 
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nontraditional unprofitable services, showed that results of research often yield inconsistent 
conclusions.   
In the 1980s, Sloan and Vraciu (1983) used Florida hospitals to compare hospital 
ownership differences.  They found that for-profit and not-for-profit system hospitals were 
virtually identical in terms of after-tax profit margins, percentages of Medicare and Medicaid 
patient days, and the dollar value of charity care and bad debt adjustments to revenue.  This 
study suggested that ownership was a poor predictor of a hospital’s willingness to treat low-
income patients, costs to the community and profitability.   
In 1986, Shortell et al. examined the effects of ownership on hospital provision of 
nontraditional services by comparing selected system-affiliated hospitals with their market 
competitors.  The study sample included 550 system hospitals, belonging to 8 multi hospital 
systems, and 555 freestanding community hospitals.  Nontraditional or alternative services 
were defined as ambulatory care, geriatric care, health promotion, home health and extended 
care and outpatient diagnostic services and service delivery alternatives such as HMOs and 
PPOs.  The research results revealed that not-for-profit systems hospitals offer more non-
traditional as well as more unprofitable services than their for-profit counterparts.  For-profit 
sole hospitals, defined as the only hospital in the community, provided fewer nontraditional 
services than not-for-profit sole hospitals did.  More importantly, Shortell et al. (1983) found 
that external milieu, such as market competition and government regulation, had an impact 
on hospital care delivery.  For example, systems hospitals were less likely to provide charity 
care in highly competitive markets than in less competitive markets.  However, systems 
hospitals did offer more nontraditional services when competition was high than when it was 
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low.  Both for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals provide more nontraditional services when 
Medicaid eligibility levels are high than when they are low.   
 In 1987, Herzlinger and Krasker examined 14 major hospital chains, 6 for-profit and 
8 not-for-profit, on their contribution to social goals.  Their results concluded that not-for-
profit hospitals did not achieve better social results than for-profit hospitals did.  In particular, 
not-for-profit hospitals were not more accessible to the uninsured and medically indigent. In 
response to Herzlinger and Krasker’s research and their questioning of social subsidization 
for not-for-profit hospitals, Arrington and Haddock (1990) employed discriminate analysis to 
estimate the performance differences between not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals.  
Arrington and Haddock purposely modeled their study parameters after those of Herzlinger 
and Krasker (1987).  The results were contrary to those of Herzlinger and Krasker.  
Arrington and Haddock found that not-for-profit hospitals indeed offered more social 
benefits than for-profit hospitals.  Not-for-profit hospitals appeared more accessible to the 
uninsured and medically indigent than were for-profits.  Moreover, not-for-profit hospitals 
invested more in capital improvement to provide for the long-term needs of the communities 
they served than did for-profits.  Finally, not-for-profit hospitals were more involved in 
professional education than for-profit hospitals did.   
 In 1994, the rapid growth in the for-profit hospital population prompted Norton and 
Staiger to evaluate the merit of ownership status in relation to hospital provision of free care 
to the uninsured.  Noting the uneven geographic distribution of hospitals by ownership, this 
study controlled for and tested the endogeneity between hospital ownership and service.  
Results of the study suggested that ownership did not affect the level of charity care provided 
by any given hospital after controlling for the endogeneity of geographic locations.  However, 
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for-profit hospitals tended to self-select into well-insured areas, thereby showing a negative 
correlation between for-profit ownership and volume of charity care.    
Boscarino and Chang (2000) used a 1993 survey of all private medical and surgical 
hospitals in the United States to determine the scope of preventive and palliative services 
provided by ownership status.  This study focused on thirteen services: adult day care, 
outpatient AIDS care services, Alzheimer’s assessment services, chaplaincy services, 
community health programs, fitness centers, health sciences library, home health services, 
hospice, outpatient rehabilitation, respite care, outpatient social work, and  women’s health 
center.  They found that not-for-profit and church operated hospitals are more likely to 
provide preventive-type and palliative type services, with the exception of women’s health 
center and Alzheimer’s programs.   
Using the 1997 American Hospital Annual and Governance Surveys, Lee et al. (2004) 
explored the association between community social capital and hospital provision of 
community benefits among 2,079 community hospitals.  While the results did not find a 
direct relationship between community accountability and hospital provision of community 
benefit, it did find that not-for-profit hospitals were more likely to implement more 
community accountability mechanisms and provide more community oriented services than 
for-profit hospitals were.   In addition, the results showed a significant interaction between 
voting participation and not-for-profit hospital ownership.  In other words, in communities 
where residents were more politically active, not-for-profit hospitals displayed a higher level 
of community accountability.   
Amid all the hospital system expansions and conversions during the 1990s, some 
researchers noticed a convergence in the performance behaviors among not-for-profit and 
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for-profits hospitals.  Potter (2001) takes a sociological approach to study this trend over a 
period of fifteen years.  Her research used emergency room utilization and hospital teaching 
commitment as indicators of community benefit.  Results showed that not-for-profit hospitals 
provided more emergency care than for-profit hospitals did.  However, this difference was 
more prominent in 1980 than in 1994.  In terms of hospital teaching commitment, there was 
no evidence of convergence between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals during the study 
period.  Potter (2001) concluded that not-for-profit hospitals were shown to continue their 
community benefit mission as they pursued efficiency strategies.  In addition, after 
controlling for environmental (i.e. market competition, unemployment rate, etc.) and 
organizational factors (i.e. hospital size, average length of stay, etc.), the difference between 
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals became more pronounced.  Even thought there was a 
convergence in hospitals’ emergency room utilization rate, not-for-profit hospitals still 
provided more community services than their for-profit counterparts during the 15 years of 
study period. 
 In sum, this brief literature review suggested that two decades of hospital ownership 
research have not definitely settled the debate around hospital provision of community 
benefit by ownership.  One of the primary problems may be that researchers often try to 
grasp the essence of the relationship between hospital ownership and performance from their 
unique perspectives and select their study variables accordingly.  A lack of consensus on how 
best to measure these broad concepts has led to inconsistency in research findings.    
Regardless, these mixed or inconsistent findings from the last decades of research on the 
subject may have motivated state policy makers to standardize and regulate not-for-profit 
hospitals’ provision of community benefit.  Given that hospitals would continue to shoulder 
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varying legal obligations based on their ownership status, state community benefit laws are 
one policy effort to enforce and distinguish not-for-profit hospitals’ social commitment. 
  
2.2.   The Inception of Community Benefit Laws  
  In the early 1990s, the US was in economic recession.  Growth of state revenues 
was slow and states were reluctant to raise taxes.  At the same time, demand for social 
assistance was rising (Coughlin and Liska, 1997).  The charitable tax policy came under 
intense public scrutiny as policy makers at the state level contended against the loss of 
potential tax revenues from not-for-profit hospitals (Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1996).  With 
a whirlwind of interest, more than thirty states across the country have proposed or 
experimented with legal and/or legislative procedures to develop a better set of community 
benefits standards for not-for-profit hospitals to merit their tax advantages (Moskowitz, 
1993). As of 2006, seventeen of those states (Table 2.1) have instituted community benefit 
laws for their not-for-profit hospitals (Ginn and Moseley, 2006; Maiuro et al., 2004; 
Coalition for Nonprofit Health Care, 1999; Community Catalyst, 1999, 2001 and 2003a; Seto 
et al., 2000; Hospital Association of Illinois, 2003; Revised Code of Washington 70.170.060; 
Taylor, 2006). 
 
Table 2.1. Information on the 17 states that instituted community benefit laws 
State Laws Approval Date Effective Date Amendment 
Date 
Design 
Approach* 
Washington  1989 July 1, 1990 June 1, 1994 Process 
West Virginia   July 1, 1990  n/a 
Utah 1990 December 18, 1990  Prescriptive 
New York  January 1, 1991 July 1, 1996 Process 
Texas June 2, 1993 September 1, 1993 1995, 1997 Prescriptive 
Massachusetts 1994 June 1994 January 2003 Process 
Indiana 1994 July 1, 1994  Process 
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Minnesota   July 1, 1994 2002, 2004, 
2006 
n/a 
California September 25, 1994 September 29, 1996  Process 
Georgia  July 1, 1997  n/a 
Pennsylvania  November 26, 1997 December 1997  Prescriptive 
Rhode Island  Before 1999  n/a 
Idaho March 19, 1999 January 1, 1999  Process 
New Hampshire   January 1, 2000  n/a 
Maryland  October 1, 2002  n/a 
Illinois  October 7, 2003  n/a 
Connecticut  January 1, 2005  n/a 
*defined by Coalition for Nonprofit Health Care, 1999.       
 
2.3.   Community Benefit Laws 
  Community benefit laws are state policies that require not-for-profit hospitals to 
uphold their commitment to the public and the medically needy by providing community 
health services and charity care.  The laws arose from the unique social, political and 
economic histories of the individual state environment.  For example, in California, bills 
were initially introduced to strip the tax-exempt status of not-for-profit hospitals.  These bills 
drew strong opposition and were defeated by the California not-for-profit health care 
community.  In contrast, the Texas law originated from a law suit filed by its Attorney 
General against Methodist Hospital, Houston, claiming that the hospital was not entitled to 
property tax exemption based on the level of charity care it provided.  These experiences 
helped to shape existent community benefit laws.   
Despite the distinct environments that gave rise to the laws in different states, the 
existing laws fall under the purview of two general categories.  The first one takes on a 
process approach that requires hospitals to plan and report community benefits plans.  The 
second employs a prescriptive approach which requires a minimum level of hospital 
expenditure on community benefits (Coalition for Nonprofit Health Care 1999).  This study 
  16 
uses California and Texas as the representative state for each of these approaches, 
respectively.  
 
2.3.1.  Senate Bill 697 of California - A Process Approach  
In 1994, the California Legislature passed an amendment (SB 697) to the Voluntary 
Health Facility and Clinic Philanthropic Support Act to re-affirm the importance of 
philanthropic support for voluntary health facilities and clinics to continue innovations in 
health services and to supplement government expenditure on health care.  It further linked 
not-for-profit hospitals’ tax advantages to their social obligations.  An important element in 
this bill was the requirement for private not-for-profit hospitals to reaffirm their community 
benefits mission by July 1, 1995.  They were required to complete a community needs 
assessment, in conjunction with other health care providers or through a process of 
consulting with community groups and local government officials by January 1, 1996, and 
adopt and update a community benefits plan by April 1, 1996.  These community needs 
assessments must be written documents to be filed, updated, and re-evaluated annually.  In 
addition, not-for-profit hospitals must delineate mechanisms with which to evaluate their 
community benefits plan in their reports to the Office of Statewide Health Planning and 
Development (OSHPD).  Each not-for-profit hospital is required to submit their complete 
plans to the OSHPD, which in turn, compiles an annual report to the state legislature.    
For planning and reporting purpose, the California legislature broadly defines 
community benefit as a hospital’s activities that are intended to address community needs 
and priorities primarily through disease prevention and improvement of health status, 
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including, but not limited to (1) health care services1; (2) the un-reimbursed cost of services; 
(3) financial or in-kind support of public health programs; (4) donation of funds, property, or 
other resources that contribute to a community priority; (5) health care cost containment; (6) 
enhancement of access to health care or related services that contribute to a healthier 
community; (7) services offered without regard to financial return because they meet a 
community need in the service area of the hospital, and other services including health 
promotion, health education, prevention, and social services; (8) food, shelter, clothing, 
education, transportation, and other goods and services that help maintain a person’s health 
(California Health and Safety Code Section 127345).   
It appears that the primary objective of the law is for OSHPD to use the submitted 
plans to identify and prioritize the most prevalent characteristics of community needs and to 
develop recommendations for community benefits and community priorities for future 
planning purposes.  Even though the OSHPD is also charged with identifying those hospitals 
that did not file plans on a timely basis, the legislation only mentions not-for-profit hospitals’ 
social obligation in exchange for their favorable tax treatment, but never explicitly states 
penalty for non-compliance.   
 
2.3.2.  Community Benefit Law of Texas – A Prescriptive Approach  
In 1993, the Texas Governor approved the Texas community benefit law that required 
government-owned and private not-for-profit hospitals to reinstate their philosophical and 
practical commitment to serving community health needs.  Section 311.043 of the health and 
                                                 
1
 Especially those rendered to vulnerable populations, including, but not limited to, charity care and the 
unreimbursed cost of providing services to the uninsured, underinsured, and those eligible for Medi-Cal, 
Medicare, California Childrens Service Program, or county indigent programs (California Health & Safety 
Code §127345).  
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safety code simply and clearly delineates that it is the duty of not-for-profit hospitals to 
provide community benefits in order to maintain their tax exemption.  The law was amended 
in 1995 to clarify definitions of community benefits and charity care (Texas Health and 
Safety Code Section 311.042).  It was again amended in 1997 to reach the current 
configuration2.   
The laws stipulates that not-for-profit hospitals must devise a community benefits 
plan to include a mission statement that identifies the hospital's commitment to the 
community, a community-needs assessment, an identified target population, evaluation and 
community feedback mechanisms and a budget.  Moreover, hospitals must provide 
community benefits according to one of the following standards: (1) charity care and 
government-sponsored indigent health care at a level that is reasonably related to community 
needs as determined by community needs assessment; (2) charity care and government-
sponsored indigent health care in an amount equal to at least 100% of the hospital’s tax-
exempt benefits, excluding federal income tax; or (3) charity care and community benefits 
provided in a combined amount equal to at least 5% of the hospitals’ net patient revenue, 
provided that charity care and government-sponsored indigent health care are provided in an 
amount equal to at least 4% of the net patient revenue (Texas Health and Safety Code Section 
311.044, Section 311.045; Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1997; Community Catalyst, 1999; 
Coalition for nonprofit Health Care, 1999).   
Annual reports of community benefits plans must be filed to the Texas Department of 
Health (TDH) no later than April 30th of each year. The TDH has the authority to assess a 
civil penalty of up to $1000 for each day a hospital does not file its annual community 
benefits plan. More important, the evaluation of compliance in Texas focuses primarily on 
                                                 
2
 Texas Health & Safety Code §311.044 and §311.045. 
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the community benefit expenditure standards.  Hospitals that fail to meet the minimum 
community benefits standard would be reported to the Attorney General who would evaluate 
the causes of noncompliance and may revoke a hospital of its property tax exemption 
privilege (Coalition for Nonprofit health Care, 1999; Community Catalyst, 1999).    
Perusing these two different versions of community benefit laws, the Texas 
prescriptive approach appears more comprehensive in its inclusion of the process elements 
prescribed by the California law, in addition to the specific financial requirements.  The 
California approach focuses on planning and reporting purposes.  Although it alludes to a 
financial aspect of community benefit via unreimbursed and charity care, hospitals are only 
required to assign, to the extent practicable, and report the economic value of community 
benefit provided (California Health and Safety Code Section 127350).   The Texas version 
requires hospitals to devise a community benefit plan without enlisting types of services, as 
the California law does.  Instead, it delineates unambiguously the community benefit 
requirements in fiscal values.  Further, unlike the California law, the Texas version is specific 
and stringent in its noncompliance penalty.  Hospitals have a clear timeline and expectations 
from which to adjust their community benefit behavior.  Based on the design of the state 
community benefit laws, it is reasonable to assume that the Texas prescriptive approach to 
the law would have a larger impact in changing hospitals’ behaviors in term of provision of 
community benefit than the California process approach would.    
 
2.4. Literature on Community Benefit Laws 
For the past decade and a half, many state governments have expressed interest in, 
and some have committed to, regulating hospital provision of community benefit in exchange 
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for their tax exemptions (Moskowitz, 1993; Coalition for Nonprofit Health Care, 1999; 
Hospital Association of Illinois, 2003).  As recently as January 24, 2006, Illinois Attorney 
General proposed the Tax-Exempt Hospital Responsibility Act which requires not-for-profit 
hospitals to provide a minimum percentage of free services in order to maintain their tax-free 
status (Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, 2006).  Despite such persistent and continual 
interest, there is a disconcertingly lack of research on the effectiveness of state community 
benefit laws.  That is not to say that there is a shortage of peer review literature on hospital 
provision of charity or uncompensated care, or even community-oriented services; however, 
rarely do they relate directly to the state community benefit laws.          
After an extensive literature search, four empirical studies are found to investigate 
specifically the impact of community benefit laws.  First, Barnett (2002) from the Public 
Health Institute was commissioned by the California Endowment to conduct a qualitative 
study to assess the status of community benefits in California.  This study surveyed not-for-
profit hospitals in California to document programs and activities that optimized the use of 
charitable resources to address unmet health needs of local communities.  Specifically, 
Barnett (2002) identified exemplary community health initiatives offered by these facilities 
and the challenges they faced in their efforts to meet community health needs.   
The mailed survey received a response rate of approximately 35 percent, representing 
81 out of the 234 not-for-profit hospital facilities in California.  The strengths of the study lay 
in the identification of programs that produced measurable improvements in health status and 
quality of life among hospital target populations and communities. It also pointed out 
institutional policy changes and strategic investments devoted to strengthening hospitals’ 
commitment to community health, in addition to activities that maintain ongoing partnerships 
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with community stakeholders.  Further, it described challenges faced by survey respondents 
including (1) a lack of dedicated staffing and resources; (2) a lack of sub-county data on 
health needs; (3) obstacles to coordination with local public health agencies; (4) competition 
and turf issues among community stakeholders; and (5) a lack of internal policies and 
procedures that encourage quality improvement and foster increased accountability.  These 
insights gave rise to a set of recommendations to encourage not-for-profit hospitals to learn 
from the selected best practice initiatives and to increase coordination between hospitals and 
local public health agencies.  On the broader policy level, this report also called for the need 
to identify a uniform definition and measures for community benefits or charity care and to 
increase public health understanding about community benefit planning and implementation.  
Given the qualitative and documentary nature of the study, it is not appropriate to 
draw any statistical inferences about the impact of the community benefit law from the study 
findings. In addition, the cross-sectional design of the study did not allow for the examination 
of time effect on the status of community benefits in California.  In other words, the 
implementation of community benefit law could only be viewed as one of the many 
contextual factors that influenced hospitals’ commitment to community benefits at one point 
in time.  There was no assessment of the changes in types or amount of health programs and 
activities provided by the respondent hospitals before and after the implementation of the law 
for a systematic evaluation.    
Second, the California HealthCare Foundation issued a series of three policy briefs on 
hospital charity policies and the California health care safety net in 2002 and 2003.  Two out 
of the three policy briefs were related to community benefit laws.  In the first study, Sutton et 
al. (2002) used a survey technique to gather information about the provisional guidelines of 
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California hospital charity care policies in an effort to better identify the beneficiaries of 
these policies.  The study findings indicated that hospitals offer more flexible charity care 
eligibility criteria than most public health programs.  It also re-affirmed hospitals’ potential 
to extend access to charity care for low-income populations through various creative uses of 
care eligibility guidelines.    
In the next study, Sutton et al. (2002) compared charitable contributions reported by 
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals in California in 1998.  The authors cited the community 
benefit law (SB 697) and the continual debate about whether not-for-profit hospitals deserve 
their preferential tax treatment as the impetus behind the scientific inquiry.  They used data 
from the California OSHPD 1998 Annual Financial and Patient Discharge Database to 
examine the number of charity care discharges and total charity care expenditure incurred by 
private acute care hospitals.  Study results showed that expenditures on charity care do not 
differ by hospital ownership status.  However, not-for-profit hospitals tend to incur charity 
care expenditures from costs of providing care to the uninsured rather than from financial 
losses from the Medi-Cal program.  In other words, not-for-profit hospitals shouldered a 
disproportionate amount of financial and care burdens from the under- and uninsured, despite 
a seemingly equitable financial investment in charity care by these two types of hospitals.    
The primary strength of this study series lay in the depth of its inquiry. It sought to 
understand the how well the community benefit law was translated into actual provisional 
guidelines of hospital programs, whether charity care contributions differed by hospital 
ownership and who ultimately benefited from these charity care programs. Study results were 
followed by a set of practical recommendations to encourage further expansion of or better 
access to charity care programs for the needy populations.   
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 In terms of weaknesses, Sutton et al. (2002) relied on a cross-sectional design that 
prevented causal inferences.  In fact, the primary focus of these studies seemed to be on 
documentation, rather than inferences and/or explanation.  Therefore, even though these 
studies alluded to issues raised by the community benefit law, they could not offer insights 
into the actual impact of the legislation.   Further, in the comparison of for-profit and not-for-
profit charity contribution, Sutton et al. (2002) acknowledged that they did not include 
environmental factors in the analysis.  Given that hospitals serve communities with different 
demographic characteristics, the inclusion of environmental variables would be critical in 
controlling for bias in the statistical analysis (Norton and Staiger, 1994).   
In sum, Barnett (2002) and Sutton et al. (2002) offered a snapshot of how hospitals 
fared in terms of their provision of community health programs and activities after the 
implementation of community benefit law in California. The reports were written for policy 
makers and provided scant information about the research design of the studies. However, 
several conclusions seemed clear.  First, both studies were focused on California hospitals 
and their findings might not be generalizable to other states with community benefit laws. 
Second, it was unclear how California hospital fared compared to other states with similar 
legislations or to states without such legislations. Most importantly, the cross-sectional 
design of the studies could not assess whether the community benefit law made a difference 
in hospitals’ commitment to community health needs.    
Third, Sutton and Stensland (2003) used descriptive and multivariate analysis 
methods to examine and compared California private hospitals’ charity care expenditure with 
those of hospitals in Washington State and Texas between 1996 and 1998, as a result of state 
community benefit and charity care laws.  They modeled charity care expenditure as a 
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function of state difference, hospital mission, community need, hospital market and hospital 
financial health.  The results of this study found that, after controlling for hospitals 
characteristics, Texas hospitals were estimated provide over 3 times more charity care and 
Washington hospitals were estimated to provide 66% more charity care than California 
hospitals did.  They also indicated that hospital financial health was not a significant 
predictor of hospital charity care expenditure.  Sutton and Stensland (2003) concluded that 
more prescriptive community benefit or charity care requirements may be necessary to 
ensure that private hospitals assume a larger role in the care of the uninsured.   
The principle strength of this study was that it represented the first research effort to 
explore indirectly the impact of state community benefit and charity care laws longitudinally.  
It also employed a unique theoretical approach to examine hospitals charity care expenditure 
by testing the effect of prior financial performance on hospitals’ current ability to dispense 
free healthcare assistance to the poor.  One of the major weaknesses of the study, as 
mentioned by Sutton and Stensland (2003), was that the analysis only focused on one aspect 
of the broadly defined community benefit concept.  Even though the authors related private 
hospitals’ charity care expenditure to the community benefit and charity care laws, it was 
unclear how the authors made such a direct inference.  There may be other policy or 
organizational causes to hospitals’ charity care expenditure decisions.   
Finally, the most recent study on the subject examined the effect of state community 
benefit laws on hospitals’ community health orientation and their provision of health 
promotion services (Ginn and Moseley, 2006).   Using a multiple regression analysis, this 
study compared hospitals residing in states with community benefit laws with those residing 
in states without the laws in the year 2000 and tested the effect of the laws on hospital 
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behavior by ownership types.  Results indicated that both not-for-profit and for-profit 
hospitals in ten states with community benefit laws/guidelines reported significantly more 
community health orientation activities than their counterpart not-for-profit and for-profit 
hospitals in the forty other states.  Ginn and Moseley (2006) concluded that state community 
benefit laws were effective in compelling not-for-profit hospitals to report more community 
orientation activities through coercive mechanisms.  At the same time, mimetic pressures 
associated with these laws also effectively induced for-profit hospitals to report increased 
similar activities.  
As indicated by the authors, this study was among the first laudable attempts to 
examine directly the effect of state community benefit laws on hospitals behavior.  Its 
research methodology was derived logically from a solid theoretical framework.  However, 
this study took a very general approach to compare hospital reporting of community health 
orientation activities by ownership across fifty states.  It did not account for the complexity 
and content differences seen in the varying state community benefit laws.  Instead, its 
dependent variable of community health orientation activities was limited to just one aspect 
of community benefit broadly defined by the myriad state laws.  Further, the cross-sectional 
design greatly reduced its causal inferential power on the effect of these laws.   
This dissertation study fills the gaps found in these studies by evaluating the 
effectiveness of community benefit laws in two different states using longitudinal data set to 
control for the time trends.  Hospitals in another state without the law are also included as a 
comparison group in the analysis. Further, this study compares provision of community 
benefits by hospital ownership status and takes into account the socio-economic and 
demographic variations in hospitals’ environments. 
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2.5. Scope of This Study  
To investigate the impact of state community benefit laws, there are several key 
concepts that need to be clarified.  First, the notion of hospital ownership, for the purpose of 
this proposed research, is limited to private for-profit and not-for-profit short-term general 
community hospitals.  Public hospitals are not the focus of the study because they operate 
under a very different set of financial incentives as well as social obligations.  Their 
government-supported nature requires that they provide a disproportionate amount of 
community benefits.  Therefore, their patient mix and financial structure are largely different 
from those of private hospitals.  Further, public hospitals have been shielded from the public 
debate about hospitals’ entitlement to tax advantages precisely because of their mandated 
social obligations. This proposed study will focus on hospitals in the private sector only.  
Second, the concept of community benefit is difficult to clearly delineate. As 
described in the previous section, California and Texas community benefit laws define 
community benefit broadly to include four aspects: (1) hospital programs/activities, (2) 
financial contributions and personnel activities, (3) special needs populations, and (4) 
efficiency. Community-oriented wellness and health promotion programs, prevention 
services, adult day care, child care, food, shelter, education, outreach and transportation are 
programs that hospitals can provide to fulfill their community benefit responsibility.  Charity 
care, uncompensated care to the uninsured and underinsured, indigent programs, financial 
and in-kind support of public health programs, as well as personnel devoted to relevant 
community health activities are examples of the financial contributions hospitals make to 
enhance commitment to their communities.  The law also emphasizes hospitals’ role in 
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providing health services to vulnerable populations (Medicaid patients) through previously 
mentioned programmatic and financial means. Finally, cost containment and administrative 
efficiency that enhance health care access are also considered as community benefit.   
The all-encompassing nature of community benefit has created difficulties for 
researchers to operationalize this concept in a uniformly satisfactory manner (Owens, 2005).  
A literature review reveals that the most commonly used estimate of community benefit or 
social good is uncompensated care derived from the sum of charity care and bad debt.  Many 
researchers have pointed out that charity care should not be conflated with bad debt.  
However, the wide range of variation in hospital accounting practices makes it practically 
impossible to differentiate the two measures as an indication of insufficient payment received 
from patients. (Claxton et al., 1997; Clement et al., 1994; Desai et al., 2000; Young et al., 
1997; Thorpe et al., 2000)  In some instances, researchers do not specify the source of 
uncompensated care.  They are simply aggregated as services provided to the uninsured. 
(Norton and Staiger, 1994; Blumenthal et al., 2000)  
 Access to programs or health services aimed to promote community health status is 
reported as another form of community benefits.  These programs or services are often 
unprofitable to the hospitals.  Shortell and colleagues (1986) delineated a cadre of 
nontraditional services including ambulatory care, geriatric care, health promotion, home 
care and outpatient diagnostic services and compared their availability among investor-
owned and not-for-profit hospitals.  Lee et al. (2003, 2004) evaluated hospitals’ community 
orientation by the availability of 17 specific health service programs such as child wellness, 
fitness center, health screening, nutrition program, and social work. This measure of 
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community benefits is extremely difficult to quantify in terms of monetary values.  Instead, 
their cumulative sum usually forms the basis for analysis.  
 Some studies have attempted to capture the breadth of community benefits by 
devising an index representing a combination of myriad potential benefits offered by the 
hospitals.  Clement and colleagues (1994) developed a value of total community benefits 
derived from the sum of uncompensated care, education and research, net income, money-
losing services and price discounts as a percentage of the total assets of the hospital. Several 
assumptions about the hospitals total assets and service price setting practices were made in 
order to standardize this measurement.  Arrington and Haddock, (1990) in their rebuttal of 
the Herzlinger and Krasker’s 1987 study, used a combination of seven specific community 
services and emergency room visits as a proxy for access to compare the level of community 
benefits offered by a hospitals.  In Schlesinger et al. (1997) study of psychiatric hospitals, an 
index of hospital service mix and the level of uncompensated care constitute the dependent 
variables in the comparative analysis.  
 Further, resources devoted to research and education has been measured as a 
potential community benefit because knowledge and skills generated by these programs 
benefit the community at large.  Blumenthal et al. (2000) investigated the changes in the 
commitment to graduate medical education in three teaching hospital conversions.  Hospital 
teaching status or commitment has been used as a community benefit outcome as well (Potter, 
2001).  Research found that hospitals with teaching programs treat a more costly mix of 
patients, maintain larger reserve margins and have larger staff, and offer more extensive 
treatment options than do non-teaching hospitals (Potter, 2001; Thorpe, 1988).  Since these 
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hospitals are typically not reimbursed the full cost of such care, their teaching commitment is 
viewed as a proxy for provision of community services (Potter, 2001).    
Occasionally, there are efforts to quantify social responsibility or quality of care as 
part of the community benefits index.  Phillips (1999) used the median household income 
and number of Medicaid patient days as a percentage of total patient days to depict the level 
of Medicaid and indigent patients that the hospitals serve.  In a managed care study by 
Schlesinger et al. (1996), community benefit was defined as public goods, information 
created and disseminated, and a complex array of quality of care measures.   
 In sum, researchers often choose to highlight a singular aspect of community benefit 
in their studies for the ease of analysis and interpretation of outcomes.  As a result, they 
inevitably sacrifice the conceptual validity and the breadth of the notion of community 
benefit.   Based on the stipulation of the state community benefit laws, it is reasonable to 
assume that policy makers construe community benefit as a broad and multifaceted concept 
that is not limited to one interpretation.  Therefore, this dissertation study seeks to focus on 
and derives key dependent variables from three (programmatic, financial and special 
population) aspects of community benefit.  Due to data limitation and a lack of explicit 
definitions, administrative efficiency cannot be addressed in the study.  By using three 
aspects of community benefit as dependent variables, this dissertation study attempts to 
improve upon past research by eliminating some of the validity threats to the 
operationalization of community benefit. 
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2.6. Significance of This Study 
The access to health services among the under- and uninsured are an important social 
challenge facing this nation. Being key suppliers of health services, hospitals’ ability and 
willingness to participate in charitable activities and community health services contribute 
greatly to alleviate the social and financial burdens of this growing population.  Policy efforts 
by state governments to encourage and/or regulate hospitals’ provision of community benefit 
are commended and they require systematic evaluation to ensure policy efficiency and 
effectiveness.    
Further, the lack of federal enforcement of the tax laws has created opportunities for 
states to experiment with policy innovations to command not-for-profit hospitals’ social 
commitment.  Community benefit laws represent important state policy change that urges 
hospitals to uphold and balance their commitment to the public and the medically needy amid 
conflicting and difficult circumstances.  Though the most recent policy debates on hospital 
community accountability have been fueled by fiscal interests of state, local and federal 
governments, the policy relevance of community benefit laws is so profound that more than 
30 states have pondered and proposed legislative propositions to better define and regulate 
community benefits standards for their not-for-profit hospitals (Buchmueller and Feldstein, 
1996; Moskowitz, 1993). To date, seventeen states have instituted community benefits 
standards and laws with varying scopes and noncompliance penalty measures (Maiuro et al., 
2004; Community Catalyst, 1999 and 2003; Illinois Hospital Association, 2003; Revised 
Code of Washington, 70.170.060; Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, 2006).   At least one 
state, Massachusetts, has also imposed community benefits guidelines for HMOs requiring 
them to contribute a fund to pay for free care (Community Catalyst, 2001). More states are 
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likely to face the decision of whether to continue tax exemption and how better to define 
community benefit standards for not-for-profit hospitals. 
Not-for-profit hospitals, regarded by many as central, civic, and almost sacred 
institutions, are recognized for their long and honorable history of caring for the medically 
indigent through a preferential tax treatment by the government (Scott et al., 2000).  Facing 
intense economic and market pressures, not-for-profit hospitals are struggling to uphold their 
charitable missions and to survive (Unland, 2004; Weissman, 2005; Currie and Fahr, 2004; 
Lee et al., 2004).  Contrary to their laudable reputation, news of not-for-profit hospitals 
overcharging and practicing aggressive collection techniques on the uninsured have saturated 
the press since early 2004 (Fonda, 2004; Majumder, 2004; Moreney et al., 2004; Abelson and 
Glater, 2004).  The resulting pending class-action law suits (Fonda,  2004; Majumder, 2004; 
Moreney et al., 2004; Unland, 2004) and revocation of tax exempt status of Provena 
Covenent Medical Center in Urbana Champaign, Illinois, (Unland, 2004;  Maiuro et al., 2004) 
signaled to hospitals that they shall no longer take their tax privileges for granted.  In the 
meantime, industry experts and policy makers question whether current laws stipulate 
sufficient details on hospitals’ charitable purposes in terms of their definitions and quantity 
(Majumder, 2004).   
Movement towards community benefit regulation is a reality in the health care sector.  
As recent as January 24, 2006, Illinois Attorney General proposed the Tax-Exempt Hospital 
Responsibility Act to tighten the requirements of its original Community Benefits Act 
enacted in 2003 (Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, 2006).  On March 19, 2006, the New 
York Times reported that congressional leaders are concerned that many not-for-profit 
  32 
hospitals are not providing enough charity care to justify their tax-exempt status.  These 
policy makers declared that they will set standards for the industry if it does not do so itself.   
This evaluation of state community benefit laws is timely because state governments 
and hospitals continue to wrestle with the issues of community benefit standard, in relation, 
but not limited, to criteria for tax exemptions (Owens, 2005; Weissman, 2005).  Community 
advocacy groups also welcome these health policy debates as an opportunity to assert their 
influences to enhance hospital-community relationships and better community health 
outcomes (Community Catalyst, 2003).  Sufficient time has passed since the first wave of 
community benefit laws were established to allow for a systematic evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the laws from a longitudinal perspective.  Results of the study not only 
contribute to the understanding of community benefit laws in terms of their impact on 
hospitals behavior, but also inform future policy formation on similar regulations in response 
to the pending lawsuits against not-for-profit hospitals.     
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
This dissertation research aims to examine three central questions: (1) how has not-
for-profit hospitals’ provision of and financial expenditure on community-oriented health 
services changed as a result of state community benefit laws; (2) whether not-for-profit 
hospital compliance to community benefit laws is contingent upon their organizational 
characteristics (e.g. size, managed care contracts, membership in health systems and 
networks) and the level of market competition; (3) whether there are spill-over effects in the 
provision of and financial expenditure on community benefit by for-profit hospitals as a 
result of sate community benefit laws.    
 
3.1. Conceptual Framework 
Drawing on the open systems perspective (Scott, 2000), hospital provision of 
community benefits is conceptualized to be the direct result of environmental constraints 
imposed by state community benefit laws and hospitals’ response to these pressures.  More 
specifically, the conceptual framework for this study is derived from the institutional and 
resource dependence theories.  Combined, these two theories adopt an open systems 
perspective where organizations are not only influenced by, but also dependent upon 
interchanges with the environment in order to maintain their viability (Buckley, 1967; Pfeffer, 
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1982; Scott, 1998).  They also explain hospital response to the state regulation in terms of 
resource accessibility while accounting for the unique historical values and characteristics of 
hospitals in the US society.     
Other factors that may influence hospital behavior include economic, socio-
demographic, and political factors as well as hospital attributes (Figure 3.1).  Past literature 
suggested that market competition, hospital location and presence of public hospitals within a 
market area were highly associated with hospital provision of nontraditional and community 
oriented programs (Shortell et al., 1986; Sanders, 1993; Norton and Staiger, 1994; Olden and 
Clement, 2000; Lee et al., 2003).  Socio-demographic factors express community needs and 
therefore potential demands for hospital services (Reinhardt, 2003).  Hospital attributes, such 
as size, ownership and location, influence hospitals’ financial and administrative capacity to 
provide services (Olden and Clement, 2000; Potter, 2000).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Conceptual Framework for the Impact of Community Benefit Laws on Hospital 
Provision of Community Benefits 
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3.2. Institutional Theory 
Hospitals, particularly not-for-profit hospitals, possess a unique social standing as 
charitable organizations in the United States.  To understand the inception and impact of state 
community benefit laws on hospital behaviors, it is imperative that one first understands the 
symbolic values of hospitals, and the social context or institutional environment in which 
hospitals reside.  Institutional theory, with its great emphasis on the taken-for-granted 
character of social realities, provides valuable insights into the historical and political 
processes by which hospital behaviors are shaped.     
According to the institutional theory, organizations are different from institutions.  As 
an organization is often thought of as a physical entity, an institution is seen as a shared 
system of socially constructed norms and values that governs and provides guidance for 
relations of individuals to each other (Parsons, [1934] 1990: 326 (p.15 Scott, 2001); Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967 (p.17, Scott, 2001)).  The process by which organizations become 
infused with these shared values is called institutionalization (Selznick, 1957; Scott, 2001).  
Berger and Luckmann (1967) characterized three phases of institutionalization as 
externalization, objectification, and internalization.  Externalization describes the process 
where people and/or organizations create, from their social interactions, a set of symbolic 
rules or structures whose meanings come to be shared by participants.  As more people and 
organizations come to recognize these rules and structures, these symbolic structures become 
objectified as a reality readily experienced by others.  Finally, the perpetuation of these rules 
and structures back into the social consciousness completes the internalization process.  Once 
an organization is institutionalized, it embodies a distinct identity with a particular set of 
values developed from its unique history, organizational mission and purpose as well as 
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employee influence.   Maintenance of these institutions is no longer a perfunctory mechanical 
matter, but a struggle to preserve a set of unique values (Scott, 2001).  
To illustrate this process, hospitals began as organizations with religious affiliations 
extending mercy to the society and imparting appropriate morals onto the sinful social 
deviants (Rosenberg 1987).  As a result, in the first modern federal tax law of 1894 that later 
evolved into the Income Tax Act of 1913, voluntary or not-for-profit hospitals were granted 
exemptions based on their charitable, religious or educational purposes (Marmor et al. 1987; 
Mancino 2001).  Throughout the years, not-for-profit hospitals then used their community 
image to mobilize resources and sustain donations and fees.  The symbolic images of 
morality and altruism became hospitals’ institutional identities that left a lasting impression 
in the American conscience and set the tone for future health policy making.     
Fundamental to the conception of institution are the qualities of durability and duality 
(p.49 and 50, Scott, 2001).  Because institutions are made up of symbolic elements, social 
activities and material resources, these ideas and practices are passed down from generation 
to generation.  Giddens (1984) called them the “enduring features of social life”, resistant to 
change.  In this sense, institutions impose restraints and restrictions on activities and 
behaviors by defining legitimacy, stability and order.  This is not to say that institutions do 
not undergo changes themselves.  In fact, institutions are susceptible to changes, both 
incremental and revolutionary.  The duality of institutions refers to their properties as an 
existing social order but also as a process, institutionalization or deinstitutionalization.  Scott 
(2001) further attributes these properties to three building blocks of institutional structures.   
He posits that institutions are consisted of and shaped by cultural-cognitive, normative, and 
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regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior 
(Scott, 1995; Scott, 1998).   
First, the cultural-cognitive structures refer to socially and culturally constructed 
belief and rule systems that provide frameworks from which institutions are created and 
organized (Scott, 1998).  Within this paradigm, an individual or organization’s behavior is 
perceived as the direct result of their interpretations of external stimuli.  Culture, the 
symbolic external environment, provides the contextual framework for a person’s internal 
interpretive processes.  As a result, common meanings arise from personal interactions and 
are maintained and transformed to make sense of happenings.  Eventually, individual and 
organizational compliance occurs because routines are established and taken for granted 
(Scott, 2001).  Meyer and Rowan (1977) further argued that widely held beliefs can be 
perceived as true and necessary to accomplish a given end.  In sum, the cultural-cognitive 
conception of institutions emphasizes the critical role played by the socially mediated 
construction of a common framework of meaning (Scott, 2001).   
Second, norms and values that define the moral framework for individual and 
organizational conducts are referred to as the normative structures of institutions.  More 
specifically, values define preferences and norms specify how things should be done.  
Combined, they forge standards to which behaviors are compared and define legitimate 
means to pursue valued ends.  This normative paradigm introduces a prescriptive, evaluative 
and obligatory dimension into social life (Scott, 2001).  As such, it dictates social roles, 
rights and responsibilities as well as expectations by imposing constraints on social behaviors, 
or by empowering and enabling social actions (Scott, 1998).  In general, the normative 
conception of institutions highlights the stabilizing influence of social beliefs and norms.   
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Finally, rules and codes are the basis for the regulative structures imposed on 
organizations.  From this perspective, institutions can be viewed as a stable system of rules.  
Commonly used regulatory processes include rule-setting, monitoring and sanctioning 
activities to influence organizational behaviors.  These formal or informal regulatory 
mechanisms can come from external sources as the nation-state, or internal governance 
systems.  Institutional stability is often achieved through coercion as individuals and 
organizations comply with these rules out of force, fear or expediency (Scott, 2001).  In the 
application of this regulative perspective, North (1990) argues that an essential function of an 
organization reflects balancing the cost of ascertaining violations from the rules and the 
severity of punishment within its institutional environment.  Overall, the regulative 
dimension of institutions focuses on the systems of formal and informal rules and their 
subsequent surveillance and sanctioning power on organizations (Scott, 2001).  
Central to institutional theory is the notion of legitimacy.  For an organization to 
survive in an institutional environment, it requires social acceptability and credibility.  In 
other words, it must possess legitimacy.  The organization needs to be deemed desirable, 
proper or appropriate within the accepted social system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions (Suchman, 1995).  This could mean that the organization is established legally 
and acting in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.  Sometimes, professional 
certification or accreditation confers legitimacy.  An organization can be compelled to fulfill 
social and moral obligations beyond the requirements of the law.  Moreover, legitimacy can 
be derived from the cultural context where an organization’s functions and existence align 
with contemporary cultural values and are somehow taken-for-granted.   
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Institutional theorists have long explored processes by which organizations obtain 
legitimacy.  Meyer and Rowan (1977) posited that organizations that succeed in conforming 
to the institutional environment gain the legitimacy and resources for survival.  Later, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) focused on the importance of social fitness and introduced the 
notion of isomorphism as three specific mechanisms organizations undertake to become 
more similar to each other within an organizational field to gain legitimacy.  They are 
coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism.   
Coercive isomorphism, relating to the regulative conception of institutions, results 
from formal or informal external pressures exerted by other organizations or cultural 
expectations upon which the focal organization is dependent (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
While legal mandates are a common source of coercive authority, subtle forces affect 
organizational behavior as well.  As a result, the focal organization is compelled to adopt 
new structures or procedures in order to maintain a viable relationship with the pressure 
sources.  For example, car manufacturers may adopt new pollution control technologies to 
conform to environmental regulations.  A growing company may feel pressure to formalize 
their accounting practices, performance evaluations and human resources policies in order to 
appear more official in their business transactions with large corporations.   
Under the cognitive-cultural conception of institutions, mimetic isomorphism is a 
common strategy to achieve legitimacy in times of uncertainty (Scott, 2001; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  Contrary to the process of coercive isomorphism, organizations may change 
their behaviors voluntarily, without the presence of an overt pressure source.  When an 
organization temporarily loses sight of their organizational goals or when it struggles to 
understand its environment, it may elect to model after another organization that seems 
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similar in its goals and functions yet more legitimate and successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983).  In the social services field, best practice models are often collected and disseminated 
by philanthropic foundations among their grantees in an attempt to provide better services 
and achieve better health status for a large and diverse population.   
Normative isomorphism describes mechanisms of change under the normative pillar 
of institutions.  Practically, it stems primarily from professionalization.   As members of an 
occupation are defined as a profession, they can be perceived as a collective striving for 
stability and legitimacy for their work and livelihood.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) asserted 
that the professional socialization people experience in universities and other educational or 
training sites contributes greatly to the development and establishment of norms among 
professionals and their staff.  Further, professional and trade associations represent another 
vehicle propagating normative rules about organizational and professional behavior.  This 
type of information exchange among professionals has many benefits to organizations.  For 
example, an organization can obtain and bring back information about industry trends and 
common business practices from professional meetings.  By following these trends and 
common practices, the organization’s legitimacy may increase. 
 According to institutional theory, organizations are viewed more as passive players 
responding to institutional pressures and expectations.  This theoretical framework 
emphasizes the over-powering force of the institutional environment on organizations by 
focusing on the taken-for-granted character of the socially constructed rules, myths, and 
beliefs and on the processes by which organizations are influenced and become instilled with 
values and meanings (Oliver, 1991).  Organizations are thought to respond to environmental 
pressures only by conforming their structural and procedural characteristics in order to obtain 
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and sustain stability and legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Given its deterministic 
predisposition, the institutional theory has been criticized for its lack of attention to the role 
of organizational self-interest (Oliver, 1991).    
 
3.3. Resource Dependence Theory 
Complementing the institutional theory, resource dependence theory highlights 
organization’s adaptability in responding to the external environment.  Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) put it simply that “[what] happens in an organization is not only a function of the 
organization, its structure, its leadership, its procedures, or its goals. What happens is also a 
consequence of the environment and the particular contingencies and constraints deriving 
from that environment.”  Resource dependence theory contrasts and complements 
institutional theory in stressing organizations’ proactive negotiations with environmental 
constraints in order to achieve optimal autonomy and viability (Pfeffer, 1982).        
According to resource dependence theory, environments are collective and 
interconnected.  Organizations must be responsive to external demands and expectations in 
order to survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991).  Moreover, organizations exist 
and survive to the extent that they can manage their resources effectively (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978).   Given that organizations are embedded in an environment comprised of 
many other organizations, they must interact and maintain relationships with a variety of 
resource suppliers, often with conflicting interests.  According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
three factors determine the dependence of one organization on another.  One, where the 
organization can function with a certain resource and what proportion of the total inputs or 
outputs is accounted by this resource?  Two, how much discretion does a resource supplier 
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have over resource allocation and use?  Three, can the focal organization access the same 
resources from multiple suppliers?   
To achieve stable and low cost resource relations with their environment, resource 
dependence theorists argue that organizations must account for these dependency issues and 
actively and effectively exercise power and control in negotiating interdependencies with 
external organizations (Oliver, 1991).  As such, organizations may alter their structures and 
behaviors to attend to or negotiate with external demands to achieve optimal degree of 
freedom from environmental demands (Pfeffer, 1982; Ulrich and Barney, 1984).  They may 
also manipulate external dependencies or exert power over the allocation of critical resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Oliver, 1991).    
Compared to institutional theory, resource dependence theory assumes that 
organizations have a certain level of power and influence over their environment.  While 
facing external pressures, institutional theory emphasizes the advantage of conformity.  
Resource dependence theory, in contrast, focuses on the organizational necessity to adapt to 
environmental uncertainty.  Active management and control over resource flow is the 
primary strategy to achieve organizational stability, legitimacy and survival.    
Combining the strengths of both institutional and resource dependence theories, 
Oliver (1991) proposed a typology of organizational strategic responses to institutional 
processes.  This hybrid theory attempts to refine the institutional perspective to accommodate 
organizations’ self-interest seeking behaviors within the institutional environment.  It posits 
that organizations’ response to institutional pressures may in fact range from passive 
acquiescence to proactive manipulation of their circumstances depending on the nature and 
context of the institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991).   
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According to Oliver (1991), the first level of organizational strategic response to 
institutional processes is acquiescence.  It describes an organization’s common and passive 
acceding position to external pressures, as emphasized by institutional theory.  At the most 
passive level, organizations may unconsciously or blindly succumb to institutional pressures 
by repeating history or reproducing actions out of habit or taken-for-granted rules (Scott, 
1998).  This occurs most often when the institutional force is so strong that it has established 
itself as a social fact.  On the next level, organizations may consciously or unconsciously 
imitate a more successful business model or accept advice from professional organizations 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  They may also choose to comply with external pressures in 
anticipation of specific benefits.  Although the degree of awareness of institutional pressures 
is the key distinction between these three forms of acceding behaviors, the action of 
compliance encompasses all three of the isomorphic mechanisms described by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983).  Oliver (1991) further asserts that the cause, constituent, content, control and 
context of the institutional processes can all influence organizational response to these 
pressures.  In the case of acquiescence, Oliver (1991) predicts that when organizations 
anticipate a gain in economic benefits or social legitimacy, they are more likely to conform to 
or comply with institutional pressures.  Moreover, when an organization’s dependence on the 
source of the external pressures is high, it is more likely to give in to its demands.  Other 
conditions that help contribute to an acceding response include a fairly uniform constituent 
expectation, a consistent institutional norms and requirements with organizational goal, a 
high degree of legal coercion.  
A step above acquiescence is organizations’ attempt to balance, pacify and bargain 
with external constituents.  Oliver (1991) generalizes these actions as compromises.  From a 
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strategic perspective, organization may strive to accommodate internal and external demands 
from multiple stakeholders (Rowan, 1982).  They may also choose to conform to the 
minimum requirements imposed by the demand source (Scott, 1983).  They may even 
negotiate, via professional associations or unions, with external sources to reduce the 
stringency of requests (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Compromise is the most probable 
strategic choice of action when there is a high multiplicity of interests among and a high 
dependency on constituents, along with a high level of uncertain in the institutional 
environment.   
   Avoidance is viewed as a rather proactive strategic response to institutional 
processes, according to Oliver (1991).  Organizations’ attempt to preclude the necessity of 
conformity by concealing their nonconformity, buffering themselves from institutional 
pressures, or escaping from institutional rules and expectations are all examples of all part of 
the avoidance tactics.  Organizations are likely to use the avoidance technique when there is a 
perceived low degree of social legitimacy and efficiency attainable from conformity.  A high 
level of conflicting constituent expectations, constraint on organizational resources and 
environmental uncertainty also contribute to an avoidance tendency (Oliver, 1991).   
 Defiance benchmarks the proactive part of the organizational strategic response 
continuum.  Organizations may choose to dismiss, challenge or attack institutional pressures 
and expectations.  Dismissal is the ignoring of institutional rules.  Oliver (1991) asserted that 
the temptation to ignore authority is exacerbated with a deficient understanding of the 
rationale behind institutional pressures and consequences of noncompliance.  To go the 
offensive and contest accepted rules and expectations is considered an act of challenge.  
Often, organizations with a strong vision and their own insular view are more likely to 
  45 
challenge or contest the rationalized norms and rules of the institutional environment.  Attack 
is the most intense and aggressive of the defiance acts.  That is, organizations deliberately 
assault, belittle, or denounce institutionalized values.  This is most likely to occur when the 
organization itself feel discredited or threatened in their rights and autonomy.   
 Manipulation is the most active strategic response organizations take to try to 
change or exert power over the institutional environment.  This is defined as purposeful 
attempt to co-opt, influence or control institutional pressures and evaluations (Oliver, 1991).  
In response to institutional pressures, organizations may attempt to forge ties with other 
organizations or the source of institutional pressures to bolster their acceptability and 
legitimacy (Benson, 1975; DiMaggio, 1983).  They may also go so far as to lobby public 
agencies to change the institutional rules.  When the institutional expectations are localized 
and weakly promoted, organizations may even exert power to shape or neutralize the 
pressure sources (Oliver, 1991).   
Oliver’s typology of organizational strategic responses to institutional processes 
provides a more well-rounded and balanced perspective than institutional or resource 
dependence theory alone can offer.  Focused on the force of environment, institutional theory 
has been criticized for its lack of attention to the role of organizational active agency in 
responses to social pressures and expectations (Oliver, 1991).  Resource dependence theory 
alone maps the versatility of organizational agency, but neglects the power of history and 
social consciousness.  In contrast, Oliver’s hybrid theory capitalizes on the strengths of both 
theories and captures the power of and tension between institutional norms and 
organizational self-interests.  In the application of hospital responses to state community 
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benefit laws, this typology accounts for the unique historical and institutional environment 
from which hospitals developed and the contemporary fiscal struggles they face.      
 
3.4. Theoretical Applications and Research Hypotheses 
In the health care industry, the institutionalization process for hospitals evolved over 
a period of 300 years.  In the early 1800s, hospitals were first established under the 
sponsorship of religious entities to dispense free medical care for the indigent population 
with the financial support of their wealthy patrons (Rosenberg, 1987; Stevens, 1989).  Later 
in the 18th and 19th centuries, the first voluntary hospitals were established and developed 
with the help of local philanthropists and religious leaders, who actively transformed 
hospitals—their charity projects—into practicing laboratories for physicians (Stevens, 1989).  
By the end of the Civil War, most of the US hospitals were private not-for-profit and nearly 
half of them were associated with a religious institution.  
Throughout much of the 20th century, not-for-profit hospitals remained the standard 
and preferred organizational form in the hospital sector.  They relied and capitalized on 
federal and state tax subsidies, private donations and, in some cases, religious affiliations to 
aid their steady expansion and growth.  Physicians preferred the not-for-profit organizational 
form as a means to minimize the threat of corporate control on their professional authority 
(Marmor et al., 1987).  At the height of consumerism, physicians, hospitals and medical 
associations joined forces to encourage client trusts and elevated their own professional 
status above the commercial ends of for-profit entities.  Not-for-profit hospitals, in turn, 
capitalized on and infused their identities with the American ideals of democracy, 
voluntarism and charity.  As these ideologies were internalized by the social consciousness, 
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not-for-profit hospitals were able to rely on this socially constructed mythical image to 
mobilize resources for survival (Stevens, 1989).   
Complementing this institutionalization process is the history of US tax policy 
development.   In the first modern federal tax law of 1894 that later evolved into the Income 
Tax Act of 1913, not-for-profit hospitals were granted exemptions based on their charitable, 
religious or educational purposes (Marmor et al., 1987; Mancino, 2001). Throughout the US 
history, the favoritism of government agencies and courts towards tax subsidies for indigent 
care, the absolution from tort liability, the increased community commitment to local 
hospitals, and the promotion of hospitals’ voluntary images by medical professions all 
constituted a positive reinforcing mechanism that secured the tax exemption status of not-for-
profit hospitals.  In fact, the values of US society aligned with and supported the professed 
voluntary and charitable characteristics of hospitals so well that these organizations were 
later named community hospitals (Montoya and Meyer 1998).  As a result, the altruistic 
mission of not-for-profit hospitals towards the medically indigent has become a myth - a 
widely held public opinion legitimated by history and rationalized by contemporary tax 
policies.   
 
3.4.1. Effect of Community Benefit Laws on Not-for-Profit Hospitals  
In the context of contemporary health care industry, the institutionalized not-for-
profit hospitals have experienced great constraints in their roles, operations and reactions to 
the environment.  As an institution that was created as a symbolic commitment to preserve 
the value of social benevolence and charity towards the medically needy, not-for-profit 
hospitals are expected to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of the indigent.  
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Despite efforts to keep pace with the industry care quality and technological demands, not-
for-profit hospitals’ social legitimacy is largely derived from the fulfillment of their 
charitable role.  It is as if this taken-for-granted social expectation has imposed an additional 
weight on not-for-profit hospitals’ responsibilities.    
Internally, not-for-profit hospitals may have deemed provision of community benefit 
and charity care as their social obligation without the enforcement of laws.  Though not the 
most powerful motivator, such internalized norm can dictate not-for-profit hospitals’ 
organizational goals, rules and conventions.  In an economically competitive environment, 
not-for-profit hospitals may willingly sacrifice scarce resources to render indigent care in 
order to do the right thing while their for-profit counters reap financial gain from paying 
patients.  Compliance may reduce the chance that not-for-profit hospitals’ vulnerability to 
negative assessment of their conduct or services.  
Looking at their resource environment, not-for-profit hospitals depend heavily on 
federal, state and local government funding and subsidies to sustain their capital updates and 
constructions, services for the vulnerable population, as well as educational and research 
functions.  They interact with the Internal Revenue Services to ensure the validity of their 
501(c)3 status which allows them access to no-interest bonds for service expansion and 
capital construction, tax-deductible philanthropic donations, and federal, state and local tax 
exemptions (Montoya and Meyer 1998; Mancino 2001).  The community at large forms a 
formidable source of support to not-for-profit hospitals as well.  Public opinions affect their 
donor pool, donation income and volunteer resources.   
Between 1990 and 2002, several important policy changes have altered the landscape 
of the uninsured population and the Medicaid program.  First, Medicaid expenditures 
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exploded between 1988 and 1992 as a result of enrollment growth attributable to economic 
recession, a number of federal eligibility mandates and the growth of disproportionate-share 
hospital payments3 (Holahan et al., 1998; Coughlin and Liska, 1997; Coughlin et al., 2004).  
States began seeking out ways to use managed care as a tool to control Medicaid program 
costs (Holahan et al., 1998).  Still looking to reduce the cost of Medicaid programs, Congress 
enacted the welfare reform law that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and de-linked Medicaid 
from the welfare programs (Kronebusch, 2001).  The new block grant TANF program 
resulted in a drastic decrease in the Medicaid enrollment of low-income children 
(Kronebusch, 2001).  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA of 1997) then introduced the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to again expand insurance coverage to 
low-income children (Ullman et al., 1998).  All of these political maneuvering to shift costs 
of the medically vulnerable has left the health care industry in a permanent state of transition.  
Hospitals must constantly keep pace with these policy changes and adjust their service 
delivery and program configurations accordingly.   
 In the meantime, governmental budgetary cut-backs raised real concerns about the 
scarcity of present and future resources, resulting in scrutiny in hospital charitable activities 
and the establishment of state community benefit laws.  The regulations that challenge 
hospital ownership status pose a real and significant threat to not-for-profit hospitals’ 
operational strategies and survival.  Most importantly, not-for-profit hospitals must juggle to 
                                                 
3
 Congress established the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program in the early 1980s to 
provide financial relief to hospitals with high Medicaid or low-income inpatients.  States had much freedom in 
deciding which hospitals quality for DSH payments and in setting payment levels for those hospitals. In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, states began using creative means to induce larger federal matching funds. The DSH 
financing mechanism became a highly contentious issue between the state and the federal government, and 
Congress enacted legislation on several occasions to restrict its use by states (Coughlin et al., 2004).  
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meet the demands of their funders within the charitable regulatory parameters while 
competing with for-profit hospitals to achieve financial solvency and provide the best quality, 
most accessible services to patients.           
Facing the enactment of state community benefit laws, not-for-profit hospitals could 
respond in different ways.  From a regulative perspective, community benefit laws are a 
formal rule levied by state government to regulate not-for-profit hospital provision of 
community benefit.  Social expectations of community accountability on the part of not-for-
profit hospitals also assert direct pressures on these hospitals to comply with the regulatory 
measures and provide tangible community-oriented services.  Given that these demands 
coincide with the social ethos of charity, not-for-profit hospitals may perceive the benefit of 
an elevated degree of social legitimacy upon compliance.  Further, for not-for-profit hospitals 
that already considered provision of community benefit and charity care as an appropriate 
norm, this new legislation merely re-affirms their beliefs.  Using Oliver’s (1991) schema, 
there appeared substantial consistency between the institutional demands and organizational 
goals.     
In terms of constituent multiplicity, the federal, state and local governments have long 
encouraged not-for-profit hospitals to provide community benefit and charity care through 
other laws and regulations.  For example, as early as in 1946, the Hill-Burton Act was 
designed to subsidize the much-needed expansion and construction of not-for-profit and 
public heath care facilities.  The program purposely required grantees to provide a specified 
amount of charity care and allocated more funding to poorer states (Sloan et al., 1986; 
Stevens, 1989; Gamm, 1996), expressing a distinct interest in not-for-profit hospitals’ 
participation in social purposes.   As a result, the program also bolstered public expectation 
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and demand for community accountability on the part of not-for-profit hospitals.  To date, the 
public enthusiasm about not-for-profit hospitals’ fulfillment of their social obligations of 
caring for the indigent never wavered.  Community groups continue to question the basis for 
the tax-exempt status of hospitals, arguing that hospitals that fail to play a significant role in 
improving community health should not receive tax exemptions and other support (Proenca 
et al., 2000; Russel, 1995; Sigmond and Seay, 1994; Hasan 1996).  As such, there seems a 
minimum degree of conflict in terms of constituent interest and expectations when it comes 
to the social goals of state community benefit laws.   
Finally, the enactment of state community benefit laws imposes a strong coercion on 
not-for-profit hospital behavior.  The regulations were not devised simply as a practice 
guideline for not-for-profit hospitals.  They were established as laws and in some cases with 
non-compliance penalties.  Given these reasons, not-for-profit hospitals are expected to take 
an acceding position, according to Oliver’s (1991) typology, towards state community 
benefit laws.  They would likely gear up their provision of community benefit according to 
the specifications of state community benefit laws in order to retain their ownership status 
and the subsequent financial and non-financial benefits.   
Hypothesis Ia:   There would be an increase in not-for-profit hospitals’ provision of 
community benefit activities (in terms of community-oriented 
programs, financial expenditures and special population served) after 
the implementation of state community benefit laws. 
 
Douglass North (1990) stressed the power of regulatory rules and enforcement 
mechanisms imposed by nation-state.  He asserted that an essential part of the functioning of 
institutions is the costliness of ascertaining violations and the severity of punishment.  Base 
on this argument, not-for-profit hospitals’ compliance to state community benefit laws may 
also depend on the severity of noncompliance penalty prescribed by the laws.  Therefore, it is 
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postulated that Texas not-for-profit hospitals will be more compliant with their state 
community benefit law which clearly delineates non-compliance penalties.   
Hypothesis Ib:   The increase in not-for-profit hospitals’ provision of community 
benefits activities (in terms of programs, financial expenditures, and 
special population served) will be greater in Texas than that in 
California as a result of the implementation of community benefit 
laws. 
 
 
3.4.2. The Contingency Factors    
In the 2002 hospital charity policy study, Sutton et al. described challenges faced by 
hospital survey respondents to encompass (1) a lack of dedicated staffing and resources; (2) a 
lack of sub-county data on health needs; (3) obstacles to coordination with local public health 
agencies; (4) competition and turf issues among community stakeholders; and (5) a lack of 
internal policies and procedures that encourage quality improvement and foster increased 
accountability.  These insights suggest that hospital operation and service provision decisions 
are made in accordance to its interpretation of external pressures and internal assets (Davis, 
1991; Galaskiewicz, 1991; Scott, 1995; Proenca, 2000). While it is difficult to examine all 
the factors mentioned by Sutton et al. (2002), the second set of research questions aims to 
explore structural and environmental factors that may potentially facilitate and/or hinder 
hospital compliance with community benefit laws.  Specifically, the analysis focuses on 
exploring the influence of hospital resources (size, managed care and network status) as well 
as market competition on hospital behavior.   
Many sociological and economic theories predict organizational behaviors. Some 
suggest that hospitals trade off margins or profits against the costs of providing social goods 
(Frank and Salkever, 1991; Gruber, 1994; Norton and Staiger, 1994; Banks, Paterson, and 
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Wendel, 1997; Gaskin, 1997; Thorpe et al., 2000).  Scott (1995) argues that other than 
economic incentives, hospital response to external pressures, such as state imposed 
regulations, may differ according to their position in the organizational network, their 
organizational goals and interests and their perception of the type and intensity of the 
pressures (David, 1991, Galaskiewicz, 1991; Proenca, 2000).  Complexity, uncertainty, 
fragmentation and conflict in the constantly changing health care industry climate are also 
likely to cause variation in organizational response (Goodrink and Salancik, 1996; Proenca et 
al., 2000).  Under these circumstances, hospitals’ abilities and willingness to comply with 
state community benefit laws may depend on not only their self-interest, but also their 
assessment of internal attributes, and the extent of their active participation in balancing, 
placating and/or shaping these environmental pressures (Oliver, 1991).   
First, size may be an important contingency factor in hospitals’ strategic response to 
state regulations.  Large firms attract greater attention from the state, the media and various 
interest groups (Meyer, 1979; Powell, 1991).  Increased visibility represents a form of power 
but also makes organizations vulnerable to public scrutiny (Pfeffer and Salancic, 1978; 
Proenca et al., 2000).  Therefore, conformity to external pressure becomes a strategic 
response of choice for large not-for-profit hospitals to ensure legitimacy.  Further, large 
hospitals are associated with having more financial and human resources that are required to 
facilitate hospitals’ abilities to comply with the law and to optimize the effect of the state 
interventions.  Access to financial resources may be key conditions that allow hospitals to 
accept the new guidelines to the law without having to compromise too much of their 
original goals or existing activities.   
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Hypothesis IIa:  Compared with smaller hospitals, larger hospitals will respond more 
positively to the community benefit laws in their provision of 
community benefits.   
 
Managed care organizations represent a key constituency in the health care industry. 
They impose strict expectations of effective and efficient service delivery to their enrolled 
populations by contracted hospitals (Proenca et al., 2000).  In the interest of depressing cost 
and maximizing profit, their goal is to maintain a generally healthy status among all of their 
enrollees.   As a result, managed care organizations prefer and promote access to preventive 
care among its enrollees rather than dispensing high-cost curative procedures to individuals.   
Sigmond (1994) and Proenca (2000) found that having a managed care affiliation is 
positively related to hospitals’ professed community orientation.  In this case, not-for-profit 
hospitals that are dependent on managed care are likely to respond to state community 
benefit laws by developing their community-orientation capacities to comply with the laws.    
However, managed care organizations also practice strict financial controls over 
contracted hospitals through their utilization review and capitation systems.  Their service 
contracts focus on cost saving and impose more stringent financial restraints on hospitals 
(Campbell and Alexander, 2005).  For example, as states convert their Medicaid program to 
the managed care model, they use various approaches to determine capitation rates for 
payment.  Often, these rates are set based on fee-for-services costs adjusting for the 5-10 
percent expectant savings for managed care.  Risk adjustment methods based on utilization 
management data, then, are used to prevent serious over- or underpayment (Holalan et al., 
1998).     
 Studies have found that the cost-savings objectives of managed care programs often 
outweigh their goals to improve access to care (Holalan et al, 1998).  Therefore, participation 
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in managed care contracts is expected to impede not-for-profit hospitals’ abilities to comply 
with the laws.  In fact, the notion of free care, though it serves to maintain public health, is 
counter intuitive to managed care organizations’ profit orientation.  Even if hospitals and 
managed care organizations possess the long-term vision of a healthy and low-cost 
community, the immediate potential fiscal loss may prevent hospitals affiliated with managed 
care from committing to community benefits standards.    
Hypothesis IIb:  Hospitals with managed care contracts will respond more negatively 
to community benefit laws in their provision of community benefits. 
 
 
Organizational conformity, in part, depends on the level of interconnectedness among 
institutional organizations (Oliver, 1991).  When organizations have closer ties with other 
organizations, they share information, values and practices more readily.  Network structures 
also serve as a vehicle for technological and administrative innovations diffusion (Westphal 
et al., 1997).  Further, they provide a convenient setting for mimetic and normative 
isomorphic processes because institutional pressures seem more consistent and spread more 
rapidly (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Proenca, 2000).  Therefore, not-for-profit hospitals that 
belong to systems and alliances have greater exposure to institutional expectations and norms.  
They are also more likely to recognize the potential social benefits of state community 
benefit laws.  At the same time, they may exchange best practices and community linkages to 
facilitate implementation of community health promotion activities and programs.   
Hypothesis IIc: Compared to freestanding hospitals, those that belong to networks, 
systems, or alliances will respond more positively to community 
benefit laws in providing community benefits.  
 
 
Market competition is an external contingency factor that may attenuate the effects of 
state community benefit laws.  On the one hand, it may intensify hospitals’ need to maintain 
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or heighten their good will image to retain and recruit customers.  On the other hand, it may 
reduce hospitals’ financial ability provide non-profitable services.  In this complex blend of 
public private health care system, not-for-profit hospitals are subject to different types of 
competition for survival.  In a market where more hospitals compete for the same paying 
population, maintaining their reputation as a legitimate social service provider is very 
important.  In fact, Shortell and colleagues (1986) found that systems hospitals offer more 
services when competition is high than when it is low.  Moreover, not-for-profit hospitals 
offer more alternative services under highly competitive conditions.  This evidence suggests 
that not only do hospitals compete for financial viability, their social validity hinges on their 
abilities to contribute to public welfare.  Further, competition cultivates the impression of 
uncertainty in a market place.  Illusions of market instability, in turn, also facilitate 
conformity (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1995; Shortell et al., 1986).  Therefore, this study postulates 
that competition would improve not-for-profit hospitals’ compliance with state community 
benefit laws.     
Hypothesis IId:  Hospitals locating in counties with greater market competition will 
respond more positively to community benefit laws in their provision 
of community benefits.  
 
 
3.4.3.  Spill-Over Effects of Not-for-Profit on For-Profit Hospital Behavior 
The third and last set of research questions investigates the spill-over effect of state 
community benefit laws on for-profit hospitals’ community benefit activities.  Even though 
for-profit hospitals are not the intended subject of state community benefit laws, their service 
configurations may be affected indirectly by the new policy for several reasons.  First, for-
profit hospitals share a competitive market and service niche with not-for-profit hospitals.  
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They experience the same environmental pressures from the rapid expansion of managed 
care and prolonged economic recession in the early and mid-1990s, as well as the rampant 
growth of the uninsured and under-insured populations (Weissman et al., 2003).  It is around 
this time that the public’s demand for community accountability among hospitals has raised 
expectations with regard to hospitals’ fulfillment of their social roles (Clement et al., 2002).   
From a consumer’s perspective, the ownership differences within the private health 
care sector are often subtle and blurred.  In other words, people may associate a hospitals’ 
quality with its name and reputation, but they do not always know the hospitals’ ownership 
status.  In this case, for-profit hospitals are exposed to the same kind of institutional 
environment and cultural-cognitive standards to which for-profit hospitals are exposed.  That 
is to say, as not-for-profit hospitals derive their social legitimacy from their charitable 
functions and their trustworthy characteristics, for-profit hospitals are judged by the same 
criteria by the public despite legal differences.  In an empirical study, Gray (1991) posits that 
for-profit hospitals, also, recognize that they could lose business if they fail to meet 
community expectations regarding provision of uncompensated care.  In an attempt to secure 
their social legitimacy and appease constituent demands, for-profit hospitals may bolster their 
provision of community benefits as a compromising strategy.   
Second, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that mimicry is a probable 
organizational response to uncertainty in an institutional environment.  This argument 
stipulates two fundamental requirements: (1) the focal organizations or organizational 
decision makers must perceive uncertainty in the institutional environment and (2) the focal 
organization must perceive the modeled target to be more successful in some way.  Given the 
health care landscape is constantly changing with the establishment of new policies and 
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regulations, advances in pharmaceutical innovations and transformations of service delivery 
and contract models, hospitals often perceive turbulence and uncertainty in their environment 
(Lee et al., 2004).  The transition of Medicaid programs from its original fee-for-service 
configuration to managed care models, to its delinking from the welfare program and finally 
to the expansion of children’s health insurance coverage through SCHIP certainly resulted in 
great fluctuations in the uninsurance population and heightened public awareness about this 
growing problem.   
Moreover, in the US health care market, not-for-profit hospitals constitute the 
majority of the private hospital sector (Marmor et al. 1987).  Historically, they embody the 
essence of quality and scientific advancement (Crimm 1995; Rosenberg 1987; Marmor et al. 
1987).  Certainly in terms of social symbolism, not-for-profit hospitals retain a good-
neighbor image much more so than for-profit hospitals do.  Hospitals need to maintain a 
good neighbor image in order to attract business.  Provision of community benefits are 
thought to be a good strategy to convey this message and bolster a hospital’s social 
legitimacy.  Clement and colleagues (2002) found that not-for-profit hospitals’ service 
provision behaviors help set community expectations regarding the amount of charity care 
hospitals ought to supply to a community in general.  For-profit hospitals facing greater 
expectations are likely to align their service configurations to these public demands.  
Although it is possible that for-profit hospitals allow not-for-profit hospitals in the market to 
bear most of the burden of charity care (Clement et al., 2002), Ginn and Moseley (2006) 
found that for-profit hospitals residing in states with community benefit laws/guidelines 
reported significantly more community health orientation activities than for-profit hospitals 
residing in the other control states.  It appears that for-profit hospitals operating in 
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communities where not-for-profit hospitals must comply with the new laws confront public 
pressures about community accountability therefore are expected to increase their charity 
care productivity.  Assuming social legitimacy is a critical element of survival, heightened 
consumerism and the consistently changing health care landscape will forfeit profit margins 
as the sole concern of for-profit hospital management.  Therefore, it is likely that for-profit 
hospitals will model after not-for-profit hospital’s behavior in increasing their provision of 
community benefit and charity care as a result of state community benefit laws.   
Hypothesis III:  For-profit hospitals’ provision of community benefits activities (in 
term of programs and financial expenditures) will be positively 
correlated with not-for-profit hospital provision of community 
activities.   
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
STUDY DESIGN AND DATA 
 
4.1. Study Design  
This study uses time-series data to examine changes in hospitals’ reaction to 
community benefit laws in California, Texas, and Florida over a twelve-year period from 
1991-2002.  The three states are selected because of their variation in the community benefit 
laws.  The law in California was enacted in 1994 and implemented in 1996.  It adopted a 
process approach that required NFP hospitals to perform annual assessment of community 
health needs, and design and evaluate a plan to meet those needs.  The law in Texas was 
passed and became effective in 1993 and it subscribed to a more stringent prescriptive 
approach that specified the level of charity care and community health services (no less than 
5% of net patient revenue) to be provided by NFP hospitals.  It was later amended in 1995 
and 1997.  No similar law has been established in Florida and hospitals in the state will serve 
as a comparison group.  The variation in state regulations allows for the average treatment 
effect differences before and after the establishment of the laws in one treatment state to be 
compared with the average treatment effect differences before and after the same time period 
in the control state.  Therefore, the impact of the community benefit laws on hospitals’ 
provision of community health services and charity care is examined based on (1) the 
differences in states with and without the law, (2) the differences in states (California and 
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Texas) that adopted different designs of the law, and (3) the differences in California and 
Texas before and after the law was enacted, implemented and/or amended.  
In addition to using the two treatment states and a control state in the study design, 
the chronology of these state community benefit laws are divided into pre-enactment, post-
enactment and post amendment periods.  Combined, this case-control quasi-experimental set-
up in a pre-/post- panel data format permits the usage of the difference-in-difference (DD) 
and difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimation method to answer the three 
research questions: (1) how has hospitals’ provision of and financial expenditure on 
community-oriented health services changed as a result of state community benefit laws; (2) 
whether hospital compliance to community benefit laws is contingent upon their 
organizational characteristics (e.g. size, managed care contracts, membership in health 
systems and networks) and the level of market competition; (3) whether there are spill-over 
effects in the provision of and financial expenditure on community benefit by for-profit 
hospitals as a result of sate community benefit laws.  The DD and DDD estimation methods 
are commonly used to analyze the effects of policy change because it potentially reduces the 
threat of internal validity and offers a direct and reliable answer the policy change question 
without emphasizing the causal pathways.   
 
4.2. Data Source 
To examine the effectiveness of community benefit laws, it is essential to have 
specific hospital programmatic and financial data that span time periods before and after the 
implementation of these regulatory interventions.  Given that the establishment, 
implementation and amendments to the community benefit laws in Texas and California 
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occurred in the 1990s, hospital information between 1991 and 2002 were secured for the 
study.  More specifically, data were obtained from six sources: (1) American Hospital 
Association’s (AHA) Annual Hospital Surveys; (2) hospital utilization and financial data 
from the California Statewide Office of Health Planning and Development (OSHPD); (3) 
cooperative Texas Department of Health TDH/AHA/THA Annual Surveys of Hospitals; (4) 
the Florida Hospital Financial Surveys; (5) the Area Resource File (ARF); and (6) the CMS 
Medicaid and SCHIP expenditure report.   
The AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals has been conducted annually since 1946. It is 
administered to more than 6000 AHA registered and non-registered hospitals with an average 
response rate of 82% (http://www.hospitalconnect.com/ahadata/data.html).  The Annual 
Hospital Surveys provide nationwide information on community hospitals’ organizational 
characteristics, bed capacity, service pattern, staffing, participation in community health 
activities and inter-organizational linkages (Lee et al., 2003).  The OSHPD data include 
utilization and financial information on all health care organizations operating in California.  
The TDH/AHA/THA Annual Surveys of Hospitals collect aggregate programmatic, 
utilization and financial information on all licensed Texas hospitals. It also includes data on 
Texas hospitals’ provision of community benefits and compliance with the law.  Florida 
Hospital Financial Surveys contain state work sheets on hospital fiscal information.  The 
ARF contains health and demographic statistics for all US counties and is used to measure 
the socio-economic conditions of the hospital’s local market, defined as the county in which 
the hospital is located.  Finally, the CMS reports provide net Medicaid and SCHIP 
expenditures reported by all fifty states.   
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4.3. Sampling Method  
To construct the study sample, private community hospitals that resided in the three 
study states and participated in the AHA Annual Hospital Survey between 1991 and 2002 are 
first pooled (Figure 4.2).  Specialty hospitals whose mission may vary from a general 
community orientation and that may compete under different market conditions are then 
excluded from the sample. The remaining AHA hospitals are matched with state hospital data. 
An average of 90% of hospitals matched successfully, yielding a total of 11,847 hospital-year 
observations in the panel data. For the purpose of the study, 178 hospitals (n=2,003) that 
experienced ownership conversion during the study period are partitioned for a separate 
analysis.  All public hospitals (n=2,506), though serving a community oriented mission are 
subject to different kinds of government regulations, are removed from the sample 
population.  Lastly, missing demographic information from the Area Resource Files dictated 
elimination of data from 20 hospitals (n=239) from the state of Florida.  The remaining 7,099 
hospital-year observations representing private hospitals residing in the states of California, 
Texas and Florida between 1991 and 2002 comprise the primary data set for the study.  
Among them, 4,148 hospital-year observations representing not-for-profit hospital data are 
employed in the main effect and contingency effects analyses of state community benefit 
laws.  The remaining 2,951 for-profit hospital-year observations are used in the spill-over 
effects analysis.   
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Figure 4.1.  Sampling framework for study analysis 
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The final study sample consisted of an average of 261 (75 for-profit and 186 not-for-
profit), 216 (109 for-profit and 107 not-for-profit), and 106 (52 for-profit and 54 not-for-
profit) hospitals from California, Texas and Florida, respectively (Table 4.4).  During the 
study period, there is a slight downward trend in the hospital populations in all three states, 
with the exception of not-for-profit hospitals in Texas.  California, as a state, experienced the 
largest decrease in hospital population, followed by the state of Florida.  Texas, on the other 
hand, maintains a fairly stable hospital population.  Though not shown, the number of public 
hospitals in all three states also dwindled during this time. Therefore, it is safe to assume that 
ownership conversions may not be the primary contributor to hospital population changes. 
Mergers and closures may be the likely culprit for decreasing numbers of hospitals. 
 
Table 4.1.  Hospital Population and Change between 1991 and 2002 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Change 
NFP  197 195 196 195 194 189 187 185 177 173 171 170 -13.7% CA 
FP 88 83 81 81 82 79 79 71 67 66 63 63 -28.4% 
 
              
NFP  104 106 103 110 109 111 109 108 106 105 103 104 -0% TX 
FP 110 107 111 115 117 110 115 106 105 104 103 104 -5.5% 
 
              
NFP  57 58 58 57 56 54 53 51 50 50 50 50 -12.3% FL 
FP 66 65 67 65 64 63 61 59 58 58 58 57 -13.6% 
               
 
Further, in this study sample, Texas had the largest hospital population, split evenly 
between not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals. California had the second largest hospital 
population dominated by not-for-profit hospitals.  In fact, there were nearly 2.5 times as 
many not-for-profit hospitals as for-profit hospitals in California. Over the 12-year study 
period, both not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals in California experienced significant 
decreases.  However, the not-for-profit to for-profit (2.5:1) ratio remained fairly constant. 
Florida has the smallest hospital population size among the three study states. Although not-
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for-profit institutions occupied a slightly larger percentage of the hospital market share in 
1991, the not-for-profit and for-profit hospital size converged towards a near (1:1) ratio, as 
seen in Texas.  
 
4.4. Variables 
4.4.1.  Dependent Variables  
To comprehensively assess the effectiveness of state community benefit laws, three 
categories of dependent variables are constructed. Consistent with state community benefits 
laws, these categories of dependent variables included programmatic, financial and special 
populations.  Each of these dependent variables, by itself, is limited and assesses only a 
single aspect of hospitals’ commitment to local health needs. Assessing these variables 
together represents an important contribution of the study, over and beyond that of previous 
research, and it allows a comprehensive evaluation of hospitals’ reaction to community 
benefit laws. A hospital, for example, may try to meet the requirements of the state regulation 
by offering many programmatic activities but contributes very little to serving disadvantaged 
populations in the local community. Another hospital may serve a disproportional share of 
the disadvantaged populations and as a result lacks the financial means to provide a 
comprehensive array of preventive and social services that are aimed to improve the health 
status of the community. Such variation can best be captured by including all three dependent 
variables in the study. 
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4.4.1.1. Percent Community-Oriented Programs  
The first dependent variable involves hospitals’ provision of community-oriented 
health programs. Creation and elimination of these often unprofitable services are perceived 
to indicate hospitals’ commitment to local communities (Lee et al., 2003). The dependent 
variable also provides a reliable measure of hospitals’ community service configurations 
irrespective of any accounting changes prompted by the implementation of community 
benefit laws. More specifically, the AHA Annual Hospital Survey contained information 
about the provision of 67 services offered by individual hospitals. Ideally, a subset of 21 
distinct services aimed at promoting community health through preventive and educational 
programs, as specified by state community benefit laws and prior literature (Lee et al. 2003; 
Lee et al., 2004), would be compiled to create a community service composite index for all 
study years (Table 4.1). However, due to the content changes in the national and state 
hospital surveys, only 13 categories of community oriented programs were reported between 
years 1991 and 1993 (Table 4.2). Based on a national sample, the composite index for those 
years was shown to have good reliability with an average Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 
0.85.   
Table 4.2.  List of Community Benefits Programs between 1991 and 1993 
Community Outreach Health Information Patient Representation Transportation 
Burn Unit Occupational Health Birthing Center Volunteer Services 
Fitness Center Patient Education Social Work  Women’s Center 
Emergency Room    
 
 
Between the years 1994 and 2002, the composite index was made out of 21 services (Table 
4.2) and also yielded good reliability with an average Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.94. 
To reconcile the variation in community-oriented program availability, the programmatic 
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dependent variable was constructed as a percentage of programs offered by hospitals each 
year.   
Table 4.3.  List of Community Benefits Programs between 1994 and 2002 
Community Outreach Health Fair Patient Education Transportation 
Crisis Prevention Health Information Patient Representation Volunteer Services 
Child Wellness Health Screening Social Work  Women’s Center 
Burn Unit Nutrition Support Groups Birthing Center 
Fitness Center Occupational Health Teen Outreach Meals on Wheels 
Emergency Room     
 
 
4.4.1.2. Bad Debt, Charity Care and Uncompensated Care per bed 
The second set of dependent variables involves hospitals’ financial contribution to 
bad debts, charity care and total uncompensated care adjusted for cost-charge ratio and 
hospital size.  More specifically, charity care is free hospital services programs provided 
without expectations of reimbursement (Kane and Wubbenhorst, 2000; Sutton and Stensland, 
2004).   Bad debts, on the other hand, are care for which payment is expected but never 
received (Kane and Wubbenhorst, 2000; Blewett et al., 2003).  Because bad debt and charity 
care have been conflated in hospital accounting practices, researchers have often used sum of 
bad debt and charity care, namely uncompensated care) as a proxy for hospitals’ charitable 
contributions (Sutton and Stensland, 2004).   
In this study, hospital bad debt and charity care were extrapolated from itemized 
deductions from total revenue from state hospital surveys and financial statements. As 
hospital accounting practices vary, bad debts and charity care can also be reported as 
expenses.  In this case, the absolute values of bad debts and charity care were used.  To 
adjust for hospital’s overall markup, a cost-charge ratio was constructed by dividing the total 
operating expenses by the total patient revenues produced by each hospital.  Missing values 
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in cost-charge ratio were imputed by the average cost-charge ratio per hospital across the 
study period. Further missing values were imputed by the county-wide and state-wide 
average cost-charge ratio in the same year.  Bad debts and charity care charges values were 
then multiplied by these cost-charge ratios to approximate each hospital’s average cost of 
these items.   Finally, the final financial dependent variables are achieved by dividing these 
adjusted figures by the number of hospitals beds to adjust for hospital size.   
 
4.4.1.3. Percent Medicaid Inpatient Load 
Medicaid inpatient days are constructed by dividing Medicaid inpatient by the total 
inpatient days reported by each hospital year.  The chronically ill represent the highest health 
care spending group in the country (Keehan et al., 2004).  In fact, Medicaid spending has 
reached over 15 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2003 (Kronick and Rousseau, 
2007).  With a comparatively low reimbursement rate (Bazzoli et al., 2005), hospitals’ 
willingness and abilities to provide services to this population indicate their commitment to 
community health.  This measure also corresponds to the law’s focus on special needs 
populations.    
 
4.4.2.  Independent Variables 
4.4.2.1. Community Benefit Laws Timeline  
Three sets of independent variables are included in the study. The first and most 
important set pertains to the community benefit laws and is derived from the timeline of 
these laws (Figure 4.1). Some state community benefit laws have gone through several 
modifications since their enactment between 1991 and 2002. In Texas, the law was enacted 
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in 1993, but amended in 1995 and 1997. Using the pre-1993 era as the reference, a dummy 
variable (yr93to95) was constructed to indicate the first time period after law enactment as 
the beginning of 1993 through the end of 1994. Similarly, two more dummy variables 
(yr95to97 and yr97to02) were constructed to capture the years from 1995 through the end of 
1996 and the post-1997 era.  In California, there was a lag period between the enactment and 
the implementation of community benefit law during the study period. Using the pre-1994 
years as a reference, a dummy variable (yr94to96) was constructed to indicate the time from 
the beginning of 1994 through the end of 1995.  The last dummy variable (yr96to02) was 
used to signal the eventual implementation of the California law.   
Figure 4.2. Community Benefit Laws Timeline  
 
 
4.4.2.2. Proportion of not-for-profit Community Benefits 
To capture the indirect effects of community benefit laws on for-profit hospitals, for-
profit hospitals’ provision of community benefits are modeled in relations to not-for-profit 
hospitals’ behaviors. Therefore, the weighted mean of community benefits provided by not-
for-profit hospitals (vis-à-vis that of for-profit hospitals) in the same county is used as 
independent variables in the estimation models (Clement et al. 2002).  In the first part of the 
spill-over effect estimation, the proportion of community-oriented programs was calculated 
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by dividing the sum of community oriented program provided not-for-profit hospitals by the 
total community-oriented services provided by all public and private community hospitals in 
a county.  In the financial estimate of spill-over effects, the sum of uncompensated care 
provided by all not-for-profit hospitals is divided by the sum of uncompensated care 
provided by all hospitals in the county to yield the weighted mean of not-for-profit 
uncompensated care.  Lastly and similarly, the weighted mean of not-for-profit Medicare and 
Medicaid load is calculated by the dividing the sum of not-for-profit load by that of all 
hospitals’ in the same county.   
 
4.4.2.3.  Contingency Variables  
In testing the contingency effects of the community benefit laws, four variables are 
used—hospital size, managed care contracts, systems affiliation, and market competition. 
Hospital size is measured by the total number of staffed beds reported in the AHA survey.  In 
the regression analysis, this value is scaled down by 100 fold to yield coefficients of 
comparable scale as other covariates.   
Two dichotomous variables–whether the hospital had formal contracts with HMOs 
and PPOs – are used to by the AHA annual hospital survey to indicate managed care 
affiliations between 1991 and 1997.  Starting in 1998, the annual survey modified its 
questionnaire and required hospital to report the actual numbers of HMO and PPO contracts 
in possession.  In the main and spill-over effects analyses, HMO and PPO contracts are 
included in the regression models as separate dichotomous control variables indicating 
possession of more than one HMO and PPO contracts, respectively.   However, in the 
contingency effects analysis, managed care is conceptualized as a broad notion. Therefore, 
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variables PPO contracts and HMO contracts are combined into a single dichotomous 
managed care variable.  Those without any HMO or PPO contracts are assigned a value of 
zero for this variable.   
System affiliations are operationalized as any connections with or membership in 
hospital systems, alliances as well as networks.  Between 1991 and 1993, the AHA Annual 
Survey only recorded hospital affiliations with systems and alliances.  Starting in 1994, it 
added a network connection variable.  Affiliations with any of these two or three forms of 
organizational coalitions are identified as the treatment group.  Freestanding hospitals then 
are defined as those that reported no association with hospital systems, networks or alliances.    
Market competition is operationalized by two measures. One derives from county 
Herfindahl index that measures hospital market concentration. It is used to calculate the level 
of competition within the focal hospital’s county.  Two, a separate Herfindahl index that 
takes into account all hospitals in all adjacent counties capture more accurately the hospitals’ 
market demand characteristic.  Market competition measures are constructed as (1-
Herfindalh Index).  Based on the regression results from the direct and spill-over effects 
analyses of community benefit laws, the surrounding county market condition is rarely a 
statistically significant contributing factor to hospitals’ provision of community benefit.  
Therefore, only county-level market competition is used as a potential factor examined in the 
contingency effects analysis.   
 
4.4.3.  Control Variables 
Additional factors, including hospitals’ geographic locations and related socio-
demographic characteristics, their teaching status and financial allocations from recent 
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policies, that may influence changes in the hospitals’ provision of community benefit are 
included in the estimation models as control variables.  The location of hospitals is indicated 
by whether they reside in a metropolitan (vs. rural) area, as designated by the AHA’s 
metropolitan statistical area size.  Social and economic resources are often not as readily 
available in rural areas as in the more populated metropolitan locales.  With fewer health care 
facilities present, rural hospitals can serve as the only health care facility to care for a wide 
variety of patients and shoulder all charitable responsibilities in their localities regardless of 
their ownership status (Ricketts and Heaphy, 2000).  Presence of public hospitals has been 
found to have a crowding-out effect on private hospitals’ provision of uncompensated care 
(Sloan et al., 1998; Thorpe and Phelps, 1992).  Presence of public hospitals in a county has 
been incorporated as a dichotomous variable in the estimation model to control for these 
effects.  
Hospital’s teaching status provides information about hospitals’ commitment to 
medical education, research and training as well as their access to the Medicaid and Medicare 
populations.  It exposes hospitals to the most vulnerable populations in the market place and, 
therefore, affects their charitable behaviors.  Empirical evidence has also shown that large 
urban teaching hospitals tend to provide a disproportionate share of uncompensated care, 
especially in areas with high managed care concentration (Gaskin, 1997; Weissman et al., 
2003).  Hospitals’ case mix would influence its service provision decisions. In this analysis, 
average length of stay is constructed using the total inpatient days divided by total 
admissions. It serves as a proxy for hospital case mix.      
Research found that members of minority groups are far more likely to be uninsured, 
particularly if they have income below 200 percent of the federal poverty level (Friedman, 
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2005).  Given that chronic illness is more prevalent among the elderly and minorities are 
more likely to be uninsured (Friedman, 2005), percentages of the elderly and non-white 
populations in a county represent measures of need.  The county unemployment rate is the 
percentage of people in the county who are in the labor force and who are unemployed. It 
serves as another indicator of community needs.  Because one would expect that those with 
limited education are less likely to find employment with comprehensive benefits, 
educational attainment is incorporated as a social proxy of need. County education level is 
the percentage of adults older than 25 years of age that have a high school diploma.  
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) funding reflects the total annual 
SCHIP expenditure reported by states.   Since its implementation in 1997, SCHIP has given 
states the authority and funding to expand health insurance coverage to low-income children 
by broadening Medicaid eligibility (Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. Urban 
Institute).  Urban Institute found that SCHIP reduced unmet health needs and out-of-pocket 
spending for children.  As a result, it may affect the charity care pool and/or community 
benefit programs provide by hospitals. Further, program development and participation in 
SCHIP and Medicaid vary substantially by state.  The inclusion of total annual state SCHIP 
expenditure in the analysis provides a proxy for the extent of program participation in state.  
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Table 4.4. List of study variables  
Variable  Definition  Type  Data Source 
Dependent Variables  
   
Programmatic Category    
Percent of 
Community Oriented 
Services Available  
Percent of total Community Oriented 
Service cataloged by AHA (total=13 
between 1991 and 1993; total=21 
between 1994 and 2002) 
Continuous 
Ranging from 0-1 
AHA 
 
Financial Category    
Bad Debt  Revenue deductions on Bad Debt 
adjusted for cost-charge ratio 
  
Continuous OSHPD 
TDH/AHA/THA 
FL Hosp Survey 
Charity Care Revenue deductions on Charity Care 
adjusted for cost-charge ratio 
Continuous OSHPD 
TDH/AHA/THA 
FL Hosp Survey 
Uncompensated Care Sum of adjusted bad debt and 
adjusted charity care 
Continuous OSHPD 
TDH/AHA/THA 
FL Hosp Survey 
Special Needs Populations 
Category 
   
Medicaid  Medicaid Inpatient Days/Total 
Inpatient Days 
Continuous AHA 
    
Independent Variables  
   
H1: Law Various time periods during evolution 
of Community benefit laws 
Dichotomous  N/A 
    
H2: Hospital Size # of staffed beds in each hospital Continuous AHA 
    
H2: Systems Affiliations Affiliations with Hospital Systems, or 
Networks or Alliances 
Dichotomous AHA 
H2: Managed Care  
Contracts 
1= yes, 0= no Dichotomous AHA 
H2: Market Competition I 1 - County Herfindahl Index Continuous 
Between 0 and 1 
AHA 
H3: Not-for-profit 
hospitals provision of 
community benefits  
Proportions of community benefits 
provided by not-for-profit hospitals in 
the same county 
Continuous  OSHPD 
TDH/AHA/THA 
FL Hosp Survey 
AHA 
ARF 
    
Control Variables 
   
Hospital Attributes  Inpatient days/total admissions   
Hospital Teaching 
Status 
1= yes, 0= no Dichotomous AHA 
Rural  1= rural, 0=urban Dichotomous AHA, ARF 
Length of Stay Inpatient days/Total admissions Continuous AHA 
Socio-demographic 
Factors 
   
Education Level % of people over 25 years of age with 
a high school education in each 
Continuous ARF 
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county 
Percent Elderly % elderly in each county  Continuous ARF 
Percent Minority non-white population/total population 
in a county 
  
Unemployment Rate # of unemployed / county population Continuous ARF 
Per Capital Income  Per capita Income  Continuous ARF 
Economic Factors    
Market Competition 
II 
1 - Neighboring County Herfindahl 
Index 
Continuous  
Between 0 and 1 
AHA 
Public Hospitals  Presence of Public Hospitals within 
the same County 
Dichotomous AHA, ARF 
SCHIP expenditures Total Reported SCHIP expenditure by 
state 
Continuous CMS 
    
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
THE EFFECT OF STATE COMMUNITY BENEFIT LAWS  
ON NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITAL BEHAVIORS 
 
 
 
This chapter investigates the effectiveness of community benefit laws on not-for-
profit hospitals’ community benefit activities in California and Texas, compared to those in 
Florida.  It uses a pre-post quasi-experimental study design to test two hypotheses: (1) there 
would be an increase in not-for-profit hospital’s willingness and provision of community 
benefit activities after the implementation of community benefit laws; and (2) the increase in 
not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness and provision of community benefit activities would be 
greater in Texas than that in California after the implementation of community benefit laws.  
The panel data allow for observation of hospital behavior patterns over time and direct 
comparisons of California and Texas hospital provision of community benefit activities 
before and after the implementation of community benefit laws, in reference to the control 
cases in Florida.     
 
5.1. Study Sample  
 
5.1.1.  Study Sample for Analysis on Community-Oriented Programs 
This estimation of the main effects of state community benefit laws on hospital 
community benefit activities employs the full study sample of private not-for-profit hospitals 
participating in both the AHA and state Annual hospital surveys from 1991 to 2002.  A total 
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of 4,148 hospital-year observations are used (Table 5.1).  In terms of hospitals attributes, this 
sample consists of primarily medium size hospitals that staff an average of 227 beds.  
Between 62 and 67% of these hospitals are involved in managed care activities through PPO 
or HMO contracts.  Seventeen percent of the observations maintain no affiliations with 
hospital systems, networks or alliances.  On average, these hospitals provide 47% of the 
community oriented programs surveyed by AHA to their local residents.   
 
5.1.2  Trends in Hospital Provision of Community Oriented Programs 1991-2002 
  Of the 4,148 hospital-year observations included in the analysis, only 3,571 
observations represent hospitals that provide one or more community-oriented programs 
(Table 5.2).  These tend to be slightly larger hospitals with 232 staffed beds, compared to an 
average of 227 staff beds in the total sample population.  They are also more likely to have 
HMO and PPO contracts.  In terms of environmental attributes, these hospitals reside in areas 
where there are fewer hospitals within the surrounding counties.  However, their residing 
counties tend to have a slightly lowered per capita income ($24,470), compared to that of the 
general hospital population ($24,935).   
State-specific subgroup analysis shows that, among not-for-profit hospitals that do 
provide positive quantities of community-oriented programs (n=3,571), not-for-profit 
hospitals in California, Texas and Florida provided a comparable level of community 
oriented services between 1991 and 1993 (Figure 5.1).   However, by 1993, Texas and 
Florida not-for-profit hospitals’ provision of these services increases drastically.  Texas not-
for-profit hospitals continue the increasing trend to reach the highest percentage of 
community oriented services by the end of the study period.  California not-for-profit 
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hospitals, in contrast, maintain a steady provisional behavior before increasing these 
activities in 2002.     
 
5.1.3.  Trends in Hospital Provision of Bad Debts, Charity Care and Uncompensated Care 
1991-2002 
 
Analyses on the effectiveness of community benefit laws in terms of bad debt, charity 
care and uncompensated care include a sample of 3,738 hospital-year observations. Of the 
total 4,148 hospital-year observations, 410 are missing financial variables.  Hospital financial 
information is obtained from state hospital surveys.  After adjusting for cost-charge ratios, 
hospitals appear to incur an average of $2.39 million in bad debt, and spend an average of 
$1.96 million on charity care per hospital per year.  In total, they provide an average of $4.35 
million on uncompensated care, the sum of adjusted bad debt and adjusted charity care, per 
hospital per year.  Further adjustment for hospital size reveal that not-for-profit hospitals 
incur an average of $10,802 bad debt, $7,510 charity care, and $18,313 uncompensated care 
per bed (Table 5.3).  
In general, not-for-profit hospitals that have incurred or provided positive values of 
bad debt, charity and uncompensated care share very similar organizational attributes with 
those in the total sample (Table 5.3).   In term of state differences, California not-for-profit 
hospitals report the least amount of bad debt, charity and uncompensated care per bed 
throughout the study period, with the exception of Florida after 2001 (Figure 5.2-5.4).  In fact, 
California not-for-profit hospitals record a steady and lower level of bad debt, charity and 
uncompensated care between 1991 and 1996, despite the implementation of the state 
community benefit law in 1994.  It is after the amendment of the law in 1996, California not-
for-profit hospitals begin increasing their reporting of bad debts and charity care.     
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Texas not-for-profit hospitals rank the highest in their incurrence of bad debts, charity 
and uncompensated care throughout most of the study period (Figure 5.2-5.4).  Between the 
implementation of Texas community benefit law in 1993, Texas not-for-profit hospitals 
provide similar levels of bad debt as well as charity care as their Florida counterparts.  After 
1995, Texas hospitals begin to dispense markedly higher charity care than Florida hospitals 
did (Figure 5.3).  In Florida, without state policy intervention, not-for-profit hospitals’ 
provision of charity care appears fairly steady between 1991 and 2002.  However, their 
averaged bad debt increases drastically between 1994 and 2000, only drops back down to the 
1991 level in 2002 (Figure 5.2).  Combined, the Florida not-for-profit hospitals’ total 
uncompensated care shows an elevating trend between 1994 and 2000 (Figure 5.4).   
  
5.1.4.  Trends in percent Medicaid inpatient days 1991-2002 
Based on the AHA data, not-for-profit hospitals in the three study states carry an 
average of 16 percent Medicaid inpatient days throughout the study period.  Only 86 
hospital-year observations indicate no Medicaid inpatient days.  Not-for-profit hospitals with 
a positive Medicaid load are more likely to have PPO contracts than those in the full sample 
do (Table 5.4).  
Time trends show that percent Medicaid inpatient days remained consistent in not-
for-profit hospitals in California and Florida throughout the study period (Figure 5.5).  In 
Texas, there are more variations in the average Medicaid inpatient days among not-for-profit 
hospitals between 1991 and 2002.  There are two major dips in these hospitals’ Medicaid 
inpatient load in the 1995-1996 and the 1998-1999 periods.  After 2000, the averaged 
Medicaid inpatients days bounces back to the pre-1993 level.   
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.5.2. Model Specifications 
The impact of state community benefit laws on hospital behavior is estimated using 
regression analysis according to the following specifications:  
Community Benefitsth  = f [States, Timet, State·Timest, Economic Factorssth, 
  Socio-demographic Factorssth, Organizational Factorsth, µst, νsth]          (5.1)  
 
Community benefit behavior categories, such as percent community oriented programs, 
uncompensated care, and percent Medicaid inpatient days, are abbreviated as dependent 
variable Community benefithst. The h subscript indicates individual hospital; the s subscript 
indicates treatment or control state group; and the t subscript indicates policy change time 
periods.  Each of these three continuous dependent variables is modeled as a function of the 
time dummies, state variables, the interaction between the treatment states and time dummies, 
and time-varying organizational, demographic and environmental factors. 
The interaction terms between state and law timeline represent primary independent 
variables that capture the effect of these state regulations on hospital behaviors. More 
specifically, the evolution of policy changes in California and Texas is modeled according to 
their individual timelines (Figure 4.2).  It is hypothesized that the enactment, amendment and 
implementation of community benefit laws would have differential impact on hospital 
behavior.  Since the time before the enactment of the law is treated as reference time frame, 
the time between the enactment and implementation of the law affords a transitional period 
for hospitals to ramp up their service provisions.  In California, the pre-1994 period is 
considered the reference time.  Two time dummies are constructed to represent the 1994-
1996 and post-1996 times. In Texas, the reference time is pre-1993. Time dummies are 
constructed to represent the 1993-1995, 1995-1997 and post 1997 periods. The interactions 
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between states and time dummies allow for across time comparison of dependent variables 
within states.  
Finally, the model controls for various economic, socio-demographic factors and 
hospital fixed effects.  Unspecified time invariant and time-varying state heterogeneities are 
represented in the model as µst and νhst, respectively.  State specific regulations that extend 
beyond the beginning and the end of the study period, at the same time affect the 
implementation of community benefit laws may be one example of the time-invariant 
heterogeneity.  Time varying heterogeneity may come from changes in the Medicaid or 
Medicaid-related policy, state macro-economy or the demographic distributions of the 
population.   
 
5.3. Estimation Methods  
The effects of state community benefit laws on hospital provision of community benefit 
are estimated using a two-part model (2PM).  Both parts employed the difference-in-
difference (DD) model as the primary estimation method.  The DD modeling strategy 
compares changes of hospital community benefits provision behaviors in intervention states 
to changes of hospital community benefit provision behaviors in the control state.  The first 
difference compares the post-law and pre-law hospital community benefit activities in an 
intervention state.  The second difference compares the community benefit activities 
differentials between one of the study states (i.e. Texas or California) and the control state of 
Florida.  
Specifically, a diagnostic examination of the distributions of dependent variables 
show that 14% of observations contained a zero value for the provision of community 
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oriented programs.  The distributions of bad debt, charity care and uncompensated care also 
yield 3.5%, 6.2% and 3.0% zero values.  Moreover, the distributions of Medicaid inpatient 
days showed a 2.1% of zero values.  Given the distributions of all the dependent variables are 
skewed with zero values, separate equations were used to estimate hospitals’ decision to 
provide community benefit and their decision about how much community benefit to provide 
in response to state community benefit laws.  The times series setup further allows for a 
longitudinal perspective in answering these two questions.   
Traditionally, the first part of the 2PM estimating the probability of hospitals 
providing any community benefits employs a logit or probit model.  However, given the 
nature of panel data, estimations and inferences from these non-linear models are difficult.  
Further, the available estimation models are limited to fixed-effects logit and random-effects 
probit only.  Since hospitals that did not provide community benefits may persist in their 
behaviors, it is likely that a large proportion of the observations in a group would have the 
same outcomes throughout the study period.  In a standard fixed-effects model, all these 
observations will be dropped from the analysis.  The potential time-series effect in hospital 
behaviors may also introduce significant bias into fixed-effects logit models.  Random-
effects probit models impose strict error term assumptions upon the unobservables.  Since it 
is unlikely that these unobservables are completely uncorrelated with explanatory variables, 
random-effects probit may not be the best estimation approach, either.  Instead, a linear 
probability model (LPM) is proposed as the alternative estimation method for this part of the 
analysis (equation (5.2)).  In this case, the binary outcome of whether hospitals provide 
community benefit, in terms of community oriented program provision, revenue deductions 
on bad debts and charity care, as well as Medicaid inpatient days, is predicted as a function 
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of time representing the state laws and other control variables using ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  
βi ii X  1) (Y p === Pr           (5.2)  
In the second part of the 2PM, ordinary least squares, random effects, fixed effects 
estimators are used and compared with the support of specification test statistics in order to 
get the most efficient and consistent estimates of the effects of community benefit laws that 
are not induced by unobserved individual hospital heterogeneity.  The distributions of 
adjusted bad debt, charity and uncompensated care, in particular, are right skewed as were 
typical of distributions of monetary values.  The Wooldridge test (Wooldridge 2000) that 
compares residual squares from a logged dependent variable model with that of the unlogged 
model is used to determine the functional forms of the dependent variables.  Results of the 
test indicate that unlogged forms of all three variables are preferred to the logged forms.   
Upon application of the same battery of specification tests, all the dependent variable 
categories of community oriented programs, uncompensated care and special populations 
yield the same results.  Random effects estimates are preferred to OLS in the Breusch-Pagan 
test of random effects.  Subsequent Hausman test rejects random effects estimates in favor of 
the consistent fixed effects estimates.  Finally, a White (1980) test indicates that the errors of 
the fixed effects estimates are heteroskadastic.  One source of such heteroskedasiticity could 
be potential omitted time-varying unobservables caused by state level hospital policy 
changes regarding certificate of needs, or free care legislations.  Therefore, robust standard 
errors are applied to correct for the downward biased standard errors in the final results. 
In testing the proposed hypothese regarding the impact of state community benefit on 
not-for-profit hospital behaviors, key variables of interests are represented by the interaction 
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terms between time dummies and state treatment groups.  These linear probability and 
fixed/random effects within estimators each uses the program provisional variations in 
different states within the same time period to calculate the effect of policy change. For 
example, let β represent the coefficient estimate for the interaction terms among Year 1994-
1996 and the state California.  The resulted regression estimate can be interpreted as the 
difference between provision of community benefits before and after the 1994-1996 time 
period in California not-for-profit hospitals minus the difference between provision of 
community benefits before and after the same period of time in Florida not-for-profit 
hospitals (equation (5.3)).   
   β
 
 = (YYr94to96, CA – Ypre94, CA ) – (YYr94to96, FL – Ypre94, FL )            (5.3) 
 
The full incremental effects of policy change variables in the 2PM are derived from 
the product of the marginal probabilities of the LPM and the marginal expected values of the 
fixed or random effects outcome.  Due to the interaction terms of the difference-in-difference 
model, the resulting incremental effects estimator is expanded into the long equation (5.4) 
where the subscript Yr indicates time and subscript St indicates states.  More specifically, Yr 
= 1 represents a specific time period in the evolution of the state community benefit law and 
Yr = 0 represents the pre-law period.  Similarly, St = 1 refers a specific treatment state 
California or Texas while St = 0 refers to the control states of Florida.   
IE
 
= [(Pr(y>0|
 Yr=1, St=1)-Pr(y>0| Yr=0, St=1)) - 
(Pr(y>0|
 Yr=1, St=0)-Pr(y>0| Yr=0, St=0))] ×E[y|y>0]  
+ [Pr(y>0|
 Yr=1)-Pr(y>0| Yr=0)]×  (E[y|y>0, St=1]-E[y|y>0, St=0]) 
+ [Pr(y>0|
 St=1)-Pr(y>0| St=0)]×  (E[y|y>0, Yr=1]-E[y|y>0, Yr=0]) 
+ Pr(y>0)× [(E[y|y>0, Yr=1, St=1]-E[y|y>0, Yr=0, St=1]) - 
(E[y|y>0, Yr=1, St=0]-E[y|y>0, Yr=0, St=0])]      (5.4) 
 
Given both year and state are dummy variables, each of the four terms in this log 
equation can be simplified (equation (5.5)).  For example, the difference-in-difference 
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probabilities in the first term can be replaced by the coefficient estimate of the interaction 
between time and state in the LPM.  In the second term, the marginal probabilities by year in 
can be replaced by the coefficient estimate of the year variable in the LPM and the marginal 
expected values by states can be replaced by the coefficient estimate of the state variable in 
the fixed or random effects model.  Finally, the standard errors of these full incremental 
effects are obtained by bootstrapping. 
IE
 
= (βYr x St |LPM ×E[y|y>0]) +  (βYr |LPM ×  βSt|FE/RE ) 
+ (βSt|LPM ×  βYr |FE/RE) + [Pr(y>0)×  βYr x St|FE/RE]     (5.5) 
 
To test hypothesis Ib, it is necessary to compare the statistical significance and 
magnitudes of coefficient estimates for the three-way interactions by state.  Since they yield 
the average treatment effect of community benefit laws in California not-for-profit hospitals 
compared to that of Florida, and the average treatment effect of community benefit laws in 
Texas not-for-profit hospitals compared to that of Florida, the magnitude difference between 
the coefficient estimates reveals the relative differential effect of the law in the two states.  
 
5.4.  Results 
5.4.1. The Effect of Law on Hospital Provision of Community Oriented Programs 
The impact of state community benefit laws is estimated by categorizing the study 
period into specific chronological orders based on the evolutions of California and Texas 
community benefit laws.  In the first part of the 2PM analysis, the linear probability model 
predicts hospitals’ decision to provide any community oriented programs at all between 1991 
and 2002 (Table 5.5).  Compared to the reference state of Florida, California not-for-profit 
hospitals are 7% more likely to provide any community oriented programs (p=0.004) and 
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Texas not-for-profit hospitals are 10% more likely to provide the same kind of programs 
(p=0.001).   
OLS regression results of community oriented program provision further show that 
the California community benefit law does not propel not-for-profit hospitals’ decision to 
provide community-oriented programs (Table 5.6).  After the establishment of the law, 
Californian not-for-profit hospitals decrease their willingness to provide these programs by 
17 percentage points.  This likelihood rebounds by 5 percentage points once the law is 
implemented in 1996.  However, compared to the pre-law period, California not-for-profit 
hospitals are still less willing to begin offering these programs after 1996.  In Texas, not-for-
profit hospitals decrease their willingness to provide community oriented programs after the 
implementation of the state community benefit law by 8.7 percentage points between 1993 
and 1995 (p=0.009).  After the first and second amendments of the law, Texas not-for-profit 
hospitals do not exhibit any statistically significant difference in their willingness to begin 
offering these programs as the pre-law period.   
The second part of the 2PM predicts the impact of community benefit laws 
conditional on hospitals’ participation in community oriented program provision.  The 
primary assumption is that Florida hospital community benefit activities are not influenced 
by the enactment or implementation of any direct government regulations between 1991 and 
2002 due to the absence of community benefit laws.  Therefore, the provision of community 
oriented programs differentials among not-for-profit in Florida before and after a specific 
time period should not change and would serve as the difference-in-difference estimates in 
the analysis model.  Accordingly, a statistically significant positive coefficient estimate from 
the 2-way interaction terms among the time and variables would indicate a positive effect of 
  88 
state community benefit law in the community oriented program provision among not-for-
profit hospitals in California and Texas, compared to that of Florida hospitals.   
The fixed-effects regression results show that the averaged community oriented 
program provision gap between California not-for-profit hospitals before and after 1994 lags 
the same comparison in Florida hospitals in the same time periods by a magnitude of 0.046 
(p=0.001).  This difference-in-difference estimate in hospital behavior maintained at negative 
0.091 (p<0.001) after the California law was implemented in 1996, compared to the pre-law 
period.  In Texas, not-for-profit hospitals do not show a statistically significant difference in 
the levels of their community benefit program provision until after the second amendment of 
state community benefit law, compare to the relative change seen in the reference Florida 
state.  After 1997, Texas not-for-profit hospitals decrease their provision of community-
oriented programs by 2.8 percentage points (p=0.047), compared to the pre-law period before 
1993.   
To examine the relative effect of the California and Texas community benefit laws, 
the magnitudes of the fixed effects coefficients after the full implementation of each 
community benefit law are compared.  Based on the evolutionary timeline of the laws, the 
full implementation of the final version of the Texas law is implemented in 1997.  California 
has gone through a transitional period where the law was enacted but not implemented 
between 1994 and 1996.  The California regulation is finally fully implemented in 1996.  
Results from the fixed effects estimates show that the changes in California not-for-profit 
hospitals’ provision of community oriented programs after 1996 and before 1994, lag behind 
that of Florida not-for-profit hospitals in the same time period by a magnitude of 0.091 
(p<0.001).  In Texas, the full implementation of the law in 1997 only decreases not-for-profit 
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hospitals’ provision of the same programs by 2.8 percentage points (p=0.047).  Therefore, it 
appears that both California and Texas state community benefit laws have a negative effect 
on hospitals’ provision of community-oriented programs.  However, these negative effects 
are more prominent among California not-for-profit hospitals, despite regulatory efforts.   
Results of the 2PM analyses also show that several organizational and market 
variables are correlated with not-for-profit hospitals’ decision to provide community oriented 
programs (Table 5.5).  In general, hospitals’ teaching status, possession of managed care 
contracts, an elevated per capita income and presence of public hospitals in the same county 
as well as an increased SCHIP expenditure contribute positively to their probability of 
providing services geared towards the general welfare of the local community.  PPO 
contracts, in particular, are the most significant contributors to hospitals’ decision to provide 
these services at a magnitude of 0.24 (p<0.001).  Network status and same county market 
competition negatively impact not-for-profit hospitals’ decision to provide any community 
services at all.    
Consistent with previous research (Lee, Alexander and Bazzoli 2003; Proenca, Rosko, 
and Zinn 2000), hospitals with HMO contracts (p=0.008) tend to provide more community 
oriented programs.  Networked hospitals and those residing in counties with higher per capita 
income also tend to provide more of these services.  On the contrary, hospitals with PPO 
contracts, those with sicker patients who have longer length of stay and those residing in 
counties with public hospital presence provide fewer community oriented programs.  Finally, 
hospitals residing in counties with more high school graduates tend to lower their service 
provision percentage by 0.83 points (p<0.001).      
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The full incremental effect of the changes in the policy variables across both parts of 
the 2PM shows that the community benefit law decreased California not-for-profit hospital 
provision of community-oriented programs by 12 percentage points and 13 percentage points 
between 1994 and 1996 and after 1996, respectively (Table 5.6).   The Texas community 
benefit law, in contrast, significantly decreases not-for-profit hospitals’ provision of the same 
activities by 5.0 percentage points after 1993.   
 
 
5.4.2. The Effect of Law on Hospital Bad Debt, Charity Care, and Uncompensated Care 
 
The effect of state community benefit laws on hospital reported bad debt, charity care 
and uncompensated care are also analyzed using the two-part model.  Results from the first 
part LPM (Table 5.8) show that California not-for-profit hospitals are not more likely to 
report bad debt and charity care than Florida not-for-profit hospitals in general.  In contrast, 
Texas not-for-profit hospitals have a statistically significant higher probability to report both 
bad debt and charity care than Florida not-for-profit hospitals.   
According to the California legislative timelines, not-for-profit hospitals show a 3.8 
percentage point (p=0.058) gain in their probability to carry bad debt after the enactment of 
community benefit law in 1994 (Table 5.7).  This likelihood is maintained at 3.1 percentage 
points level after the official implementation of the law in 1996 (p=0.088).  No statistical 
significant finding is yielded from California not-for-profit hospitals’ likelihood to offer 
charity care.   
The impact of state community benefit laws on the quantity of bad debt reported by 
hospitals is estimated by the fixed effects model.  Results from this analysis show that even 
though California community benefit law positively influences their not-for-profit hospitals’ 
decisions to carry bad debt, it does not affect the amount of bad debt hospitals carry.  In 
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contrast, the California legislation does not affect not-for-profit hospitals’ decision to offer 
charity care, but negatively affects the amount of charity care provided by these hospitals.  
After the enactment of the law in 1994, California not-for-profit hospitals carry a negative 
differential of $1,449.13 per bed per year (p=0.002) in charity care, compared to that of 
Florida not-for-profit hospitals.  Between 1996 and 2002, the negative trend continues and 
hospitals incur another negative differential of $989.44 per bed per year in charity care.   
Combined, the California community benefit law encourages more not-for-profit 
hospitals to incur uncompensated care both after the enactment and implementation of the 
law.  However, among not-for-profit hospitals that already provide these financial assistance 
to the poor, the state policy change depresses the quantity of total uncompensated care a 
differential of $1570, compared to that of Florida not-for-profit hospitals (p=0.094).   
Results from the full incremental effect across both parts of the 2PM show that the 
community benefit law has mostly negative effects on California not-for-profit hospitals’ 
financial contribution to assist the indigent (Table 5.8-5.10).  However, only one statistically 
significant incremental effect is seen in the negative impact on California not-for-profit 
hospital reporting of charity care between 1994 and 1996.   The enactment of the California 
legislation has propelled not-for-profit hospitals in the state to decrease their averaged 
provision of charity care by $1136 per bed per year.   
In Texas, the state community benefit law has a negative impact on hospitals’ 
incurrence of bad debt and charity care after the initial implementation of the law in 1993 
(Table 5.7).  Between 1993 and 1995, not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness to report bad debt 
and charity care decreases by 5.1 percentage points and 4.8 percentage points, respectively.  
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Upon amendment of the law in 1995, Texas not-for-profit hospitals’ decisions to carry bad 
debt and offer charity care are no longer affected by the law.   
  Even though the Texas community benefit law does not appear to affect the quantity 
of bad debt not-for-profit hospitals carried, its prescriptive approach positively influences 
hospitals’ provision of charity care.  After the initial implementation of the Texas legislation, 
not-for-profit hospitals incur a positive differential of $1272 per bed per year in charity care, 
compared to that of the Florida hospitals.  This positive trend continues and is augmented 
after the first and second amendments of the laws.  Between 1995 and 1997, Texas not-for-
profit hospitals increase their provision of charity care by $3138 per bed per year (p<0.001).  
After 1997, the positive differential grows to $4021 per bed per year (p<0.001).  Finally, in 
term of the combined measure of uncompensated care, the Texas state community benefit 
law positively attenuates not-for-profit hospitals’ financial contributions to the indigent after 
the first and second amendments of the law.   
The full incremental effects analysis shows that state policy change has negative but 
non-significant effects on Texas not-for-profit hospitals’ incurrence of bad debt (Table 5.8-
5.10).  However, it does have an increasingly positive and significant influence on their 
provision of charity care after 1995.  After the first amendment of the Texas legislation, the 
state policy change contributes to an averaged increase of $3,009 per bed per year in charity 
care among not-for-profit hospitals, compared to the pre-law period.  Similarly between 1997 
and 2002, the policy change renders a $3,431 increase in not-for-profit contribution to charity 
care, also.  Combining bad debt and charity care, the state community benefit law in Texas 
yields a $3,493 increase in not-for-profit hospitals’ financial assistance to the poor after 1997.   
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Other factors contribute to not-for-profit hospitals probability of carrying bad debt, 
charity care, and uncompensated care.  In general, larger hospitals and those with PPO 
contracts are more likely to report any bad debt, charity care and uncompensated care at all.  
Having a teaching status reduces hospitals’ probability of render bad debt, charity care and 
uncompensated care.  Hospitals with sicker patients as reflected in longer average length of 
stay are less likely to have bad debt and charity care.  Networked hospitals are also less likely 
to render uncompensated care.  Hospitals residing in a higher educated community have a 
lowered probability of having bad debt and providing uncompensated care.  Hospitals 
residing in counties with more minorities are less inclined to report any bad debt, charity or 
uncompensated care.  Finally, unemployment rate is negatively associated with hospitals’ 
provision of charity care, in terms of their decision to participate in the services as well as the 
amount of charity care provision upon participation.   
Even though larger hospitals accumulated larger sums of bad debt, charity and 
uncompensated care, fixed effects results show that they indeed provide significantly less bad 
debt, charity and uncompensated care per bed.  Hospitals’ network and membership status is 
associated with a statistically significant increase of $977 per bed (p=0.007) in bad debt 
provision but a significant decrease of $760 per bed (p=0.018) in charity care, compared to 
freestanding counterparts.  Rural hospitals tend to incur significantly less charity (-793.39, 
p=0.066) and uncompensated care (-1479.74, p=0.058) per bed.  Same county market 
competition reduces the amount of bad debt hospitals carry.  Hospitals residing in a county 
with more high school graduates tend to have more bad debts, but rendered less charity care.  
Increase in per capital income is associated with increase in the provision of all three 
financial measures.   
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5.4.3. The Effect of Law on Medicaid Inpatient Load 
Increased responsibility for the Medicaid populations is one of the important program 
dimensions enlisted in the California state community benefit law.  Results from the first part 
LPM indicate that the community benefit law compelled California not-for-profit hospitals to 
increase their willingness to carry Medicaid inpatients days from 2.5% after the 
implementation of the law in 1996 (Table 5.11).    In contrast, the Texas law does not appear 
to affect its not-for-profit hospitals decisions to carry Medicaid inpatient days between 1991 
and 2002.  Fixed effects regression results show that even though the California legislation 
encouraged not-for-profit hospitals’ participation in Medicaid inpatient care, it reduces the 
Medicaid inpatient days among those facilities that had already served this population by 1.6 
percentage points (p=0.033) after 1996.  Similarly, the implementation of Texas legislation 
reduces not-for-profit hospitals’ percentage of Medicaid inpatient days by 1.6 percentage 
points both after 1995 (p=0.051) and after 1997 (p=0.035), compared to the pre-law period. 
The full incremental effect analysis confirms that negative effect of Texas state community 
benefit law on not-for-profit hospitals’ percentage Medicaid inpatient days (Table 5.12).  
After the second amendment of the Texas legislation, not-for-profit hospitals reduce their 
Medicaid inpatient days by an average of 1.9 percentage points.  
Other factors that contribute to not-for-profit hospitals’ decision to carry Medicaid 
inpatient days are hospital size, patient mix, network and teaching status, market competition 
and per capita income (Table 5.11).  Specifically, larger hospitals are more likely to carry 
Medicaid inpatient days at all.  Hospitals with sicker patients have a slightly lowered 
probability of taking on any Medicaid inpatient days.  Hospitals with a teaching status are in 
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fact less likely to have any Medicaid inpatient days.  Surrounding county market competition 
stunts hospitals’ decision to carry Medicaid inpatient days.  Hospitals residing in 
communities with higher per capita income are less likely to carry special population loads as 
well.   
Fixed effects regression results show that not-for-profit hospitals with sicker patients 
are more likely to carry a higher percentage of Medicaid inpatient days.  Hospitals network 
status is associated with a decrease in the percentage of Medicaid inpatient days.  County-
wide demographic characteristics such as education level and proportion of elderly 
population are negatively associated with not-for-profit hospitals Medicaid inpatient days.   
 
5.5. Discussion 
As federal and state government continue to debate the tax exemption merits and 
social responsibilities of not-for-profit hospitals (Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, 2007), 
state community benefit laws represent a landmark legislation that can potentially resolve a 
significant portion of the controversy.  That is, if state governments are able to regulate not-
for-profit hospitals’ provision of community benefit, controversy concerning and public 
scrutiny of these hospitals’ tax exemption status, as well as their contribution to community 
welfare would largely subside.      
Different from past hospital accountability research that often focused on a singular 
dimension of hospital behavior (GAO, 2005; Ginn and Moseley, 2004; Clement et al., 2002; 
Shortell et al., 1986), analyses in this chapter aim to examine the effectiveness of state 
community benefit laws on not-for-profit hospital provision of community oriented programs, 
uncompensated care as well as Medicaid inpatient loads.  The estimation models also allow 
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for investigation on the two-fold impact of state community benefit laws – one, on not-for-
profit hospitals’ decision to provide community benefit at all, and two, on the amount of 
community benefit they would provide conditional on their service provision participation.  
The overall results suggest that the California state community benefit law is not 
effective in inducing not-for-profit hospitals’ provision of community oriented programs, as 
prescribed by the law.  In California where its community benefit law takes on a process 
approach, not-for-profit hospitals reduce their willingness to provide any community-
oriented programs after the enactment and implementation of the law.  Moreover, among not-
for-profit hospitals that already render these services, the law reduces the quantity of the 
community oriented programs they offered.  In the case of special population loads, the 
California state community benefit law compels more not-for-profit hospitals to begin taking 
on Medicaid inpatient services.  However, among those hospitals with the services, the 
implementation of the law significantly reduces the average percentage of Medicaid inpatient 
days they carry.  Even though the California legislation specifically delineates community 
oriented programs and special population services as community benefit activities, not-for-
profit hospitals appear to reduce these services.  According to Oliver’s theory (1991), not-
for-profit hospitals in California have chosen to defy the institutional pressures from state 
community benefit laws.  Given that the California legislation requires only annual written 
reporting of hospital community benefit efforts and does not impose non-compliance 
penalties, not-for-profit hospitals perceived limited external enforcement of the newly 
established institutional rule.   Therefore, they have strategically ignored the state regulation 
by reducing their provision of community-oriented programs.   
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Instead, more not-for-profit hospitals in California begin reporting bad debts during 
this time.  Yet, among hospitals that already provide charity care, there is a large deduction in 
the amount of charity care they provide per bed after 1994 and 1996.  Given the market 
competition and financial pressures facing hospitals in recent years, not-for-profit hospitals 
choose to signal their commitment to community benefit by invoking bad debts, which may 
or may not reflect their financial commitment to the indigent.  In actuality, California not-for-
profit hospitals significantly reduce their provision of charity care after the enactment and 
implementation of the state community benefit law.  Combined with bad debt, these hospitals 
also yield a significant reduction in their uncompensated care after controlling for hospitals 
size, compared with Florida counterparts.   
The Texas legislation focuses on the financial aspect of community benefit provision, 
it is not surprising that Texas not-for-profit hospitals showed a decreased probability of 
offering any community oriented programs after the initial implementation of the law in 1993.  
Further, the second amendment of the law in 1997 does induce a statistically significant and 
negative change in terms of the amount of community oriented programs offered by Texas 
not-for-profit hospitals.  It is possible that resources are being diverted to fulfill the financial 
aspects of community benefit via bad debt, charity care and uncompensated care.   
While California’s process approach to community benefit law aims to changing not-
for-profit hospitals’ service provision behavior, the Texas community benefit law specifies a 
minimum amount of community benefit in terms of financial values that hospitals must 
render in order to maintain their tax exemption status.  However, results of the analysis show 
that fewer not-for-profit hospitals are compelled to report bad debt, charity and 
uncompensated care after the initial implementation of the state community benefit law.   
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This negative trend recovers after the first and second amendments of the law.  No 
statistically significant differences are seen in not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness to 
participate in carrying and offering bad debt and charity care after 1995 and 1997, compared 
to the Florida hospitals.  Most importantly, the Texas state community benefit law is able to 
induce a significant increase in not-for-profit hospitals’ contribution to charity care 
controlling for hospital size after the implementation and each legislative modification of the 
law.   
Unlike California hospitals, Texas not-for-profit hospitals have chosen to comply 
with the state community benefit law in accordance to its specifications. A few reasons may 
contribute to the strength of the Texas legislation.  One, it results from a highly publicized 
litigation against the not-for-profit Methodist Hospital in 1990 (Noble et al., 1998).  Two, the 
financial requirements of the law are concrete and specific (Community Catalyst, 2003).  
Three, the law delineates an enforceable non-compliance penalty measure where the 
violating hospitals may be fined $1,000 every day the report is not filed (Community 
Catalyst, 2003).  As hospitals perceive consistency in institutional norm created by the media 
attention as well as the high potential for external reinforcement of rules specified by the law, 
it is likely that they have strategically chosen to accede to the new regulation.    
In terms of the relative effectiveness of these community benefit laws, results of the 
analyses strongly confirm that the Texas prescriptive approach is more effective in 
influencing not-for-profit hospitals’ community benefit behavior than the California process 
approach is (Sutton and Stensland, 2003).  California’s process approach focuses on 
assessing, evaluating, addressing, and documenting community needs.  More importantly, the 
legislative language does not delineate any enforceable evaluative measures.  The 
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descriptions on community benefit activities are intentionally broad in their scope, so that 
hospitals are not limited in their abilities to creatively meet community health needs.  These 
policy formulation decisions inadvertently created ambiguity in ways by which not-for-profit 
hospitals would choose to comply with the law.  On one hand, it is possible that California 
not-for-profit hospitals have bolstered their provision of community benefit activities in 
terms of quality and variety that were not reflected in the AHA annual survey.  On the other 
hand, without any non-compliance penalty measures, not-for-profit hospitals in California 
lack incentive to devote resources to community benefit activities or to increase the variety of 
community oriented services available to its target communities.   
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Table 5.1.  Summary statistics for analysis on effect of community benefit laws  
  Total 
(n=4,148) 
Variable  Definition  Mean 
 
Standard Error 
Dependent Variables  
   
Community-Oriented 
Programs  
%Community Oriented Services Available  46.64 26.41 
Independent 
Variables  
   
Year 94 to 96 1= yes, 0 = no  0.17 0.38 
Year 96 to 02 1= yes, 0 = no 0.57 0.50 
Year 93 to 95 1= yes, 0 = no 0.17 0.38 
Year 95 to 97 1= yes, 0 = no 0.17 0.38 
Year 97 to 02 1= yes, 0 = no 0.48 0.50 
Control Variables 
   
Hospital Size # of staffed beds in each hospital 227.02 188.20 
Length of Stay Total inpatient Days/total admissions 6.65 10.29 
Networked Hospitals % Hospitals Affiliated with Systems, 
Networks or Alliances 
83.37 37.24 
HMO Contract  1= yes, 0= no 0.52 0.48 
PPO Contract  1= yes, 0= no 0.67 0.47 
Market Competition I 1 - County Herfindahl Index 0.73 0.28 
Market Competition II 1 - Neighboring County Herfindahl Index 0.93 0.08 
Teaching Status 1= yes, 0= no 0.25 0.43 
Rural  1= rural, 0=urban 0.081 0.27 
Education Level % of people over 25 years of age with a 
high school education in each county 
76.10 6.88 
Percent Elderly % elderly in each county 12.73 5.09 
Percent Non-White  % minority population in a county 40.39 18.26 
Unemployment Rate # of unemployed / county population  6.51 3.04 
Per Capita Income  Per capital income per county 24,935.28 7961.50 
Public Hospitals  Presence of Public Hospitals within the 
same County 
0.71 0.45 
SCHIP State SCHIP expenditure/1,000,000 105.76 204.36 
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Table 5.2.  Summary Statistics for analysis on Hospital Provision of Community 
Oriented Programs  
 Total 
(n=4,148) 
With CB Provisions only  
(n=3,571) 
Variable  Mean Standard Error Mean Standard Error 
Dependent Variables  
    
Community-Oriented 
Programs  
46.64 26.41 54.17 20.05 
Independent Variables  
    
Year 94 to 96 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Year 96 to 02 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Year 93 to 95 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Year 95 to 97 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Year 97 to 02 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Control Variables 
    
Hospital Size 227.02 188.20 232.44 193.67 
Length of Stay 6.65 10.29 6.60 10.34 
Networked Hospitals 83.37 37.24 80.74 39.44 
HMO Contract  0.52 0.48 0.72 0.45 
PPO Contract  0.67 0.47 0.77 0.42 
Market Competition I 0.73 0.28 0.83 0.37 
Market Competition II 0.93 0.08 0.92 0.08 
Teaching Status 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.44 
Rural  0.081 0.27 0.09 0.28 
Education Level 76.10 6.88 75.82 6.89 
Percent Elderly 12.73 5.09 12.73 5.19 
Percent Non-White  40.39 18.26 40.15 18.32 
Unemployment Rate 6.51 3.04 6.59 3.02 
Per Capita Income  24,935.28 7961.50 24,470.36 7,766.64 
Public Hospitals  0.71 0.45 0.70 0.46 
SCHIP 105.76 204.36 101.09 205.03 
     
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Provision of Community Oriented Programs by Not-for-profit hospitals that 
provide positive quantities of these programs in California, Texas and Florida by Year (n=3,571) 
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Table 5.3.  Descriptive statistics for Analysis on Bad Debt, Charity Care and 
Uncompensated Care per bed 
 Total 
 
 
(n=3,738) 
Positive Bad Debt 
per bed only  
 
(n=3,604) 
Positive Charity 
Care per bed only  
 
(n=3,516) 
Positive 
Uncompensated 
Care per bed only 
(n=3,626) 
Variable  Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean 
 
S.E. Mean 
 
S.E. 
Dependent Variables      
    
Bad Debt/bed * 10.80 10.76 11.20 10.75     
Charity Care/bed * 7.51 11.89   7.98 12.11   
Uncompensated 
Care/bed * 
18.31 18.53     18.88 18.52 
Independent 
Variables  
    
    
Year 94 to 96 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Year 96 to 02 0.57 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50 
Year 93 to 95 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 
Year 95 to 97 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Year 97 to 02 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 
Control Variables     
    
Hospital Size 226.54 188.43 229.91 189.61 231.21 188.14 229.66 189.47 
Length of Stay 6.83 10.79 6.74 10.76 6.64 9.91 6.84 10.94 
Networked Hospitals 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.82 0.38 
HMO Contract  0.65 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.66 0.47 0.66 0.47 
PPO Contract  0.70 0.46 0.72 0.45 0.73 0.45 0.72 0.45 
Market Competition I 0.72 0.29 0.72 0.30 0.72 0.29 0.72 0.30 
Market Competition II 0.92 0.08 0.92 0.08 0.92 0.08 0.92 0.08 
Teaching Status 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41 
Rural  0.09 0.28 0.091 0.288 0.089 0.285 0.090 0.287 
Education Level 75.82 6.85 75.79 6.88 75.85 6.84 75.78 6.88 
Percent Elderly 12.79 5.19 12.83 5.21 12.84 5.26 12.82 5.20 
Percent Non-White 40.06 18.34 39.77 18.37 39.70 18.37 39.87 18.39 
Unemployment Rate 6.60 3.05 6.62 3.09 6.58 3.04 6.61 3.08 
Per Capita Income * 24470.65 7370.02 24369.27 7388.91 24403.92 7372.74 24386.61 7379.23 
Public Hospitals  0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 
SCHIP ** 101.08 201.58 100.71 201.72 102.00 202.49 101.34 202.04 
         
* value reported in $1,000.  ** value reported in 1,000,000. 
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Figure 5.2.  Average Adjusted Bad Debt per bed incurred by Not-for-profit hospitals in 
California, Texas and Florida by year 
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Figure 5.3.  Average Adjusted charity care per bed incurred by Not-for-profit hospitals 
in California, Texas and Florida by year 
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Figure 5.4.  Average Adjusted uncompensated care per bed incurred by Not-for-profit 
hospitals in California, Texas and Florida by year 
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Table 5.4.  Summary Statistics for Analysis on Medicaid Inpatient Days 
 Total 
(n=4,148) 
Positive Medicaid Load  
(n=4,062) 
Variable  Mean 
 
Standard Error Mean 
 
Standard Error 
Dependent Variables  
    
% Medicaid Inpatient Days 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14 
Independent Variables  
    
Year 94 to 96 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Year 96 to 02 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Year 93 to 95 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Year 95 to 97 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Year 97 to 02 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Control Variables 
    
Hospital Size 227.02 188.20 230.06 188.70 
Length of Stay 6.65 10.29 6.57 10.33 
Networked Hospitals 0.83 0.37 0.83 0.37 
HMO Contract  0.52 0.48 0.63 0.48 
PPO Contract  0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 
Market Competition I 0.73 0.28 0.73 0.29 
Market Competition II 0.93 0.08 0.93 0.08 
Teaching Status 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 
Rural  0.081 0.27 0.082 0.274 
Education Level 76.10 6.88 76.12 6.90 
Percent Elderly 12.73 5.09 12.77 5.12 
Percent non-White 40.39 18.26 40.24 18.29 
Unemployment Rate 6.51 3.04 6.52 3.05 
Per Capita Income  24,935.28 7961.50 24878.27 7975.74 
Public Hospitals  0.71 0.45 0.70 0.46 
SCHIP/1,000,000 105.76 204.36 104.71 203.23 
     
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Average Percentage of Medicaid Inpatient Days among not-for-profit hospitals in 
California, Texas and Florida by Year (n=4,062) 
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Table 5.5.  Effect of state community benefit laws on hospital provision of community 
oriented programs from 1991 to 2002 
 
Variable  
OLS Coefficients 
(n=4,148) 
Fixed Effects 
(n=3,571) 
CA 0.072 ***  
 (0.025)  
TX 0.10 ***  
 (0.03)  
Year 94 to 96  0.069 *** 0.16 *** 
 (0.026) (0.01) 
Year 96 to 02  0.049 0.20 *** 
 (0.032) (0.01) 
Year 93 to 95 -0.051 ** 0.018 * 
 (0.020) (0.009) 
Year 95 to 97 -0.12 *** 0.034 ** 
 (0.03) (0.015) 
Year 97 to 02  -0.15 *** 0.056 *** 
 (0.03) (0.017) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA -0.17 *** -0.046 *** 
  (0.03) (0.014) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA -0.12 *** -0.091 *** 
 (0.03) (0.013) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX -0.087 *** -0.0046 
 (0.033) (0.0140) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX -0.0038 -0.018 
 (0.0366) (0.015) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX -0.019 -0.028 ** 
 (0.033) (0.014) 
Hospital Size/100 -0.0016 0.0056 
 (0.0027) (0.0045) 
Length of Stay -0.00041 -0.0023 *** 
 (0.00041) (0.0009) 
Freestanding Hospitals -0.069 *** 0.036 *** 
 (0.012) (0.007) 
Teaching Status 0.075 *** 0.0065 
 (0.011) (0.0103) 
Rural 0.011 0.017 
 (0.019) (0.013) 
PPO Contract 0.24 *** -0.017 ** 
 (0.02) (0.009) 
HMO Contract 0.15 *** 0.022 *** 
 (0.02) (0.008) 
Market Competition I -0.092 *** 0.090 * 
 (0.026) (0.054) 
Market Competition II -0.046 -0.10 
 (0.072) (0.14) 
Education Level/100 -0.31 ** -0.83 *** 
 (0.12) (0.20) 
Percent Elderly/100 0.16 0.069 
 (0.13) (0.396) 
Percent non-Whites/100 -0.043 -0.0099 
 (0.049) (0.0900) 
Unemployment Rate/100 0.28 -0.0058 
 (0.21) (0.2204) 
Per Capital Income/1,000  0.0020 ** 0.0034 *** 
 (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Public Hospitals Presence  0.030 ** -0.033 *** 
 (0.013) (0.010) 
SCHIP Expenditure/1,000,000 0.000090 *** 0.000018 
 (0.000026) (0.000015) 
Constant 0.87 *** 1.00 *** 
 (0.13) (0.22) 
   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level.  
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 Table 5.6. Full incremental effect of changes in community benefit laws on hospital 
provision of community-oriented programs  
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  95 % Confidence Interval  
CA x (Yr1994-1996) -0.12 * 0.02 -0.15 -0.09 
CA x (Yr1996-2002) -0.13 * 0.02 -0.16 -0.10 
TX x (Yr1993-1995) -0.050 * 0.017 -0.083 -0.015 
TX x (Yr1995-1997) -0.014 0.019 -0.057 0.022 
TX x (Yr1997-2002) -0.029 0.017 -0.059 0.007 
Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* Significance at 5% level.  
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Table 5.7.  Effect of state community benefit laws on Adjusted Bad Debt, Charity Care, 
and Uncompensated Care between 1991 and 2002  
Adjusted Bad Debt Adjusted  
Charity Care 
Adjusted  
Uncompensated Care 
 
 
 
Variable  
OLS 
(n=3.738) 
Fixed Effects 
(n=3.604) 
OLS 
(n=3,738) 
Fixed Effects 
(n=3,516) 
OLS 
(n=3,738) 
Random Effects 
(n=3,626) 
CA 0.024  0.013  0.030 * 12032.81 *** 
 (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.016) (3189.81) 
TX 0.045 **  0.074 ***  0.042 ** -4346.47 
 (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.019) (3331.91) 
Year 94 to 96  -0.010 -135.39 -0.017 1759.18 *** -0.013 1543.03 * 
 (0.017) (444.95) (0.023) (416.06) (0.016) (807.12) 
Year 96 to 02  -0.051 ** -96.97 -0.067 ** 2003.17 *** -0.055 *** 1759.84 * 
 (0.022) (656.04) (0.028) (589.30) (0.020) (1035.11) 
Year 93 to 95 0.032 ** -1096.82 ** 0.036 ** 320.94 0.030 ** -757.38 
 (0.014) (447.03) (0.017) (318.84) (0.013) (658.80) 
Year 95 to 97 0.023 -1292.73 * 0.036 -318.47 0.021 -1524.03 
 (0.020) (647.55) (0.026) (487.62) (0.018) (952.43) 
Year 97 to 02  0.088 *** -652.13 0.11 *** -170.55 0.088 *** -659.12 
 (0.023) (902.96) (0.03) (636.52) (0.021) (1147.82) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA 0.038 * -110.36 0.025 -1449.13 *** 0.038 ** -1404.69 
  (0.020) (519.26) (0.026) (458.17) (0.018) (934.88) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA 0.032 * -711.74 0.027 -989.44 * 0.034 ** -1570.51 * 
 (0.019) (667.14) (0.024) (536.73) (0.017) (936.69) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX -0.051 ** -63.92 -0.048 * 1271.52 ** -0.050 ** 1206.33 
 (0.022) (611.32) (0.029) (628.20) (0.020) (1139.55) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX 0.0042 -860.74 0.013 3138.21 *** 0.0065 2407.07 ** 
 (0.0245) (696.00) (0.032) (686.49) (0.0224) (1139.55) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX -0.030 256.67 -0.039 4020.74 *** -0.031 4474.84 *** 
 (0.022) (770.17) (0.029) (666.45) (0.020) (1069.85) 
Hospital Size/100 0.022 *** -22.55 *** 0.020 *** -945.93 *** 0.021 *** -2163.01 *** 
 (0.002) (3.61) (0.002) (226.10) (0.002) (284.09) 
Length of Stay -0.00046 * -32.32 -0.0012 *** 12.15 0.00034 -67.13 ** 
 (0.00027) (24.94) (0.0003) (19.55) (0.00024) (31.42) 
Networked Hospitals -0.012 976.92 *** 0.0041   -760.20 ** -0.014 ** 370.71 
 (0.008) (364.47) (0.0103) (320.87) (0.007) (479.70) 
Teaching Status -0.10 *** -944.91 -0.083 *** 2423.00 *** -0.098 *** 2517.80 *** 
 (0.01) (668.44) (0.010) (790.71) (0.007) (805.59) 
Rural 0.012 -269.90 0.0069 -793.39 * 0.012 -1479.74 * 
 (0.013 ) (649.36) (0.0165) (430.72) (0.012) (780.78) 
PPO Contract 0.096 *** 78.45 0.11 *** -978.98 ** 0.098 *** -673.38 
 (0.012) (460.69) (0.02) (424.68) (0.011) (643.25) 
HMO Contract -0.0098 -174.39 -0.013 1220.39 *** -0.017 909.44 
 (0.0112) (423.29) (0.015) (421.00) (0.010) (615.63) 
Market Competition I 0.019 -4817.46 ** 0.057 ** 102.16 0.026 * -2864.41 
 (0.017) (2186.62) (0.023) (1766.13) (0.016) (2706.34) 
Market Competition II -0.073 -6157.18 -0.040 6229.88 -0.058 9714.58 
 (0.048) (6490.13) (0.063) (4907.27) (0.044) (8428.18) 
Education Level/100 -0.30 *** 378.77 ** -0.096 -50197.47 *** -0.31 *** -13722.17 
 (0.08) (155.60) (0.109) (11273.65) (0.08) (11132.73) 
Percent Elderly/100 -0.027 -236.22 0.14 -38090.29 ** -0.014 -53667.74 *** 
 (0.089) (264.61) (0.12) (17293.70) (0.081) (19463.50) 
Percent non-Whites/100 -0.15 *** 49.41 -0.12 *** -9617.41 ** -0.13 *** -4556.69 
 (0.03) (58.51) (0.04) (4573.17) (0.03) (5321.10) 
Unemployment Rate/100 -0.12 -73.03 -0.051 -1668.28 -0.31 ** -5470.86 
 (0.14) (152.38) (0.188) (12477.91) (0.13) (15422.26) 
Per Capital Income/1,000  -0.00015 0.30 ** -0.0011 205.99 *** -0.00070 488.56 *** 
 (0.00064) (0.13) (0.0008) (60.93) (0.00059) (58.84) 
Public Hospitals Presence  -0.016 * -291.90 -0.015 -988.83 ** -0.016 ** -1280.76 * 
 (0.009) (492.26) (0.011) (472.01) (0.008) (759.49) 
SCHIP 
Expenditure/1,000,000 
-0.000013 7.25 *** 0.000023 4.15 *** 0.0000024 11.32 *** 
 (0.000018) (1.16) (0.000023) (0.88) (0.0000161) (1.00) 
Constant 1.19 *** -7758.33 0.93 *** 43822.37 *** 1.20 *** 30461.56 ** 
 (0.09) (15908.29) (0.11) (11264.15) (0.08) (13607.87) 
       
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level  
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Table 5.8. Full incremental effect of changes in community benefit laws on hospital provision of 
bad debt 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  95 % Confidence Interval  
CA x (Yr1994-1996) 333.79 554.21 -699.88 1439.12 
CA x (Yr1996-2002) -319.84 717.26 -1691.33 1168.76 
TX x (Yr1993-1995) -693.81 654.67 -1949.48 609.18 
TX x (Yr1995-1997) -833.62  756.99 -2318.54 507.34 
TX x (Yr1997-2002) -126.83 774.04 -1617.91 1379.58 
Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* Significance at 5% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.9. Full incremental effect of changes in community benefit laws on hospital provision of 
charity care  
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  95 % Confidence Interval  
CA x (Yr1994-1996) -1135.69 * 495.64 -2071.03 -55.42 
CA x (Yr1996-2002) -685.99 536.00 -1655.90 534.13 
TX x (Yr1993-1995) 825.07 617.34 -407.69 1959.62 
TX x (Yr1995-1997) 3008.95 * 664.29 1677.21 4288.06 
TX x (Yr1997-2002) 3431.32 * 652.34 2116.47 4671.19 
Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* Significance at 5% level.  
 
 
 
Table 5.10. Full incremental effect of changes in community benefit laws on hospital provision 
of uncompensated care  
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  95 % Confidence Interval  
CA x (Yr1994-1996) -682.96 736.89 -1985.16 743.82 
CA x (Yr1996-2002) -1056.23 891.34 -2620.24 1025.12 
TX x (Yr1993-1995) 140.25 860.35 -1524.80 1873.44 
TX x (Yr1995-1997) 2169.11 1087.91 -63.43 4292.44 
TX x (Yr1997-2002) 3493.39 * 1062.81 1161.27 5466.13 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* Significance at 5% level.  
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Table 5.11.  Effect of state community benefit laws on Medicaid inpatient load between 
1991 and 2002  
Medicaid Inpatient Days  
 
Variable  
OLS  
(n=4,148) 
Fixed Effect 
(n=4,062) 
CA 0.014  
 (0.013)  
TX -0.00069  
 (0.01556)  
Year 94 to 96  0.0018 0.0081 
 (0.0134) (0.0063) 
Year 96 to 02  0.0016 0.010 
 (0.0165) (0.008) 
Year 93 to 95 -0.0037 0.020 *** 
 (0.0103) (0.005) 
Year 95 to 97 0.0046 0.029 *** 
 (0.0148) (0.008) 
Year 97 to 02  0.0026 0.023 ** 
 (0.0170) (0.009) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA 0.014 -0.0014 
  (0.015) (0.0074) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA 0.025 * -0.016 ** 
 (0.014) (0.007) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX -0.013 -0.00053 
 (0.017) (0.00733) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX 0.00098 -0.016 * 
 (0.01884) (0.008) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX -0.022 -0.016 ** 
 (0.017) (0.007) 
Hospital Size/100 0.017 *** 0.0016 
 (0.001) (0.0028) 
Length of Stay -0.00060 *** 0.0043 ** 
 (0.00021) (0.0022) 
Networked Hospitals -0.015 ** -0.015 *** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Teaching Status -0.057 *** 0.0040 
 (0.006) (0.0086) 
Rural 0.0088 0.0064 
 (0.0099) (0.0061) 
PPO Contract 0.0071 0.00039 
 (0.0084) (0.00556) 
HMO Contract 0.0092 -0.0021 
 (0.0081) (0.0050) 
Market Competition I -0.0016 0.013 
 (0.0134) (0.040) 
Market Competition II -0.14 *** -0.059 
 (0.04) (0.069) 
Education Level/100 0.0012 -0.32 *** 
 (0.0636) (0.12) 
Percent Elderly/100 0.051 -0.37 * 
 (0.067) (0.21) 
Percent non-Whites/100 -0.023 -0.049 
 (0.025) (0.064) 
Unemployment Rate/100 -0.081 0.027 
 (0.110) (0.125) 
Per Capital Income/1,000  -0.00081 * 0.00041 
 (0.00044) (0.00048) 
Public Hospitals Presence  -0.0086 -0.0078 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) 
SCHIP Expenditure/1,000,000 -0.000016 0.000039 *** 
 (0.000013) (0.000001) 
Constant 1.10 *** 0.45 *** 
 (0.07) (0.13) 
   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level  
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Table 5.12. Full incremental effect of changes in community benefit laws on percent hospital 
Medicaid inpatient days 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  95 % Confidence Interval  
CA  x (Yr1994-1996) 0.0011 0.0080 -0.0149 0.0164 
CA  x (Yr1996-2002) -0.011 0.007 -0.027 0.002 
TX  x (Yr1993-1995) -0.0026 0.0081 -0.0188 0.0130 
TX x (Yr1995-1997) -0.016 0.008 -0.030 0.001 
TX x (Yr1997-2002) -0.019 * 0.008 -0.034 -0.004 
Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
THE CONTINGENCY FACTORS  
ON NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITAL BEHAVIORS 
 
   
 
This chapter investigates the structural and environmental factors that may potentially 
facilitate and/or hinder not-for-profit hospital compliance with community benefit laws.  
Scott (1995) argues that other than economic incentives, hospital response to external 
pressures, such as state imposed regulations, may differ according to their position in the 
organizational network, their organizational goals and interests and their perception of the 
type and intensity of the pressures (David, 1991, Galaskiewicz, 1991; Proenca, 2000).   Due 
to data limitations, this analysis focuses on exploring how hospital size and network status, 
possession of managed care contracts and market competition affect not-for-profit hospitals’ 
abilities and willingness to comply with state community benefit laws among the laws’ 
intended subjects of private not-for-profit hospitals.  More specifically, it aims to test 
hypotheses: (1) larger not-for-profit hospitals will respond more positively to community 
benefit laws in their provision of community benefits, compared to smaller not-for-profit 
hospitals; (2) not-for-profit hospitals with managed care contracts will respond more 
negatively to community benefit laws in their provision of community benefits; (3) 
networked not-for-profit hospitals will respond more positively to community benefit laws; 
and (4) not-for-profit hospitals residing in counties with greater market competition will 
respond more positively to community benefit laws.  
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6.1. Study Sample  
 
A total of 4,148 hospital-year observations, representing private not-for-profit short-
term community hospitals participating in both the AHA and state Annual hospital surveys 
from 1991 to 2002, were included in the analyses of the contingency effects of community 
benefit laws.  They represented the full sample used in the programmatic and special 
populations analyses.  Since some hospitals failed to report financial information, only 3,738 
hospital-year observations were used as full sample size in the financial aspect of analyses.  
Private for-profit and public hospitals were excluded from the study sample because they 
were not legally bounded by the requirements of the state community benefit laws.     
 
 
6.1.1.  Study Sample for Analysis on Community-Oriented Programs 
In the analysis to estimate the contingency effects of state community benefit laws on 
not-for-profit hospital provision of community oriented programs, a total of 4,148 hospital-
year observations were used.  On average, these hospitals provided 47% of surveyed 
community oriented programs to its local residents (Table 6.1).  Of these, 3,571 hospital-year 
observations represented not-for-profit hospitals that do provide some level of community-
oriented programs during the study period.  A higher percentage of these hospitals had 
managed care contracts.   
 
6.1.2. Data for analysis on bad debt, charity care and uncompensated care 
Analyses on the contingency factors influencing not-for-profit hospital’s compliances 
to these laws in terms of bad debt, charity care and uncompensated care included a study 
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sample of 3,738 hospital-year observations. Hospital financial information was obtained from 
state hospital surveys.  Once adjusted, hospitals appeared to incur an average of nearly 
$11,000 in bad debt per bed, and spend $7,500 per bed on charity care each year.  In total, 
they provided an average of $18,300 on uncompensated care per bed, the sum of adjusted 
bad debt and adjusted charity care, per year (Table 6.2).    
Not all not-for-profit hospitals reported bad debt, charity care or uncompensated care 
consistently between 1991 and 2002.  In fact, only 3,604 hospital-year observations 
represented not-for-profit hospitals that report positive bad debt and 3,516 and 3,626 
hospital-year observations reported positive charity care and uncompensated care, 
respectively.  A brief descriptive analysis showed that these hospitals that report bad debt and 
provide charity care shared similar organizational and environmental attributes as those that 
did not (Table 6.2).     
 
6.1.3. Data for contingency Analysis on Special Population Load  
Based on the AHA data, hospitals in the three study states carried an average of 16 
percent Medicaid inpatient days throughout the study period. Very few hospitals reported 
zero Medicaid inpatient days.  Study samples further indicated similar summary statistics 
after excluding hospitals that did not carry Medicaid inpatients (Table 6.3).   
 
 
6.2.  Model Specification  
The impact of these contingency factors associated with hospitals’ compliance with 
state community benefit laws was estimated using regression analysis according to the 
following specifications:  
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Community Benefitsth  = f [States, Timet, Contingency Factorh, State·Timest,  
State·Contingency Factorsh, Time·Contingency Factorth,  
State·Time·Contingency Factorsth, Economic Factorssth,  
Socio-demographic Factorssth, Organizational Factorsth, µst, νsth]  (6.1)  
 
Community benefit behavior categories, such as percent of community oriented programs, 
expenditure on bad debt and revenue deductions on charity and uncompensated care, and 
percent special population, are abbreviated as dependent variable Community Benefithst. The 
h subscript indicates individual hospital; the s subscript indicates treatment or control state 
group; and the t subscript indicates policy change time periods.  Each of the three continuous 
dependent variables is modeled as a function of the time dummies, state variables, 
contingency factors, the interaction between treatment states, time dummies and hospital 
contingency factor, time fixed effects and time-varying organizational, demographic and 
environmental factors.  The contingency factor is substituted with hospital size, freestanding 
status, managed care contracts and market competition, in each of the hypothesis testing.   
While the coefficient estimates of these contingency factors indicate their main 
effects on hospitals’ community benefit provision behavior over time, the coefficient 
estimates from the interactions between state, law timeline and the specified contingency 
factor, are also important.  They represent the primary independent variables that capture the 
contingency effects on hospital behaviors.  Similar to the estimation method used in the 
previous chapter, the evolution of policy changes in California and Texas is modeled 
according to their individual timelines (Figure 4.2).  It is hypothesized that the enactment, 
amendment and implementation of community benefit laws would have differential impact 
on hospital behavior. Since the time before the enactment of the law is treated as reference 
time frame, the time between the enactment and implementation of the law affords a 
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transitional period for hospitals to ramp up their service provisions. In California, the pre-
1994 period is considered the reference time.  Two time dummies are constructed to 
represent the 1994-1996 and post-1996 times.  In Texas, the reference time is pre-1993. Time 
dummies are constructed to represent the 1993-1995, 1995-1997 and post 1997 periods. The 
interactions between states and time dummies allow for across time comparison of dependent 
variables within states. The interactions between state, time dummies and hospital 
contingency factors allow for observation of changes given a contingency condition before 
and after a time period and across states.  
Finally, the model includes time category fixed effects to capture time trend.  Various 
economic, socio-demographic factors and organizational attributes are added as control 
variables.    Unspecified time invariant and time-varying state heterogeneities are represented 
in the model as µst  and νhst, respectively.  State specific regulations that extend beyond the 
beginning and the end of the study period, at the same time affect the implementation of 
community benefit laws may be one example of the time-invariant heterogeneity.  State 
specific regulations that extend beyond the beginning and the end of the study period, at the 
same time affect the implementation of community benefit laws may be one example of the 
time-invariant heterogeneity.  In contrast, time varying heterogeneity may come from 
changes in the Medicaid or Medicaid-related policy, state macro-economy or the 
demographic distributions of the population.   
 
6.3. Estimation Methods  
The contingency effects of hospital size, freestanding status, possession of managed 
care contracts and market competition on hospitals’ compliance with state community benefit 
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laws are estimated using the difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) model as the 
primary estimation method.  The DDD modeling strategy compares changes of hospital 
community benefits provision behaviors in intervention states to changes of hospital 
community benefit provision behaviors in the control state.  The first difference compares the 
post-law and pre-law hospital community benefit activities in an intervention state.  The 
second difference compares the community benefit activities differentials between one of the 
study states (i.e. Texas or California) and the control state of Florida. The last difference 
compares hospitals community benefit activities with changes in contingency conditions.   
A diagnostic examination of the distributions of dependent variables shows that 
13.9% of observations contain a zero value for the provision of community oriented 
programs.  The distributions of bad debt, charity care and uncompensated care also yield 
3.6%, 5.9% and 3% zero values.  Moreover, the distributions of Medicaid inpatient days 
show 2.1% zero values.   Given the distribution of all the dependent variables are skewed 
with zero values. This analysis employs the two-part model (2PM) which uses separate 
equations to estimate hospitals’ decision to provide community benefit and their decision 
about how much community benefit to provide in response to state community benefit laws. 
The times series setup further allows for a longitudinal perspective in answering these two 
questions.   
A linear probability model (LPM) is used to estimate whether not-for-profit hospitals 
provide community benefit, in terms of community oriented program provision, revenue 
deductions on bad debts and charity care, as well as Medicaid inpatient days, given each 
contingency factor.  The ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (equation (6.2) is 
employed as the primary model estimator.  
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βi ii X  1) (Y p === Pr        (6.2)  
In the second part of the 2PM, OLS, random effects, fixed effects estimators are 
compared with the support of specification test statistics in order to get the most efficient and 
consistent estimates of the effects of community benefit laws that are not induced by 
unobserved individual hospital heterogeneity.   The distributions of adjusted bad debt, charity 
and uncompensated care, in particular, are right skewed as are typical of distributions of 
monetary values. The Wooldridge test (Wooldridge 2000) that compares the residual squares 
of the logged model with that of the unlogged model is used to determine goodness of fit 
with dependent variable functional forms.  Results of the test indicate that unlogged forms of 
all three variables are preferred to the logged forms.   
Upon application of the same battery of specification tests, all the dependent variable 
categories of community oriented programs, uncompensated care and special populations 
yielded the same results.  Random effects estimates are preferred to OLS in the Breusch-
Pagan test of random effects.  Subsequent Hausman test rejects random effects estimates in 
favor of the consistent fixed effects estimates.  Finally, a White (1980) test indicates that the 
errors of the fixed effects estimates are heteroskadastic.  One source of such 
heteroskedasiticity could be potential omitted time-varying unobservables caused by state 
level hospital policy changes regarding certificate of needs, or free care legislations.  
Therefore, robust standard errors are applied to correct for the downward biased standard 
errors in the final results. 
Coefficient estimates from the 3-way interaction terms between time dummies, state 
treatment groups and specified contingency factors indicate the contingency impact of these 
organzitaional and market attributes on not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness and abilities to 
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comply with state community benefit laws.  These fixed effects within estimators use the 
variation in treatment status within each group to calculate the contingency effect on hospital 
behavioral change.  For example, let β represent the coefficient estimate for the interaction 
terms among Year 1994-1996, California and hospital size.  The resulting regression estimate 
can be interpreted as the difference between provision of community benefits before and 
after the 1994-1996 time period in California hospitals of a certain size minus the difference 
between provision of community benefits before and after the same period of time in Florida 
hospitals of the same size. This entire quantity is used to subtract the difference between 
community benefit provision difference before and after the same time period among 
California and Florida for-profit hospitals of a different size (equation (6.3)).   
  β = [(YYr94to96, CA, Size1 – Ypre94, CA,Size1 ) – (YYr94to96, FL, Size1 – Ypre94, FL, Size1 )]   
             -  [(YYr94to96, CA, Size2  – Ypre94, CA, Size2) – (YYr94to96, FL, Size2  – Ypre94, FL, Size2)]   (6.3) 
 
The full incremental effects of policy change variables in the 2PM are derived from 
the product of the marginal probabilities of the LPM and the marginal expected values of the 
fixed or random effects outcome.  Due to the interaction terms of the difference-in-
difference-in-difference model, the resulting incremental effects estimator is expanded into a 
equation (6.4) where the subscript Yr indicates time, St indicates states and CF indicates 
contingency factor.  The standard errors of these full incremental effects are obtained by 
bootstrapping.   
IE
 
= (βYr StCF |LPM ×E[y|y>0]) + (βYr St |LPM ×  βCF|FE/RE) + (βYrCF |LPM ×  βSt|FE/RE ) 
+ (βYr |LPM ×  βStCF|FE/RE ) + (βStCF|LPM ×  βYr |FE/RE) + (βSt|LPM ×  βYrCF |FE/RE)  
+ (βCF|LPM ×  βYr St|FE/RE)+ [Pr(y>0)×  βYr StCF|FE/RE]         (6.4) 
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6.4.   Results  
 
6.4.1. The Contingency Effect of Size on Not-for-Profit Hospitals’ Compliance with State 
Community Benefit Law 
 
Hospital size is often perceived as a reflection of its financial resources and vitality.  
In terms of not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness and abilities to render unprofitable programs 
and services, it is reasonable to assume that those with a strong and healthy financial 
background would contribute more to these activities.  Results from the regression analyses 
suggest that, as a direct effect, hospital size is an important determinant of not-for-profit 
hospitals’ decision to participate in some community benefit activities.  But, it is also 
associated with decreases in hospital financial contributions to these activities (Table 6.4).  
As a contingency factor, hospital size increases not-for-profit hospitals’ compliance with 
state community benefit law by an elevated probability to make decisions to provide 
community oriented programs and the quantity of these programs in California.  It also 
shows a facilitative influence on not-for-profit hospitals’ financial contribution to charity 
care and services to special populations in Texas.       
According to the first part OLS estimates, positive coefficients for hospital size in 
magnitudes of 0.014 (p=0.024), 0.020 (p=0.014) and 0.013 (p=0.030) indicate that, in general, 
large hospitals are more likely to taking on bad debt, and providing charity and 
uncompensated care, respectively.  This correlation appears the strongest in hospitals’ 
likelihood to provide charity care at all by an increase of 0.02%.  The coefficient estimate of 
0.0063 (p=0.091) also shows that larger not-for-profit hospitals are more inclined to take on 
any Medicare inpatient days.  In contrast, among hospitals that already provide these 
community benefit, hospital size does not contribute to an elevated quantity of these 
activities.  Regression results show that increase in hospital size is directly associated with a 
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$33.26 decrease in hospital provision of bad debt per bed (p<0.001).  This trend persists with 
hospital provision of uncompensated care.  A unit increase in hospital size decreases its 
average contribution to uncompensated care by $21.74 per bed (p=0.002).   Finally, hospital 
size appears to increase the average percentage of Medicaid inpatient days by 0.020 
(p=0.002), but decrease the average percentage of Medicare inpatient days by 0.029 
(p<0.001).  
To understand how size influences hospitals’ willingness and abilities to comply with 
state community benefit laws in each of the treatment state, focus needs to be turned to the 
coefficient estimates for the three-way interaction terms among legislative timeline, 
treatment state and hospital size.  In California, the positive OLS coefficient estimates of 
0.041 (p=0.011) and 0.024 (p=0.068) indicate that size positively influences hospitals’ 
decision to provide community oriented programs between 1994 and 1996 and after 1996.  
Compared to the reference Florida not-for-profit hospitals in the same periods, the fixed 
effects coefficient estimates for the key interaction term is 0.015 (p=0.012) after 1996 
indicating that size helps augment California hospitals’ provision of community oriented 
program after the amendment of the state community benefit law.   
In Texas where the state community benefit law stipulates not-for-profit hospital’s 
financial contributions to the poor, fixed effects regression results show that increase in 
hospital size helps to facilitate a slight increase in hospital provision of charity care by an 
average of $5.69 per bed after 1997 (p=0.049).   Further, during the same period, it increases 
hospital’s likelihood to pick up Medicaid inpatients (0.014, p= 0.070) and the percentage of 
Medicaid inpatient days these hospitals serve (0.0096, p=0.019).   
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Further, results from the full incremental effects analyses indicate that hospital size 
has statistically significant positive effect on California not-for-profit hospitals’ abilities to 
comply with state community benefit law in terms of provision of community oriented 
programs after its enactment and implementation (Table 6.5).  More specifically, a unit 
increase in hospital size increases hospitals’ willingness and provision to community oriented 
programs by 3.5 percentage points between 1994 and 1996.  The pattern persists between 
1996 and 2002 where increased hospital size helps augment California not-for-profits 
willingness and provision of these programs by 2.8 percentage points over all.   
In Texas, hospital size does not seem to have any influence on not-for-profit 
hospitals’ compliance with the state community benefit law until after the second amendment 
of the law in 1997.   By then, hospital size is seen to have positively increased not-for-profit 
hospitals’ provision of charity care by $621 per bed per year over all.  It also has a combined 
positive effect on hospitals’ percentage of Medicaid inpatient days by 1.1 percentage points.   
 
 
6.4.2. The Contingency Effect of Managed Care on Hospitals’ Compliance with State 
Community Benefit Law 
 
  Results of this analysis show that managed care has a mixed direct influence on not-
for-profit hospitals’ willingness and abilities to provide community benefit (Table 6.6).  The 
effect of managed care on not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness to participate in charity care 
(0.13, p=0.046) is statistically significant and positive.   Yet, among not-for-profit hospitals 
that already provide community oriented programs, the possession of managed care contracts 
diminishes the quantity of community oriented programs offered by hospitals in general by 
0.13% (p<0.001).   
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Specific to the influence of managed care on California not-for-profit hospitals’ 
compliance with their community benefit law, managed care plays an important role in terms 
of not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness to provide community oriented programs, bad debt 
and uncompensated care.  The OLS coefficient estimates of 0.26 (p=0.003) suggests that 
possession of managed care contracts positively influence California hospitals’ decision to 
provide community oriented programs after the initial enactment of the law.  However, 
managed care contracts seem to deter these hospitals’ decisions to carry bad debt (-0.11, 
p=0.071) and uncompensated care (-0.10, p=0.076) during the same time period.  The 
influence of managed care on both not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness as well as their 
abilities to carry out community benefit activities diminishes to non-statistical significance 
after the implementation of the California regulation in 1996.   
In Texas, managed care serves as a persistent negative force in not-for-profit 
hospitals’ decisions whether to provide any community oriented programs.  The OLS 
coefficient estimates of -0.22 (p=0.0027) for the interaction term between 1993 and 1995, -
0.44 (p<0.001) between 1995 and 1997, and -0.34 (p<0.001) between 1997 and 2002 suggest 
that this negative influence grows stronger with and is consistent over time.  Moreover, 
among not-for-profit hospitals that offer these community oriented programs, managed care 
negatively attenuates the percentage of the programs provided, compared to the reference 
hospitals in Florida.  The magnitude of this influence ranges from a decrease of 0.12% of 
community oriented programs (p=0.011) between 1993 and 1995, to that of a 0.14% 
(p=0.002) between 1995 and 1997, and to a similar decrease of 0.11% (p=0.010) in these 
activities between 1997 and 2002. 
As the Texas community benefit law stipulates the financial quantity of community 
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benefit, managed care positively encourages not-for-profit hospitals, that may not have done 
so before, to take on bad debt, charity and uncompensated care, as indicated by the positive 
OLS coefficients of 0.16 (p=0.010), 0.24 (p=0.004) and 0.17 (p=0.002), after the second 
amendment of the law, respectively.  However, this positive influence does not translate into 
statistically significant increases in not-for-profit hospital actual financial contributions to the 
poor.  Further, the OLS regression analysis results show that managed care positively 
influences hospitals’ decision to admit Medicaid (0.0.97, p=0.046) between 1997 and 2002.  
However, it does not affect the level of Medicaid inpatient days these hospitals provide as a 
result of complying with state community benefit laws.   
The full marginal effects analyses show that possession of managed care contracts has 
a combined positive 22 percentage points increase on California not-for-profit hospitals 
provision of community oriented programs between 1994 and 1996 (Table 6.7).  In contrast, 
managed care status significantly decreases Texas not-for-profit hospital’s provision of 
community-oriented programs by 24, 42 and 33 percentage points after 1993, 1995 and 1997, 
respectively.  However, hospitals’ managed care contract status positively affects Texas not-
for-profit hospitals’ provision of charity care by an average of $3,275 per bed between 1997 
and 2002.       
  
6.4.3.  The Contingency Effect of Network Status on Hospitals’ Compliance with State 
Community Benefit Law 
 
 In this analysis, hospitals’ network status is defined as any affiliation with alliances, 
network or health systems.  As a direct influence, regression results show that none of the 
OLS coefficient estimates for coefficient networked is statistically significant (Table 6.8).  
This implies that hospitals’ connectivity with other entities does not influence their decision 
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to participate in any of the community benefit activities as specified by this study.  Among 
hospitals that already provide community-oriented programs, hospitals’ network status 
decreases the percentage of Medicaid inpatient days they carry provide by 0.028% (p=0.040).   
In California, the contingency effect of not-for-profit hospitals’ network status on 
their compliance with the law appears most prominent in influencing hospital decisions to 
participate in community benefit activities, if they do not before.  The OLS coefficient 
estimates of -0.20 (p=0.009) and -0.19 (p=0.006) indicate that networked hospitals are less 
likely to begin providing any community oriented programs than their freestanding 
counterparts in response to the enactment and implementation of California community 
benefit law.  However, among hospitals that do provide these programs, lack of affiliation 
with other organizations does not affect the level of hospitals’ provision of these programs, 
compared to the reference hospitals in Florida.    
 In the financial category, hospitals’ network status seems to discourage California 
not-for-profit hospitals’ decision to provide bad debt, charity and uncompensated care 
especially after the implementation of the state regulation in 1996.  In terms of bad debt, 
there is a 8.5% (p=0.076) decreased probability to report such expenses among networked 
hospitals.  They are also 14% (p=0.028) and 12% (p=0.006) less likely to report or incur 
charity and uncompensated care deductions than their freestanding counterparts during the 
same time period.   Moreover, Texas not-for-profit hospitals respond to their state 
community benefit law in a similar fashion.  After the second amendment of the law, 
networked hospitals become less likely to incur or report bad debt, charity and 
uncompensated care, compare to networked hospitals, by 11% (p=0.047), 12% (p=0.097) and 
10% (p=0.042) respectively.   
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 In terms of services to special populations, hospitals’ network status does not affect 
hospitals’ decisions to admit Medicaid patients.  In California, the random effects coefficient 
of -0.053 (p=0.007) for years 1996 to 2002 signals a negative differential in the percentage of 
Medicaid inpatients among freestanding hospitals in response to the policy change at that 
time.  Networked hospitals in Texas follow the same pattern.  As the state law evolves, a 
random effects coefficient estimate of -0.051 (p=0.029) suggests that hospitals’ network 
status hinders their admittance of Medicaid inpatients in response to the regulation change.   
 Marginal effects analysis results reveal that hospitals’ network status has negative 
effects on California not-for-profits’ provision of community-oriented programs and 
percentage of Medicaid inpatient days (Table 6.9).  As the law is first enacted in 1994, 
California hospitals’ network status is associated with a 13 percentage points decrease in 
their provision of community oriented program, compare to networked hospitals.  After the 
actual implementation of the law, the negative influence persists at the 9.1 percentage point 
level.  During the same time, hospitals’ network status decreases their percentage of 
Medicaid inpatient days by an overall 5.5 percentage points.  In Texas, hospitals’ network 
status does not yield statistical significant changes in their community benefit behaviors, 
except in the provision of community oriented programs.   
 
 
6.4.4.  The Contingency Effect of County-Level Market Competition on Hospitals’ 
Compliance with State Community Benefit Law 
 
 Market competition has been known as a strong driving force in health care 
management (Gresenz, et al., 2007).  Results from this analysis suggest that directly market 
competition has mixed effects on hospitals’ community benefit behaviors (Table 6.10). 
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However, as a contingency factor, market competition seems to have positive effects on not-
for-profit hospitals’ decision to participate in and level of community benefit provisions.   
 As a direct effect, the OLS estimates of market competition I yields a -0.21 
(p=0.008) in terms of hospitals’ decision to provide any community oriented programs.  This 
outcome suggests that market competition dissuades hospitals from providing community 
oriented programs or adding to the variety of community oriented programs available to local 
residents.  However, an OLS coefficient estimate of 0.13 (p=0.070) shows that market 
competition seems to encourage not-for-profit hospitals to participate in providing charity 
care, if they do not before.  Market competition also affects hospitals’ services to special 
populations.  Fixed effects regression results show that market competition, in general, is 
associated with a decrease in not-for-profit hospitals’ percentage of Medicaid inpatient days 
(-0.30, p=0.012). 
As a contingency factor, market competition has a positive and significant effect on 
many aspects of California not-for-profits community benefit behaviors, especially after the 
implementation of the law in 1996.  During the transition period between the enactment and 
the implementation of the law, market competition positively encourages more California 
not-for-profits to provide charity care (0.18, p=0.074), if they do not already.  After the 
implementation of the law, greater market competition seems to increase California not-for-
profits’ commitment to community benefit activities.  Responding to the programmatic 
aspects of the law, market competition helps to increase the variety of community oriented 
programs provided by these hospitals by 14% (p=0.003).  Even without regulatory mandate, 
increasing saturation in hospital market helps augment California not-for-profits’ levels of 
charity and uncompensated care per bed.  Random effects results show that a unit percentage 
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increase in market competition is associated with an average of $58.82 (p=0.003) and $67.44 
(p=0.033) boost in hospitals’ spending on charity and uncompensated care, respectively.  
Marginal effects analysis confirms that the full incremental effect of market competition can 
boost California not-for-profits provision of charity care by a significant average of $4727 
per bed per year after 1996 (Table 6.11).   
In Texas, the contingency effects of market competition are most prominently 
observed in not-for-profit hospitals’ financial contributions to community benefit activities 
after the second amendment of the law in 1997.  Fixed effects regression results suggest that 
a unit percentage increase in market competition is associated with an average increase of 
$53.09 (p=0.054) bad debt per bed.  Similarly, market competition helps to facilitate Texas 
not-for-profit hospitals’ contribution to uncompensated by an average of $67.21 (p=0.054) 
per bed during the same time period.   
 
6.5. Discussion 
This chapter aims to examine organizational and environmental attributes that may 
influence hospitals’ willingness and abilities to provide community benefit in compliance 
with state community benefit laws.  The analysis focuses on four prominent factors: hospital 
size, managed care contract, freestanding status and market competition.  Results from the 
analysis suggest that there is no single sweeping statement that can describe the effect of 
each of these factors on hospital behavior simply.  Hospitals must make operational decisions 
amid a complex array of organizational and socio-economic considerations.  These 
contingency factors influence hospital behaviors differently under different circumstances.  
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The first hypothesis of this chapter posits that larger hospitals will respond more 
positively to community benefit laws in terms of their provision of community benefit.  
Results of the study support this hypothesis among both California and Texas hospitals in 
general.    Hospital size is often perceived as a reflection of its financial resources and vitality.  
Those with ample means also have flexibility in shifting resources to meet rising needs and 
changes.  As the California legislation emphasizes the programmatic aspects of community 
benefit, increases in hospital sizes are seen to positively affect hospitals’ decisions to 
participate in these activities.  Further, after the implementation of the law in 1996, 
expansion of hospital size helps to augment the variety of community oriented program made 
available to patients and local residents.   
In Texas, the facilitative influence of hospital size on hospitals compliance with the 
new state regulation is not as prominent as seen in California.  There, not-for-profit hospitals 
have not experienced a legislative transitional period between the enactment and the 
implementation of the law, as in California.  The Texas community benefit law was enacted 
and implemented in the same year 1993.  It may be that hospitals scramble to comply with 
the law initially and are not as effective in maneuvering their resources to comply with the 
new regulation.  As state legislators and hospitals modify and adjust to the requirements of 
the law, it does appear that large hospital size is associated with an increased spending on 
charity care after 1997.  Albeit not specified in the legislative language, hospital size also 
helps propel Texas not-for-profits to participate in more Medicaid inpatient services as well 
as the amount of these services.  With limited and diminishing government subsidies, 
hospitals are forced to find internal resources to support Medicaid patient services 
(Zwanzeger and Bamezai, 2006).  Large hospitals are more likely to have access to resources 
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and flexibility to accommodate these needs.  Therefore, findings from this analysis not only 
support the hypothesis that hospital size is a facilitative contingency factor in hospitals’ 
compliance with state community benefit laws, they are also consistent with previous 
findings that not-for-profit hospitals gear their resources and assets in compliance with state 
community benefit laws in accordance to their legislative languages.    
Managed care, as a financial management strategy to optimize hospitals’ operational 
efficiencies and profit margins, has a great impact on hospitals’ service configurations and 
their willingness to invest in social causes (Currie and Fahr, 2000; Davidoff, et al., 2000; 
Bian and Morrisey, 2006; Gresenz, et al., 2007).  The contingency effect of managed care on 
hospitals provision of community benefit is not as clear-cut as that of hospital size. The study 
hypothesis posits that hospitals with managed care contracts would respond more negatively 
to community benefit laws reflected in the decreased provision of community benefit.  In 
California, possession of managed care contracts actually compel more hospitals to 
participate in the provision of community oriented programs after the initial enactment of the 
law.  However, among not-for-profit hospitals that already provide community oriented 
programs, possession of managed care contracts does not change the level of such services 
rendered.  This outcome makes intuitive sense in that participation in managed care plans 
exposes hospitals to a wider clientele and a more community oriented service scheme, 
compare to their operational strategy under the fee-for-service model.  Managed care plans 
strive to maintain an adequate health condition for the largest percentage of their enrollees 
possible.  Community oriented programs specified by this study aim to educate and 
communicate health and disease management knowledge and skills, open access to 
preventative services, and provide auxiliary support to reduce the burden of care.  By 
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offering community oriented programs to the community, hospitals previously lacking these 
programs align their service configuration with managed plans’ focus on preventative care.  
In contrast, among California not-for-profits that already provide these community-oriented 
programs, there are few financial incentives under managed care to increase the variety of 
these services available to clients.  Further, managed care pinches hospitals’ profit margins as 
Bazzoli and colleagues (2005) point out that health maintenance organizations had 
tremendous power to constrain hospital payment growth between 1996 and 2002.  As long as 
hospitals fulfill the requirements of the new law, bottom-line pressures from managed care 
participation may divert resources towards assessing and analyzing community health needs, 
as required by the law.     
In terms of financial commitment to the indigent, managed care in fact negatively 
affect California not-for-profit hospitals’ decision to take on any bad debt and 
uncompensated after the enactment and before the implementation of the law between 1994 
and 1996.   As the California law does not place emphasis on the fiscal aspects of community 
benefit, not-for-profit hospitals again have no incentive to devote resources in these causes.   
  In Texas, the influence of managed care on hospitals’ compliance with the law can 
best be seen in hospitals’ divergence from community oriented programs and decision to take 
on bad debt, charity and uncompensated care, as well as their decision to participate in 
Medicaid and Medicare inpatient care.  Beginning from the enactment and implementation of 
the new law emphasizing not-for-profit hospitals financial contribution to community benefit, 
managed care status deters hospitals’ effort to commit to any or provide more community-
oriented programs.  Instead, it becomes a driving force, after the second amendment of the 
law, for Texas not-for-profit hospitals to commit to the fiscal and special populations aspects 
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of community benefit if they have not already.   Contrary to the predictions of the original 
hypothesis, managed care status does not affect the level of financial contributions Texas not-
for-profits devote to patients in general.  One exception is seen in the dramatic decrease of 
bad debt after the second amendment of the law.  Results of this analysis suggest that 
managed care indeed serves as a fiscal management tool among Texas not-for-profit 
hospitals.  As soon as the new law is implemented, managed care helps to divert resources 
away from unnecessary programs and services not required by the new regulations.  In 
addition, participation in managed care may compel more Texas not-for-profit hospitals to 
comply with the new law by contributing to bad debt, charity and uncompensated care.  Yet, 
it also depressed the amount of bad debt incurred by these hospitals by a large amount.   
In this information era, hospitals’ affiliations with industry alliances, networks and 
health care systems potentially serve to enhance their abilities to share information, and 
financial and human resources in response to the changing environment.  Without such 
external connections, hospitals may trail industry movements in best practices, resource 
management and policy compliance (Oliver, 1991).  Results of this analysis do not support 
the hypothesis that networked hospitals would respond more positively to state community 
benefit laws.  In California where the community benefit law makes the largest impact on 
hospitals’ provision of community oriented program, networked not-for-profit hospitals are 
in fact less likely, than those with external affiliations, to provide any community oriented 
programs. After the implementation of the law in 1996, hospitals’ network status hinders 
incurrence of bad debt, charity and uncompensated care.  Further, it is also associated with a 
significant decrease in the percentage of Medicaid inpatient days that a not-for-profit hospital 
carries.  Similarly in Texas, after the second amendment of the law, networked hospitals are 
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less likely to incur any financial contributions to assist the indigent.  However, this does not 
affect the actual level of bad debt, charity and uncompensated care provided by hospitals in 
all years after the enactment of the new policy.    
This analysis outcome seems to suggest that even though freestanding hospitals do 
not have the advantage of information and resource sharing with other hospitals, legitimacy 
and survival may be their incentive to participate in community benefit activities.  Without 
networked hospitals’ support and program sharing capacities, freestanding hospitals must 
rely on their own services inventories to build reputation and client trust.  However, as these 
hospitals may lack tangible and intangible resources compared to their networked 
counterparts, their freestanding status actually does not affect the level of community benefit 
activities they provide.   
Finally, market competition defined by county level hospital saturation has served to 
be a positive contingency factor in California and Texas not-for-profit hospitals’ policy 
compliance experience, as predicted by the study hypothesis.  In California, market 
competition not only helps hospitals increase the variety of community oriented programs 
they offer, it also augments the amount of charity and uncompensated care incurred by these 
hospitals.  Similarly in Texas, market competition facilitates an increase in the amount of bad 
debt and uncompensated care carried by not-for-profit hospitals after the second amendment 
of the law in 1997.  Consistent with the theoretical underpinnings, market competition indeed 
serves as an external contingency factor that amplifies the positive effects of state community 
benefit laws in this study.  It intensifies not-for-profit hospitals’ need to maintain or heighten 
their good will image to retain and recruit customers.  This outcome also confirms that a 
large part of not-for-profit hospitals’ social validity hinges on their abilities to contribute to 
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public welfare.  In addition, competition cultivates the impression of uncertainty in a market 
place which, in turn, facilitates conformity (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1995; Shortell et al., 1986).     
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Table 6.1.  Summary Statistics for contingency analysis on Hospital Provision of 
Community Oriented Programs  
  Total 
(n=4,148) 
With CB Provisions only  
(n=3,571) 
Variable  Definition  Mean 
 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Error 
Dependent Variables  
     
Community-Oriented 
Programs  
%Community Oriented 
Services Provided 
0.47 0.26 0.54 0.21 
Independent 
Variables  
     
Hospital Size   # of staffed beds in 
each hospital 
227.02 188.20 232.44 193.67 
Freestanding Hospitals No affiliations with 
Hospital Systems, 
Networks or Alliances 
0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39 
HMO Contract  1= yes, 0= no 0.63 0.48 0.73 0.44 
PPO Contract  1= yes, 0= no 0.67 0.47 0.78 0.41 
Market Competition I 1 - County Herfindahl 
Index 
0.73 0.29 0.72 0.30 
Control Variables 
     
Length of Stay Total inpatient 
Days/total admissions 
6.65 10.29 6.60 10.34 
Market Competition II 1 - Neighboring County 
Herfindahl Index 
0.93 
 
0.08 0.92 0.08 
Teaching Status 1= yes, 0= no 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.44 
Rural  1= rural, 0=urban 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 
Education Level % of people over 25 
years of age with a high 
school education in 
each county 
76.10 6.88 75.82 6.89 
Percent Elderly % elderly in each 
county 
12.73 5.09 12.73 5.19 
Percent Non-White  % minority population 
in a county 
40.39 18.26 40.15 18.32 
Unemployment Rate # of unemployed / 
county population  
6.51 3.04 6.59 3.02 
Per Capita Income  Per capital income per 
county 
24,935.28 7,961.50 24,470.36 7,766.64 
Public Hospitals  Presence of Public 
Hospitals within the 
same County 
0.71 0.45 0.70 0.46 
SCHIP * State expenditure on 
SCHIP 
105.76 204.36 101.09 205.03 
      
* value reported in 1,000,000.  
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Table 6.2.  Descriptive statistics for contingency analysis on Bad Debt, Charity Care 
and Uncompensated Care 
 Total 
(n=3,738) 
Positive Bad Debt 
only  
(n=3,604) 
Positive Charity 
Care only 
(n=3,516) 
Positive 
Uncompensated 
Care only 
(n=3,626) 
Variable  Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean 
 
S.E. Mean 
 
S.E. 
Dependent Variables      
    
Bad Debt per bed * 10.8 10.8 11.2 10.7 - - - - 
Charity Care per bed* 7.5 11.9 - - 8.0 12.1 - - 
Uncompensated Care 
per bed * 
18.3 18.5 - - - - 18.9 18.5 
Independent 
Variables  
    
    
Hospital Size 226.54 188.43 229.91 189.61 232.82 189.17 229.65 189.50 
Freestanding Hospitals 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.18 0.38 
HMO Contract  0.65 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.66 0.47 
PPO Contract  0.71 0.45 0.73 0.44 0.74 0.44 0.73 0.44 
Market Competition I 0.72 0.29 0.72 0.30 0.72 0.29 0.72 0.30 
Control Variables     
    
Length of Stay 6.92 10.79 6.74 10.76 6.64 9.93 6.84 10.94 
Market Competition II 0.92 0.08 0.91 0.08 0.92 0.08 0.92 0.08 
Teaching Status 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41 
Rural  0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 
Education Level 75.82 6.85 75.79 6.88 75.83 6.83 75.78 6.88 
Percent Elderly 12.79 5.19 12.83 5.21 12.94 5.27 12.82 5.20 
Percent Non-White 40.06 18.34 39.77 18.38 39.76 18.38 39.87 18.39 
Unemployment Rate 6.60 3.05 6.61 3.09 6.58 3.06 6.61 3.08 
Per Capita Income * 24.47 7.37 24.37 7.39 24.39 7.37 24.38 7.38 
Public Hospitals  0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 
SCHIP ** 101.08 201.58 100.71 201.72 101.82 203.17 101.31 202.07 
         
* value reported in $1,000. 
** value reported in 1,000,000.  
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Table 6.3.  Summary Statistics for Analysis on Medicaid Inpatient Days 
 Total 
(n=4,148) 
Positive Medicaid Load  
(n=4,062) 
Variable  Mean 
 
Standard Error Mean 
 
Standard Error 
Dependent Variables  
    
% Medicaid Inpatient Days 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14 
Independent Variables  
    
Hospital Size 227.02 188.20 230.06 188.70 
Freestanding Hospitals 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.37 
HMO Contract  0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 
PPO Contract  0.67 0.47 0.48 0.47 
Market Competition I 0.73 0.29 0.73 0.29 
Control Variables 
    
Length of Stay 6.65 10.29 6.57 10.33 
Market Competition II 0.93 0.08 0.93 0.08 
Teaching Status 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 
Rural  0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 
Education Level 76.10 6.88 76.12 6.90 
Percent Elderly 12.73 5.09 12.77 0.05 
Percent non-White 40.39 18.26 40.24 18.29 
Unemployment Rate 6.51 3.04 6.52 3.05 
Per Capita Income * 24.94 7.96 24.88 7.98 
Public Hospitals  0.71 0.45 0.70 0.46 
SCHIP ** 105.76 204.36 104.71 203.23 
     
* value reported in 1,000; ** value reported in 1,000,000.  
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Table 6.4.  The Contingency Effect of Size on Hospitals’ Compliance with State Community Benefit Laws from 1991 to 2002 
Percent Community 
Programs 
Adjusted Bad Debt  
per bed 
Adjusted Charity Care  
per bed 
Adjusted Uncompensated 
Care per bed 
Percent Medicaid 
Inpatient Days 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
OLS  
 
(n=4,148) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(n=3,571) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Fixed Effects 
 
(n=3,604) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Random 
Effects 
(n=3,516) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Random 
Effects 
(n=3,626) 
OLS  
 
(n=4,148) 
Fixed  
Effect 
(n=4,062) 
CA 0.10 ***  0.0083  0.015 -3430.19 0.0046 -10638.15 *** -0.024  
 (0.04)  (0.026)  (0.034) (2459.39) (0.0238) (3964.35) (0.020)  
TX 0.12 ***  0.019  0.072 * -689.74 0.018 -6148.02 -0.034  
 (0.04)  (0.030)  (0.039 ) (2503.77) (0.027) (4045.56) (0.023)  
Hospital Size/100 -0.0076 -0.015 0.014 ** -3326.58 *** 0.020 **  -216.73 0.013 ** -2175.63 *** 0.0067 0.020 *** 
 (0.0095) (0.011) (0.006) (710.29) (0.008 ) (430.69) (0.006) (702.84) (0.0049) (0.007) 
Year 94 to 96  0.071 ** 0.12 *** -0.015 -233.33 -0.018 1691.99 ** -0.017 1588.85 0.0083 0.016 
 (0.039) (0.02) (0.026) (941.42) (0.034) (737.77) (0.024) (1206.37) (0.0202) (0.010) 
Year 96 to 02  0.027 0.16 *** -0.065 * -81.83 -0.084 * 2176.25 ** -0.072 ** 2454.75 0.0077 0.018 
 (0.050) (0.02) (0.033) (1237.39) (0.044) (961.28) (0.031) (1569.53) (0.0255) (0.013) 
Year 93 to 95 -0.076 ** 0.029 ** 0.041 * -1274.81 0.052 * 422.36 0.031 -449.15 -0.0034 0.018 ** 
 (0.033) (0.013) (0.022) (796.69) (0.029) (635.48) (0.020) (1020.42) (0.0167) (0.009) 
Year 95 to 97 -0.15 *** 0.046 ** 0.024 -1160.03 0.045 -272.75 0.014 -765.71 0.0040 0.021 * 
 (0.05) (0.021) (0.032) (1146.36) (0.041) (912.82) (0.029) (1467.36) (0.0237) (0.012) 
Year 97 to 02  -0.16 *** 0.052 ** 0.10 *** -839.17 0.14 *** -559.20 0.10 *** -667.14 -0.0038 0.035 * 
 (0.05) (0.024) (0.04) (1336.42) (0.05) (1053.34) (0.03) (1695.51) (0.0267) (0.014) 
CA · (Hosp Size/100) -0.016 0.0088 0.0034 163.03 -0.0024 -455.41 0.0083 -583.70 0.013 -0.025 *** 
 (0.011) (0.0132) (0.0073) (834.11) (0.0096) (522.95) (0.0037) (845.17) (0.006) (0.008) 
TX · (Hosp Size/100) -0.0061 0.014 0.0077 2292.27 *** -0.00011 -322.80 0.0071 869.50 0.010 -0.018 ** 
 (0.0128) (0.013) (0.0085) (814.70) (0.01104) (511.63) (0.0077) (836.96) (0.007) (0.008) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA  -0.25 *** -0.056 *** 0.024 873.57 0.017 -1256.49 0.039 -525.79 0.021 -0.015 
 (0.05) (0.021) (0.032) (1162.10) (0.042) (933.58) (0.030) (1495.75) (0.025) (0.013) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA  -0.16 *** -0.10 *** 0.015 -14.07 0.0024 -369.83 0.040 -1329.28 0.027 -0.027 ** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.030) (1153.95) (0.0387) (899.14) (0.027) (1450.32) (0.022) (0.012) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX  -0.087 * -0.0042 -0.062 * 674.56 -0.070 832.58 -0.058 * 1134.49 -0.024 -0.0038 
 (0.050) (0.0205) (0.033) (1180.09) (0.043) (936.95) (0.030) (1523.55) (0.026) (0.0132) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX  0.027 -0.0094 -0.0020 67.98 0.0077 3116.22 *** 0.0040 2566.78 -0.0098 -0.019 
 (0.056) (0.0237) (0.0373) (1352.98) (0.0487) (1071.50) (0.0341) (1743.28) (0.0286) (0.015) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX  0.025 -0.018 -0.039 1376.50 -0.056 2912.86 *** -0.042 3803.48 ** -0.053 -0.039 *** 
 (0.050) (0.022) (0.034) (1273.12) (0.044) (1003.45) (0.031) (1634.36) (0.026) (0.014) 
Year 94 to 96  · (Hosp 
Size/100) -0.0016 0.017 *** 0.0021 86.71 0.00090 -43.69 0.0016 20.22 -0.0024 -0.0035 
 (0.0119) (0.005) (0.0079) (274.04) (0.01026) (216.80) (0.0072) (354.74) (0.0061) (0.0003) 
Year 96 to 02  · (Hosp 
Size/100) 0.0078 0.015 ** 0.0067 87.35 0.0081 -230.06 0.0075 -224.03 -0.0023 -0.0027 
 (0.0160) (0.007) (0.0107) (372.82) (0.0140) (296.36) (0.0098) (482.58) (0.0082) (0.0041) 
Year 93 to 95 · (Hosp 
Size/100) 0.010 -0.0053 -0.0035 88.82 -0.0070 -87.80 -0.00013 -110.94 0.00013 0.00084 
 (0.011) (0.0044) (0.0073) (258.24) (0.0095) (208.08) (0.00668) (3331.34) (0.00565) (0.00285) 
Year 95 to 97  · (Hosp 
Size/100) 0.011 -0.0061 -0.00035 -45.69 -0.0037 -108.72 0.0027 -299.89 0.00068 0.0033 
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 (0.016) (0.0066) (0.01048) (367.36) (0.0137) (296.11) (0.0096) (473.19) (0.00803) (0.0040) 
Year 97 to 02  · (Hosp 
Size/100) 0.0049 -0.00010 -0.0056 91.26 -0.013 30.63 -0.0056 16.44 0.0030 -0.0048 
 (0.0175) (0.00745) (0.0118) (415.28) (0.015) (331.94) (0.0107) (534.25) (0.0089) (0.0045) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA · (Hosp 
Size/100) 0.041 ** 0.0091 0.0067 -543.37 0.0026 -11.36 0.000065 -512.79 -0.0042 0.0060 
 (0.016) (0.0070) (0.0107) (380.17) (0.0140) (311.76) (0.009816) (490.34) (0.0082) (0.0042) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA · (Hosp 
Size/100) 0.024 * 0.015 ** 0.0083 -504.59 0.011 -120.99 -0.0024 -301.70 -0.0014 0.0040 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.0090) (335.61) (0.012) (269.17) (0.0082) (427.77) (0.0067) (0.0036) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX · (Hosp 
Size/100) 0.0018 0.0012 0.0052 -338.52 0.0091 20.33 0.0040 -4.42 0.0046 0.0015 
 (0.0162) (0.0065) (0.0107) (372.02) (0.0139) (295.51) (0.0097) (481.28) (0.0083) (0.0042) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX · (Hosp 
Size/100) -0.011 0.00025 0.0035 -432.10 0.0018 64.07 0.0023 -163.22 0.0043 0.0010 
 (0.018) (0.00739) (0.0117) (417.56) (0.0153) (328.95) (0.0107) (537.86) (0.0091) (0.0046) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX · (Hosp 
Size/100) -0.017 0.00072 0.0043 -522.71 0.0069 569.38 * 0.0054 230.76 0.014 * 0.0096 ** 
 (0.015) (0.00646) (0.0100) (371.69) (0.0130) (288.93) (0.0091) (472.97) (0.008) (0.0041) 
Length of Stay -0.00034 -0.0019 *** -0.00041 -31.13 -0.0011 *** -7.91 0.00038 -68.45 ** -0.00055 *** 0.0042 *** 
 (0.00041) (0.0006) (0.00027) (29.25) (0.0003) (25.40) (0.00024) (31.48) (0.00021) (0.0003) 
Network Status -0.066 *** 0.039 *** -0.013 * 924.15 ** 0.0038 -766.04 ** -0.015 ** 288.12 -0.017 *** -0.015 *** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)  (377.42) (0.0104) (299.33) (0.007) (481.68) (0.006) (0.004) 
Teaching Status 0.077 *** 0.0033 -0.10 *** -848.51 -0.084 *** 2913.01 *** -0.099 *** 2587.04 *** -0.059 *** 0.0045 
 (0.011) (0.0117) (0.01) (669.01) (0.010) (489.27) (0.007) (809.25) (0.006) (0.0071) 
Rural 0.012 0.0036 0.011 -342.61 0.0061 -913.33 * 0.013 -1673.80 ** 0.0044 0.010 
 (0.019) (0.0117) (0.013) (642.99) (0.0168) (490.51) (0.012) (799.62) (0.0100) (0.007) 
PPO Contract 0.24 *** -0.014 0.096 *** 8.92 0.11 *** -822.20 ** 0.097 -713.92 0.0057 0.00081 
 (0.02) (0.008) (0.012) (501.71) (0.02) (395.90) (0.011) (645.77) (0.0084) (0.00516) 
HMO Contract 0.15 *** 0.019 ** -0.0093 -130.40 -0.013 1077.11 *** -0.016 910.93 0.0098 -0.0023 
 (0.02) (0.008) (0.0113) (481.10) (0.015) (377.72) (0.010) (618.28) (0.0081) (0.0049) 
Market Competition I -0.086 *** 0.088 * 0.012 -4392.63 * 0.054 ** 1866.85 0.020 -2536.93 -0.014 0.014 
 (0.026) (0.045) (0.018) (2561.01) (0.023) (1658.93) (0.016) (2712.43) (0.013) (0.028) 
Market Competition II -0.046 -0.059 -0.080 -4619.95 -0.043 9981.32 * -0.063 9743.01 -0.15 *** -0.069 
 (0.072) (0.146) (0.049) (8176.16) (0.063) (5169.30) (0.044) (8459.51) (0.04) (0.091) 
Education Level/100 -0.25 ** -0.57 *** -0.27 *** 30956.18 ** -0.081 -37167.10 *** -0.29 *** -17608.79 0.021 -0.32 *** 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.09) (12257.67) (0.111) (7048.47) (0.08) (11425.11) (0.064) (0.12) 
Percent Elderly/100 0.14 -0.030 -0.037 -19852.02 0.14 -27369.17 ** -0.024 -51950.74 *** 0.035 -0.40 
 (0.13) (0.409) (0.090) (23487.82) (0.12) (12075.17) (0.083) (19577.39) (0.067) (0.24) 
Percent non-Whites/1000) -0.046 -0.014 -0.14 *** 4801.87 -0.12 *** -8341.76 ** -0.13 *** -4947.92 -0.018 -0.054 
 (0.049) (0.095) (0.03) (5751.51) (0.04) (3300.85) (0.03) (5347.01) (0.025) (0.059) 
Unemployment Rate/100 0.43 ** 0.0016 -0.12 -8856.70 -0.049 -4370.95 -0.32 ** -8380.25 -0.10 0.055 
 (0.22) (0.2206) (0.15) (12820.33) (0.194) (9535.01) (0.14) (15501.83) (0.11) (0.134) 
Per Capital Income/1,000  0.0019 ** 0.0026 *** -0.00030 307.85 *** -0.0012 215.63 *** -0.00078 492.74 *** -0.00098 ** 0.00047 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.00065) (48.64) (0.0008) (37.21) (0.00059) (59.54) (0.00044) (0.00043) 
Public Hospitals Presence  0.030 ** -0.030 *** -0.014 * -321.71 -0.014 -899.54 * -0.014 * -1312.98 * -0.0062 -0.0072 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (608.94) (0.011) (464.85) (0.008) (759.92) (0.0065) (0.0064) 
State SCHIP/10000000 0.000090 *** 0.000019 -0.000013 7.32 *** 0.000023 3.79 *** 0.0000023 11.33 *** -0.000016 0.000038 *** 
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 (0.000025) (0.000014) (0.000018) (0.83) (0.000023) (0.61) (0.0000161) (1.00) (0.000013) (0.000009) 
Constant 0.83 *** 0.83 *** 1.21 *** -4205.52 0.93 *** 28141.26 *** 1.22 *** 33185.87 ** 1.13 *** 0.46 *** 
 (0.13) (0.23) (0.09) (13852.62) (0.12) (8511.28) (0.08) (13807.20) (0.07) (0.14) 
 
  
      
  
standard errors in parenthesis 
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level;   
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Table 6.5. Full contingency effect of hospital size on hospital compliance with state community benefit laws 1991-2002  
 Percent Community Benefit Program Bad Debt per bed Charity Care per bed 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  
CA x Size x (Yr1994-1996) 0.035 * 0.012 0.013 0.059 -514.70 396.10 -1389.19 184.96 -19.51 255.36 -529.24 468.15 
CA x Size x (Yr1996-2002) 0.028 * 0.007 0.015 0.043 -450.57 430.95 -1392.43 311.16 -36.34 242.56 -477.94 437.46 
TX x Size x (Yr1993-1995) 0.0015 0.0087 -0.0166 0.0172 -36.74 350.95 -709.78 708.99 278.33 245.65 -239.01 743.94 
TX x Size x (Yr1995-1997) -0.0093 0.0114 -0.0326 0.0128 -321.45 387.05 -966.96 402.27 115.58 275.60 -458.26 612.14 
TX x Size x (Yr1997-2002) -0.0116 0.0093 -0.0368 0.0034 -77.82 384.71 -998.00 618.24 620.97 * 266.02 57.91 1134.69 
Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* significant at 5% level.  
 
 Uncompensated Care per bed Percent Medicaid Inpatient Days 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error 
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  
CA x Size x (Yr1994-1996) -579.02 441.85 -1489.56 374.16 0.0057 0.0039 -0.0018 0.0132 
CA x Size x (Yr1996-2002) -456.51 510.94 -1398.72 574.39 0.0041 0.0038 -0.0021 0.0136 
TX x Size x (Yr1993-1995) 233.37 411.61 -599.94 1051.24 0.0019 0.0035 -0.0046 0.0093 
TX x Size x (Yr1995-1997) -106.44 470.95 -992.49 821.54 0.0014 0.0039 -0.0060 0.0086 
TX x Size x (Yr1997-2002) 579.46 467.57 -256.06 1556.30 0.011 * 0.003 0.006 0.018 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* significant at 5% level.  
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Table 6.6.  The Contingency Effect of Managed Care Status on Hospitals’ Compliance with State Community Benefit Laws 
from 1991 to 2002 
Percent Community 
Programs 
Adjusted Bad Debt     
per bed  
Adjusted Charity Care  
per bed  
Adjusted Uncompensated 
Care per bed  
Percent Medicaid 
Inpatient Days 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
OLS  
 
(n=4,148) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(n=3,571) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Fixed Effects 
 
(n=3,604) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Random 
Effects 
(n=3,516) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Random 
Effects 
(n=3,626) 
OLS  
 
(n=4,148) 
Random 
Effects 
(n=4,062) 
CA 0.059  -0.084 *  0.0016 -3025.01 -0.076 -9847.49 ** 0.015 -0.022 
 (0.071)   (0.051)  (0.0669) (2524.89) (0.047) (3981.76) (0.040) (0.029) 
TX 0.021  -0.031  0.084 -27.46 -0.023 -2439.73 -0.044 -0.066 ** 
 (0.072)  (0.051)  (0.067) (2571.16) (0.047) (4070.67) (0.041) (0.030) 
Managed Care 0.038 -0.13 *** 0.018 1373.98 0.13 * 2124.87 0.017 3454.44 0.015 -0.032 
 (0.068) (0.03) (0.049) (1849.22) (0.06) (1535.61) (0.045) (2389.17) (0.039) (0.021) 
Year 94 to 96  -0.32 *** -0.038  -0.14 ** 2524.91 -0.049 2796.55 -0.13 ** 5447.69 * -0.026 -0.0089 
 (0.09) (0.041) (0.06) (2350.42) (0.082) (1957.78) (0.06) (3016.32) (0.048) (0.0256) 
Year 96 to 02  -0.39 *** -0.015 -0.24 *** 1531.40 -0.20 ** 1779.98 -0.24 *** 3665.71 -0.010 -0.0049 
 (0.09) (0.045) (0.07) (2491.50) (0.09) (2063.80) (0.06) (3182.12) (0.050) (0.0264) 
Year 93 to 95 -0.0015 0.064 *** 0.15 *** -1740.60 0.12 ** 1057.96 0.14 **** -677.75 0.042 0.013 
 (0.0503) (0.023) (0.04) (1427.48) (0.05) (1150.30) (0.03) (1829.50) (0.028) (0.015) 
Year 95 to 97 -0.12 ** 0.086 *** 0.13 *** -1736.38 0.14 ** 366.21 0.12 *** -1045.85 0.041 0.030 * 
 (0.06) (0.032) (0.05) (1741.82) (0.06) (1402.12) (0.04) (2234.72) (0.034) (0.018) 
Year 97 to 02  -0.13 ** 0.099 *** 0.29 *** -1294.28 0.34 *** 895.01 0.28 *** 22.19 0.036 0.032 * 
 (0.07) (0.036) (0.05) (1903.45) (0.06) (1525.42) (0.05) (2433.61) (0.037) ) (0.019) 
CA · Managed Care -0.060 -0.0086 0.11 ** -7.28 0.0053 -1738.90 0.11 ** -2132.66 -0.0054 0.036 
 (0.073) (0.0352) (0.05) (2033.49) (0.0687) (1690.65) (0.05) (2616.18) (0.0413 (0.022) 
TX · Managed Care -0.018 0.082 0.078 49.52 -0.012 -1759.53 0.064 -1523.26 0.057 0.022 
 (0.077) (0.037) (0.055) (2100.53) (0.072) (1728.22) (0.050) (2714.16) (0.043) (0.024) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA  -0.26 *** -0.066 0.13 *** -1308.61 -0.00062 -2992.60 0.12 ** -4677.37 * 0.017 0.0050 
 (0.08) (0.041) (0.06) (2205.43) (0.0760) (1818.40) (0.05) (2830.60) (0.045) (0.0239) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA  -0.10  -0.070 * 0.091 * -397.53 0.0043 -1562.37 0.099 * -2775.07 0.0088 -0.0056 
 (0.07) (0.038) (0.053) (2096.18) (0.0700) (1722.87) (0.049) (2662.90) (0.0417) (0.0226) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX  0.21 ** 0.13 *** -0.064 -755.26 -0.10 304.02 -0.074 -375.92 0.027 0.023 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.066) (2479.15) (0.09) (2008.92) (0.060) (3208.70) (0.052) (0.027) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX  0.44 *** 0.13 *** 0.019 209.16 -0.036 2712.31 0.0064 2893.46 0.011 -0.0052 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.062) (2349.74) (0.080) (1916.72) (0.0561) (3034.88) (0.048) (0.0260) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX  0.35 *** 0.083 ** -0.13 ** 1251.22 -0.21 *** 1975.13 -0.15 *** 3241.55 -0.11 ** -0.012 
 (0.08) (0.039) (0.06) (2210.24) (0.07) (1811.30) (0.05) (2849.71) (0.04) (0.024) 
Year 94 to 96 · Managed 
Care 0.33 *** 0.21 *** 0.13 ** -2874.28 0.036 -1605.92 0.13 ** -4492.75 0.021 0.018 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (2431.58) (0.085) (2025.78) (0.06) (3135.70) (0.051) (0.027) 
Year 96 to 02 · Managed 
Care 0.40 *** 0.22 *** 0.22 *** -1562.32 0.17 * -134.62 0.22 *** -1821.87 0.00024 0.013 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (2599.24) (0.09)  (2161.78) (0.06)  (3351.22) (0.05340) (0.028) 
Year 93 to 95 · Managed 
Care -0.00051 -0.043 * -0.13 *** 599.97 -0.095 -855.53 -0.12 *** -76.53 -0.050 0.0058 
 (0.05390) (0.025) (0.04) (1508.91) (0.053) (1216.94) (0.04) (1943.30) (0.030) (0.0158) 
Year 95 to 97 · Managed 0.11 * -0.045 -0.11 ** 301.50 -0.11 * -823.58 -0.10 ** -528.30 -0.036 -0.0051 
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Care 
 (0.07) (0.035) (0.05) (1906.77) (0.07) (1536.10) (0.05) (2459.74) (0.038) (0.0197) 
Year 97 to 02 · Managed 
Care 0.092 -0.029 -0.27 *** 592.50 -0.33 *** -1508.32 -0.27 *** -786.41 -0.033 -0.016 
 (0.073) (0.038) (0.06) (2066.20) (0.07) (1661.90) (0.05) (2666.17) (0.041) (0.021) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA · 
Managed Care 0.26 *** 0.042 -0.11 * 1316.38 0.029 2114.39 -0.10 * 3753.68 -0.0034 0.0046 
 (0.09) (0.043) (0.06) (2349.67) (0.082) (1935.53) (0.06) (3029.53) (0.0481) (0.0256) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA · 
Managed Care 0.10 -0.0044 -0.039 -871.69 0.042 951.27 -0.051 730.59 0.021 0.0029 
 (0.08) (0.0392) (0.057) (2203.41) (0.075) (1826.28) (0.052) (2835.17) (0.044) (0.0240) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX · 
Managed Care -0.22 ** -0.12 ** 0.028 294.07 0.061 1120.49 0.041 1185.51 -0.054 -0.020 
 (0.10) (0.05) (0.071) (2663.71) (0.092) (2149.37) (0.064) (3445.62) (0.055) (0.029) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX · 
Managed Care -0.44 *** -0.14 *** -0.015 -1684.71 0.044 554.59 0.0033 -1241.24 -0.017 -0.0043 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.067) (2579.76) (0.088) (2094.47) (0.0615) (3337.70) (0.053) (0.0286) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX · 
Managed Care -0.34 *** -0.11 ** 0.16 ** -1689.47 0.24 *** 2580.40 0.17 *** 778.02 0.097 ** 0.0077 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (2414.33) (0.08) (1971.33) (0.06) (3122.28) (0.048) (0.0266) 
Hospital Size/100 0.00061 0.0058 0.022 *** -2235.28 *** 0.020 *** -547.36 *** 0.021 *** -2145.74 *** 0.016 *** 0.00022 
 (0.00245) (0.0043) (0.002) (263.03) (0.002) (174.73) (0.002) (284.89) (0.001)  (0.00211 
Length of Stay -0.00066 * -0.0021 *** -0.00048 * -30.44 -0.0012 *** -7.58 0.00032 -65.41 ** -0.00058 *** 0.0038 *** 
 (0.00037) (0.0006) (0.00026) (29.24) (0.0003) (25.50) (0.00024) (31.50) (0.00021) (0.0003) 
Network Status -0.057 *** 0.027 *** -0.018 **  1045.85 *** -0.0029 -821.80 *** -0.020 ***  331.69 -0.018 *** -0.016 *** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (378.64) (0.0103) (300.06) (0.007) (483.09) (0.006) (0.004) 
Teaching Status 0.068 *** 0.0042 -0.10 *** -817.78 -0.081 *** 2943.67 *** -0.095 *** 2604.01 *** -0.055 *** 0.0066 
 (0.010) (0.0115) (0.01) (669.24) (0.010) (489.96) (0.007) (809.18) (0.006) (0.0064) 
Rural -0.022 0.012 0.014 -242.32 0.010 -845.73 * 0.015 -1493.80 *  0.0097 0.0074 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (633.59) (0.016) (481.32) (0.011) (784.00) (0.0098) (0.0066) 
Market Competition I -0.099 *** 0.068 0.013 -4741.03 * 0.049 ** 1552.85 0.020 -3106.13 -0.0072 0.020 
 (0.024) (0.045) (0.017) (2568.83) (0.023) (1664.67) (0.016) (2717.49) (0.0133) (0.021) 
Market Competition II 0.095 -0.088 -0.068 -5707.35 -0.041 11668.28 ** -0.057 10927.62 -0.14 *** -0.057 
 (0.065) (0.143) (0.048) (8160.29) (0.062) (5175.98) (0.043) (8453.94) (0.04) (0.065) 
Education Level/100 -0.14 -0.72 *** -0.30 *** 35546.89 *** -0.097 -37441.81 *** -0.30 ***) -14633.35 -0.032 -0.26 *** 
 (0.11) (0.19) (0.08) (11956.18) (0.109) (6944.76) (0.08 (11246.08) (0.063) (0.08) 
Percent Elderly/100 
0.16 0.019 -0.078 -20718.68 0.11 -26614.97 ** -0.059 
-51934.83 
*** 0.0019 -0.25 * 
 (0.12) (0.401) (0.088) (23466.01) (0.12) (12113.96) (0.081) (19586.56) (0.0662) (0.14) 
Percent non-Whites/100 0.021 -0.048 -0.16 *** 6130.86 -0.13 *** -8253.12 ** -0.15 *** -4247.90 -0.039 0.0013 
 (0.045) (0.093) (0.03) (5715.97) (0.04) (3307.20) (0.03) (5344.21) (0.025) (0.0390) 
Unemployment Rate/100 0.14 -0.056 -0.082 -7156.63 0.0022 -4489.57 -0.26 ** -5368.44 -0.093 0.16 
 (0.19) (0.218) (0.143) (12909.44) (0.1864) (9588.29) (0.13) (15567.81) (0.109) (0.12) 
Per Capital Income/1,000  0.0013 0.0030 *** -0.000030 306.96 *** -0.0010 213.78 *** -0.00058 490.43 *** -0.00057 0.00013 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.000064) (48.35) (0.0008) (36.90) (0.00058) (58.93) (0.00044) (0.00041) 
Public Hospitals Presence  0.020 * -0.029 *** -0.012 -360.17 -0.010 -898.04 * -0.011 -1360.56 * -0.0051 -0.0067 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (612.43) (0.011) (468.18) (0.008) (764.10) (0.0065) (0.0061) 
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SCHIP/ 
1,000,000 0.000089 *** 0.000024 * -0.000017 7.22 *** 0.000019 3.72 *** -0.0000018 11.26 *** -0.000020 0.000040 *** 
 (0.000023) (0.000014) (0.000017) (0.83) (0.000023) (0.61) (0.0000159) (1.00) (0.000013) (0.000001) 
Constant 0.95 *** 1.04 *** 1.26 *** -8624.56  0.91 *** 26011.73 *** 1.26 *** 26652.40 * 1.13 *** 0.40 *** 
 (0.13) (0.23) (0.10) (13778.86) (0.13) (8567.09) (0.09) (13830.27) (0.08) (0.10) 
 
          
Standard errors in parenthesis  
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6.7. Full contingency effect of managed care status on hospital compliance with state community benefit laws 1991-2002  
 Percent Community Benefit Program Bad Debt per bed Charity Care per bed 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  
CA x Managed Care x 
(Yr1994-1996) 0.22 * 0.08 0.05 0.37 651.24 3272.68 -4956.83 8192.54 1789.17 1409.81 -1147.42 4537.85 
CA x Managed Care x 
(Yr1996-2002) 0.079 0.080 -0.106 0.216 -865.98 3486.24 -6411.42 7633.00 849.79 1642.94 -3059.76 3693.00 
TX x Managed Care x 
(Yr1993-1995) -0.24 * 0.09 -0.45 -0.09 352.16 2309.75 -3695.38 5252.70 1035.73 1396.06 -1681.88 3827.98 
TX x Managed Care x 
(Yr1995-1997) -0.42 * 0.10 -0.64 -0.25 -1897.54 2447.87 -6519.52 3042.10 804.35 1431.65 -2009.97 3677.97 
TX x Managed Care x 
(Yr1997-2002) -0.33 * 0.09 -0.57 -0.18 -25.15 2023.40 -3488.86 4626.09 3275.04 * 1216.44 850.01 5717.75 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* significant at 5% level.  
 
 Uncompensated Care per bed Percent Medicaid Inpatient Days 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  
CA x Managed Care x 
(Yr1994-1996) 2094.52 4008.64 -4897.03 11399.89 0.0024 0.0268 -0.0504 0.0587 
CA x Managed Care x 
(Yr1996-2002) -1022.80 4576.66 -10662.68 7908.25 0.0057 0.0245 -0.0392 0.0571 
TX x Managed Care x 
(Yr1993-1995) 1687.27 2615.29 -3737.63 6110.55 -0.024 0.027 -0.075 0.029 
TX x Managed Care x 
(Yr1995-1997) -1049.96 2861.78 -6987.32 4508.84 -0.0022 0.0234 -0.0462 0.0445 
TX x Managed Care x 
(Yr1997-2002) 3762.38 2225.30 -782.02 7875.76 0.032 0.022 -0.006 0.083 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times. 
* significant at 5% level.  
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Table 6.8.  The Contingency Effect of Network Status on Hospitals’ Compliance with State Community Benefit Laws from 
1991 to 2002 
Percent Community 
Programs 
Adjusted Bad Debt  
per bed 
Adjusted Charity Care per 
bed  
Adjusted Uncompensated 
Care per bed 
Percent Medicaid 
Inpatient Days 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
OLS  
 
(n=4,148) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(n=3,571) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(n=3,604) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Fixed Effects 
 
(n=3,516) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(n=3,626) 
OLS  
 
(n=4,148) 
Random 
Effects 
(n=4,062) 
CA 0.093 ***  0.015  0.017  0.025  0.017 0.011 
 (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.017)  (0.015) (0.021) 
TX 0.096 ***  0.042 *  0.076 **  0.040 *  0.0064 -0.039 * 
 (0.034)  (0.023)  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.0179) (0.023) 
Freestanding  -0.018 -0.022 -0.039  321.19 -0.039  1076.69 -0.033  1206.74 -0.028 -0.028 ** 
 (0.048) (0.022) (0.034) (1283.38) (0.044) (1017.40) (0.031) (1653.70) (0.025) (0.014)  
Year 94 to 96  0.054 * 0.18 *** -0.0081 -122.41 -0.024 1896.23 *** -0.011 1760.67 * 0.0026 0.0087 
 (0.029) (0.01) (0.0193) (704.81) (0.025) (553.34)  (0.018) (907.79) (0.0150) (0.0077) 
Year 96 to 02  0.036 0.22 *** -0.049 ** -177.84 -0.074 ** 2171.86 *** -0.052 ** 1998.48 * -0.00075 0.010 
 (0.035) (0.02) (0.024) (900.16) (0.031) (706.06) (0.022) (1158.60) (0.01823) (0.009) 
Year 93 to 95 -0.053 ** 0.017 * 0.042 *** -831.96 0.049 ** 115.64 0.038 *** -626.60 -0.0033 0.020 *** 
 (0.023) (0.010) (0.016) (590.91) (0.020) (463.20) (0.014) (758.74) (0.0118) (0.006) 
Year 95 to 97 -0.13 *** 0.037 ** 0.029 -1063.84 0.056 * -639.41 0.025 -1641.93 0.0074 0.033 *** 
 (0.03) (0.015) (0.022) (837.71) (0.029) (659.33) (0.020) (1075.86) (0.0165) (0.009) 
Year 97 to 02  -0.15 *** 0.051 *** 0.11 *** -458.06 0.15 *** -604.36 0.11 *** -989.75 0.0064 0.030 *** 
 (0.04) (0.018) (0.02) (1002.54) (0.03) (790.67) ) (0.02) (1288.53) (0.0187) (0.010) 
CA ·Network 
 0.082  0.043 * -0.037  183.79  0.018 -719.26 -0.026 -496.53  0.012  0.0091 
 (0.051) (0.024) (0.036) (1400.49) (0.047) (1113.36) (0.033) (1802.88) (0.027) (0.0149) 
TX ·Network -0.020  0.022 -0.013  1132.75  0.0084 -3832.84 *** -0.0088 -2435.53  0.027  0.020 
 (0.062) (0.029) (0.042) (1661.24) (0.0555) (1313.18) (0.0388) (2140.89) (0.032) (0.018) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA  -0.21 *** -0.056 *** 0.045 ** -330.51 0.024 -1748.69 *** 0.041 ** -1999.01 * 0.018 -0.0056 
 (0.03) (0.015) (0.023) (820.99) (0.029) (646.43) (0.021) (1056.57) (0.017) (0.0088) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA  -0.15 *** -0.096 *** 0.028 -786.44 0.0090 -1144.22 * 0.023 -2004.80 * 0.023 -0.021 ** 
 (0.03) (0.015) (0.020) (832.40) (0.0267) (653.73) (0.019) (1071.92) (0.015) (0.008) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX  -0.060 -0.012 -0.057 ** -245.45 -0.056 * 1986.50 *** -0.057 ** 1621.16 -0.018 -0.0032 
 (0.038) (0.016) (0.026) (918.78) (0.033) (719.54) (0.023) (1183.04) (0.020) (0.0102) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX  0.023 -0.027 0.015 -1216.47 0.014 3879.20 *** 0.015 2564.68 ** -0.0023 -0.023 ** 
 (0.041) (0.018) (0.027) (1005.56) (0.036) (788.34) (0.025) (1295.01) (0.0213) (0.011) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX  -0.0024 -0.024 -0.042 * 108.48 -0.054 4796.95 *** -0.043 * 4822.22 *** -0.029 -0.024 ** 
 (0.0373) (0.016) (0.025) (650.72) (0.033) (745.37) (0.023) (1224.61) (0.019) (0.010) 
Year 94 to 96 
·Network -0.048  0.092 ***  0.0092  590.54 -0.043  1239.71  0.0158  1805.64  0.0016 -0.0055 
 (0.064) (0.026) (0.0439) (1561.92) (0.057 (1656.81) (0.0401) (2012.87) (0.0333) (0.0170) 
Year 96 to 02 · 
Network -0.041  0.062 *  0.015 -117.77 -0.036  1374.52  0.034  1079.31 -0.020  0.0040 
 (0.085) (0.035) (0.058) (2101.27) (0.076) (1656.81) (0.053) (2706.63) (0.044) (0.0237) 
Year 93 to 95 · 
Freestanding 0.016 -0.012  0.033  1237.23  0.051 -176.34  0.027  1317.02 -0.00098  0.0091 
 (0.047) (0.019) (0.032) (1136.63) (0.042) (909.50) (0.029) (1462.63) (0.02450) (0.0126) 
Year 95 to 97 · -0.070  0.012  0.012  990.99  0.097  858.60 0.012 40.98 0.016 0.033 * 
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Network 
 (0.073) (0.030) (0.050) (1782.03) (0.066) (1429.35) (0.046) (2294.72) (0.038) (0.019) 
Year 97 to 02 · 
Network -0.026 -0.019 0.17 *** 665.94 0.21 *** -2151.16 0.14 *** -1002.00 0.022 0.039 * 
 (0.085) (0.036) (0.06) (2081.02) (0.07) (1661.54) (0.05) (2676.81) (0.044) (0.023) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA · 
Network -0.20 *** -0.044 0.019 1588.68 0.0081 -2223.83 0.0041 -3458.14 0.025 -0.021 
 (0.07) (0.032) (0.052) (1872.73) (0.0681) (1484.09) (0.0476) (2412.17) (0.039) (0.020) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA · 
Network -0.19 *** -0.0050 -0.085 * -625.27 -0.14 ** -1195.32 -0.12 *** -1331.22 -0.011 -0.053 *** 
 (0.07) (0.0312) (0.048) (1890.74) (0.06) (1491.51) (0.05) (2433.98) (0.036) (0.020) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX · 
Network 0.076 -0.025 -0.027 -997.70 -0.028 1511.67 -0.031 252.47 -0.013 -0.016 
 (0.076) (0.031) (0.051) (1800.06) (0.066) (1426.63) (0.046) (2319.26) (0.039) (0.020) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX · 
Network 0.15 -0.049 0.069 -1791.13 0.0071 1265.64 0.051 -225.94 -0.0015 -0.038 
 (0.09) (0.039) (0.063) (2327.19) (0.0825) (1835.02) (0.058) (2998.65) (0.0480) (0.025) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX · 
Network 0.081 0.047 -0.11 ** 232.72 -0.12 * 1457.14 -0.10 ** 1429.87 -0.024 -0.051 ** 
 (0.083) (0.037) (0.06) (2198.59) (0.07) (1726.38) (0.05) (2832.86) (0.043) (0.023) 
Hospital Size/100 -0.0020 0.0062 0.022 *** -2255.98 *** 0.020 *** -934.51 *** 0.021 *** -3119.23 *** 0.017 *** 0.00028 
 (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.002) (263.17) (0.002) (206.74) (0.002) (338.68) (0.001) (0.00210) 
Length of Stay -0.00034 -0.0021 *** -0.00050 * -33.22 -0.0012 *** 11.06 0.00031 -43.28 -0.00062 ***  0.0037 *** 
 (0.00040) (0.0006) (0.00027) (29.40) (0.0003) (33.14) (0.00024) (36.10) (0.00021) (0.0003) 
Teaching Status 0.076 *** 0.0029 -0.10 *** -947.98 -0.083 *** 2387.46 *** -0.096 *** 1390.29 -0.057 *** 0.0073 
 (0.011) (0.0118) (0.01) (669.59) (0.010) (513.59) (0.007) (850.02) (0.006) (0.0064) 
Rural 0.017 0.013 0.013 -267.22 0.0052 -823.54 0.013 -1052.35 0.0090 0.0071 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (636.04) (0.0166) (503.55) (0.012) (819.70) (0.0100) (0.0067) 
PPO Contract 0.24 *** -0.015 * 0.099 *** 7.36 0.11 *** -904.30 ** 0.099 *** -893.07 0.0069 0.00032 
 (0.02) (0.008) (0.012) (505.29) (0.02) (399.37) (0.011) (650.10) (0.0085) (0.00517) 
HMO Contract 0.15 *** 0.019 ** -0.011 -135.95 -0.013 1158.99 *** -0.018 * 1038.89 * 0.0088 -0.0017 
 (0.02) (0.008) (0.011) (482.34) (0.015) (380.00) (0.010) (620.86) (0.0082) (0.0049) 
Market Competition I -0.097 *** 0.085 * 0.018 -4957.90 * 0.056 ** -219.52 0.024 -5223.19 -0.0021 0.012 
 (0.026) (0.046) (0.017) (2575.07) (0.023) (2018.59) (0.016) (3118.01) (0.0013) (0.021) 
Market Competition 
II -0.039 -0.17 -0.082 * -5825.69 -0.044 6595.45 -0.065 996.88 -0.14 *** -0.049 
 (0.072) (0.15) (0.048) (8229.09) (0.063) (6431.70) (0.044) (10605.99) (0.04) (0.064) 
Education Level/100 -0.28 ** -0.83 *** -0.30 *** 39327.40 ***  -0.098 -492572.80 *** -0.31 *** -9490.58 0.00025 -0.25 *** 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.08) (11898.29) (0.109) (9381.39) (0.08) (15318.84) (0.06378) (0.08) 
Percent Elderly/100 0.18 -0.091 -0.028 -21465.13 0.14 -36701.84 ** -0.0093 -55446.04 * 0.051 -0.25 * 
 (0.13) (0.412) (0.089) (23536.50) (0.12) (18425.02) (0.0810) (30317.03) (0.067) (0.13) 
Percent non-
Whites/100 -0.034 -0.015 -0.15 *** 5658.10 -0.12 *** -003.83 ** -0.13 *** -2841.80 -0.023 0.0099 
 (0.049) (0.095) (0.03) (5753.58) (0.04) (4549.39) (0.03) (7406.44) (0.025) (0.0388) 
Unemployment 
Rate/100 0.27 -0.015 -0.12 -6858.34 -0.040 -813.48 -0.31 ** -7615.56 -0.089 0.16 
 (0.21) (0.222) (0.14) (12838.05) (0.188) (10155.40) (0.13) (16526.07) (0.111) (0.12) 
Per Capital 0.0019 ** 0.0035 *** 0.000013 297.13 *** -0.0010 199.35 *** -0.00058 487.98 *** -0.00082 * 0.000091 
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Income/1,000  
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.00640) (48.47) (0.0008) (39.37 ) (0.00058) (62.41) (0.00044) (0.000410) 
Public Hospitals 
Presence  0.032 ** -0.035 *** -0.017 * -289.97 -0.016 -935.09 * -0.016 ** -1153.03 -0.0090 -0.0061 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (610.10 (0.011) (481.65) (0.008) (786.19) (0.0065) (0.0061) 
SCHIP/ 
1,000,000 0.000076 *** 0.000018 -0.0000065 7.18 *** 0.000026 4.05 *** 0.0000052 11.14 *** -0.000018 0.000038 *** 
 (0.000025) (0.000014) (0.0000176) (0.83) (0.000023) (0.66) (0.0000161) (1.07) (0.000013) (0.000001) 
Constant 0.87 *** 1.08 *** 1.19 *** -9582.16 0.92 *** 42655.12 *** 1.19 *** 31838.42 * 1.09 *** 0.36 *** 
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.09) (13847.25) (0.11) (10881.28) (0.08) (17835.96) (0.07) (0.10) 
 
          
Standard errors in parenthesis  
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level;   
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Table 6.9. Full contingency effect of hospital network status on hospital compliance with state community benefit laws 1991-2002  
 Percent Community Benefit Program Bad Debt per bed Charity Care per bed 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  
CA x Network x 
(Yr1994-1996) -0.13 * 0.04 -0.21 -0.07 -1291.69 1569.85 -4928.05 1346.81 -2017.22 1311.82 -4822.53 378.73 
CA x Network x 
(Yr1996-2002) -0.091 *  0.035 -0.172 -0.026 -1552.47 2061.53 -5535.17 2562.43 -2032.85 1435.34 -5428.85 367.59 
TX x Network x 
(Yr1993-1995) 0.019 0.033 -0.047 0.086 -1198.22 1554.96 -4610.95 1498.65 1133.20 1677.08 -2230.26 4186.18 
TX x Network x 
(Yr1995-1997) 0.040 0.047 -0.053 0.132 -848.89 2307.85 -5926.84 3944.09 1247.19 1921.83 -2627.10 4984.51 
TX x Network x 
(Yr1997-2002) 0.081 0.039 -0.002 0.148 -1053.54 2450.20 -5495.76 3689.28 428.28 2158.69 -3764.90 4589.97 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* significant at 5% level.  
 
 Uncompensated Care per bed Percent Medicaid Inpatient Days 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error 
95 % Confidence 
Interval  
CA x Network x  
(Yr1994-1996) -3152.96 2013.16 -7136.99 398.29 -0.016 0.025 -0.064 0.034 
CA x Network x  
(Yr1996-2002) -3315.10 2879.26 -9543.75 1431.68 -0.055 0.025 -0.108 -0.008 
TX x Network x  
(Yr1993-1995) -370.13 2218.72 -4739.20 4427.40 -0.018 0.023 -0.063 0.028 
TX x Network x  
(Yr1995-1997) 610.27 2950.59 -5936.05 5572.73 -0.040 0.030 -0.099 0.016 
TX x Network x  
(Yr1997-2002) -645.89 3220.50 -7388.90 5310.22 -0.057 0.030 -0.119 0.002 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* significant at 5% level.  
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Table 6.10.  The Contingency Effect of County Level Market Competition on Hospitals’ Compliance with State Community 
Benefit Laws from 1991 to 2002 
Percent Community 
Programs 
Adjusted Bad Debt    per 
bed  
Adjusted Charity Care per 
bed 
Adjusted Uncompensated 
Care per bed 
Percent Medicaid 
Inpatient Days 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
OLS  
 
(n=4,148) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(n=3,571) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(n=3,604) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Random 
Effects 
(n=3,516) 
OLS 
 
(n=3,738) 
Random 
Effects 
(n=3.626) 
OLS  
 
(n=4,148) 
Fixed Effect 
 
(n=4,062) 
CA -0.10  0.058  0.19 *** -3186.06 0.063 -12413.23 * 0.051  
 (0.07)  (0.047)  (0.06) (4295.20) (0.043) (6893.01) (0.037)  
TX 0.12  0.033  0.11 * -2836.15 0.029 -4525.13 0.014  
 (0.07)  (0.047)  (0.06) (4044.85) (0.043) (6487.53) (0.037)  
Market Competition I  -0.21 *** 0.15 -0.0030 -2893.78 0.13 * 1795.25 0.0074 1669.34 0.010 -0.30 ** 
 (0.08) (0.22) (0.0536) (12388.63) (0.07) (4886.19) (0.0489) (7845.29) (0.042) (0.12) 
Year 94 to 96  0.12 * 0.12 *** 0.016 159.91 0.029 2352.60 ** 0.011 2488.84 -0.012 0.012 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.041) (1419.29) (0.053) (1141.25) (0.037) (1834.95) (0.032) (0.016) 
Year 96 to 02  0.093 0.16 *** 0.012 811.33 0.034 4266.31 *** 0.010 5109.15 ** -0.017 0.00065 
 (0.083) (0.03) (0.054) (1898.41) (0.071) (1504.70) (0.050) (2447.59) (0.043) (0.02135) 
Year 93 to 95 -0.11 0.031 -0.0040 266.45 -0.0034 -567.39 0.0073 -318.21 0.0099 0.0096 
 (0.07) (0.027) (0.0442) (1534.65) (0.0575) (1226.33) (0.0404) (1975.31) (0.0347) (0.0173) 
Year 95 to 97 -0.20 ** 0.054 -0.0027 2321.70 0.064 -136.88 0.010 2141.30 0.012 0.012 
 (0.09) (0.038) (0.0299) (2094.44) (0.078) (1680.12) (0.055) (2690.27) (0.047) (0.023) 
Year 97 to 02  -0.22 ** 0.082 * -0.041 5404.36 ** -0.0080 -1313.06 -0.039 4271.17 0.018 0.011 
 (0.10) (0.042) (0.064) (2332.57) (0.0840) (1832.99) (0.059) (2964.85) (0.050) (0.026) 
CA · Competition 0.23 ** -0.086 -0.035 4200.70 -0.24 *** -2011.52 -0.035 -762.47 -0.046 0.43 *** 
 (0.09) (0.238) (0.059) (13083.16) (0.08) (5514.85) (0.054) (8843.04) (0.046) (0.13) 
TX · Competition -0.031 -0.12 0.0084 -344.53 -0.069 1463.02 0.013 -1053.98 -0.023 0.24 * 
 (0.097) (0.23) (0.0640) (12904.19) (0.083) (520.96) (0.058) (8547.69) (0.050) (0.12) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA -0.16 * -0.099 ** 0.043 -637.12 -0.11 -2771.87 0.033 -3150.78 0.013 -0.019 
 (0.09) (0.039) (0.061) (2094.25) (0.08) (1689.68) (0.056) (2706.54) (0.047) (0.023) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA -0.026 -0.20 *** 0.091 * -1263.20 -0.13 * -4758.33 *** 0.072 -5818.34  ** 0.0040 -0.0033 
 (0.080) (0.04) (0.053) (1907.97) (0.07) (1525.84) (0.049) (2430.59) (0.0414) (0.0212) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX -0.18 ** -0.0045 -0.059 286.14 -0.041 1528.37 -0.060 1751.20 -0.035 -0.00054 
 (0.09) (0.0349) (0.056) (1930.37) (0.073) (1557.81) (0.051) (2498.62) (0.044) (0.02202) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX -0.096 -0.021 -0.054 -2923.64 -0.076 1728.05 -0.056 -1092.56 -0.018 -0.017 
 (0.094) (0.039) (0.062) (2166.90) (0.080) (1753.04) (0.056) (2786.74) (0.048) (0.024) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX -0.081 -0.028 0.0043 -3646.97 * -0.0080 3486.77 ** 0.0093 -200.75 -0.023 -0.0069 
 (0.083) (0.036) (0.0548) (1997.45) (0.0713) (1598.96) (0.0500) (2531.72) (0.042) (0.0224) 
Year 94 to 96 · 
Competition -0.060 0.068 * -0.041 -513.82 -0.070 -1231.03 -0.037 -1763.92 0.019 -0.0045 
 (0.085) (0.035) (0.056) (1926.70) (0.072) (1545.54) (0.051) (2494.68) (0.044) (0.0218) 
Year 96 to 02 · 
Competition -0.057 0.053 -0.092 -1549.58 -0.14 -4118.38 ** -0.088 -5666.56 * 0.026 0.013 
 (0.108) (0.045) (0.072) (2500.63) (0.09) (1986.88) (0.066) (3234.18) (0.056) (0.028) 
Year 93 to 95 · 
Competition 0.075 -0.021 0.049 -1574.27 0.050 1026.04 0.032 -322.29 -0.017 0.014 
 (0.082) (0.034) (0.054) (1919.06) (0.070) (1518.52) (0.049) (2442.64) (0.042) (0.022) 
Year 95 to 97 · 0.11 -0.031 0.038 -4481.46 * -0.032 -490.76 0.018 -4544.54 -0.0098 0.021 
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Competition 
 (0.11) (0.048) (0.074) (2604.91)  (0.097) (2086.78) (0.068) (3340.59)  (0.0575) (0.029) 
Year 97 to 02 · 
Competition 0.10 -0.039 0.16 ** -7634.08 *** 0.16 1030.74 0.16 ** -6283.03 * -0.021 0.017 
 (0.12) (0.052) (0.08) (2862.24) (0.11) (2267.46) (0.07) (3664.28) (0.063) (0.032) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA · 
Competition -0.0079 0.055 -0.0024 844.94 0.18 * 2133.24 0.0098 2690.53 0.000015 0.021  
 (0.1151) (0.049) (0.0769) (2662.01) (0.10) (2146.66) (0.0702) (3441.84) (0.059404) (0.030) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA · 
Competition -0.11 0.14 *** -0.081 1223.44 0.20 ** 5882.33 *** -0.054 6744.15 ** 0.022 -0.014 
 (0.10) (0.05) (0.069) (2475.93) (0.09) (1988.34) (0.063) (3169.72) (0.053) (0.027) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX · 
Competition 0.16 -0.00089 0.023 -889.60 -0.00066 -61.86 0.021 -959.44 0.032 0.0012 
 (0.11) (0.04629) (0.074) (2581.84) (0.09647) (2070.26) (0.068) (3334.40) (0.058) (0.0293) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX · 
Competition 0.16 0.0078 0.085 2334.75 0.12 2348.60 0.088 4665.77 0.031 0.0085 
 (0.13) (0.0529) (0.083) (2928.17) (0.11) (2357.96) (0.078) (3767.99) (0.065) (0.0328) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX · 
Competition 0.11 -0.0029 -0.035 5309.33 * -0.039 1301.54 -0.047 6721.79 * -0.00062 -0.0074 
 (0.11) (0.0495) (0.075) (2755.29) (0.098) (2195.35) (0.069) (3493.50) (0.058) (0.0306) 
Hospital Size/100 -0.0017 0.0055 0.022 *** -2267.69 *** 0.20 **** -570.70 *** 0.021 *** -2170.50 *** 0.017 *** 0.0012 
 (0.0027) (0.0045) (0.002) (262.39) (0.02) (174.47) (0.002) (284.57) (0.001) (0.0027) 
Length of Stay -0.00039 -0.0022 *** -0.00050 * -37.17 -0.0012 *** -6.60 0.00031 -68.41 ** -0.00061 *** 0.0043 *** 
 (0.00041) (0.0006) (0.00027) (29.16) (0.0003)  (25.43) (0.00024) (31.45) (0.00021) (0.0027) 
Network Status -0.070 *** 0.037 *** -0.014 * 942.49 ** 0.0040 -704.06 ** -0.016 354.80 -0.015 ** -0.014 *** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (375.40) (0.0103) (298.02) (0.007) (478.86) (0.006) (0.004) 
Teaching Status 0.077 *** 0.0040 -0.11 *** -948.04 -0.083 *** 2923.86 *** -0.099 *** 2505.81 *** -0.058 *** 0.0018 
 (0.011) (0.0118) (0.01) (666.39) (0.010) (487.39) (0.007 ) (804.70) (0.006) (0.0071) 
Rural 0.018 0.0048 0.0023 713.61 -0.0064 -700.72 0.0023 -299.86 0.0080 0.0064 
 (0.021) (0.0124) (0.0136) (668.39) (0.0177) (516.16) (0.0124) (844.47) (0.0107) (0.0075) 
PPO Contract 0.24 *** -0.016 * 0.098 *** 101.70 0.11 *** -908.89 ** 0.099 ***  -697.80 0.0079 0.0015 
 (0.02) (0.009) (0.012) (506.95) (0.02) (400.20) (0.011) (652.65) (0.0085) (0.0052) 
HMO Contract 0.15 *** 0.022 *** -0.012 -291.35 -0.013 1162.50 -0.018 * 804.72 0.0082 -0.0021 
 (0.02) (0.008) (0.011) (484.62) (0.015) (381.35) (0.010) (623.97) (0.0082) (0.0049) 
Market Competition 
II -0.054 -0.090 -0.081 -6364.00 -0.027 11448.78 ** -0.064 11468.28 -0.14 *** -0.047 
 (0.073) (0.150) (0.049) (8336.99) (0.064) (5267.04) (0.045) (8605.84) (0.04) (0.093) 
Education Level/100 -0.22 * -0.69 *** -0.37 *** 13648.88 -0.11 -41460.74 *** -0.36 *** -30061.83 ** -0.012 -0.28 ** 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.09) (13255.26) (0.11) (7388.67) (0.08) (11968.88) (0.067) (0.12) 
Percent Elderly/100 0.11 0.078 0.034 -41705.94 * 0.16 -29067.48 ** 0.040 -66274.18 *** 0.061 -0.28 
 (0.13) (0.423) (0.091) (24206.56) (0.12) (12317.78) (0.083) (19925.49) (0.068) (0.25) 
Percent non-
Whites/100 -0.074 0.051 -0.12 *** 4169.35 -0.10 ** -8539.78 ** -0.12 *** -7735.91 -0.014 -0.084 
 (0.051) (0.100) (0.03) (6040.63) (0.04) (3407.84) (0.03) (5511.21) (0.026) (0.062) 
Unemployment 
Rate/100 0.61 ** 0.024 -0.41 ** -8210.20 -0.20 -7482.50 -0.55 *** -10481.53 -0.15 0.086 
 (0.25) (0.225) (0.17) (12826.92) (0.22) (9636.05) (0.02) (15682.04) (0.13) (0.136) 
Per Capital 0.0022 ** 0.0028 *** -0.00040 330.71 *** -0.0013 230.54 *** -0.00092 539.09 *** -0.00088 * 0.00036 
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Income/1,000  
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.00065) (68.98) (0.0009) (37.77) (0.00060) (60.20) (0.00045) (0.00044) 
Public Hospitals 
Presence  0.030 ** -0.032 *** -0.017 ** -456.48 -0.015 -986.81 ** -0.016 ** -1477.00 * -0.0085 -0.0068 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (611.56) (0.011) (466.10) (0.008) (760.84) (0.0066) (0.0064) 
SCHIP/1000000 0.000092 *** 0.000017 -0.000015 7.31 *** 0.000021 3.72 *** 0.00000025 11.28 *** -0.000016 0.000043 *** 
 (0.000026) (0.000014) (0.000017) (0.83) (0.000023) (0.61) (0.00001600) (1.00) (0.000013) (0.000001) 
Constant 0.89 ***  0.87 *** 1.28 *** 9539.82 0.90 *** 31506.36 *** 1.27 *** 40742.29 *** 1.10 *** 0.41 *** 
 (0.15) (0.24) (0.10) (14404.48) (0.13) (9172.76) (0.09) (14831.75) (0.08) (0.15) 
 
  
      
  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level;   
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Table 6.11. Full contingency effect of market competition on hospital compliance with state community benefit laws 1991-2002  
 
Percent Community Benefit 
Program 
Bad Debt per bed Charity Care per bed 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  
CA x Market Competition 
x (Yr1994-1996) 0.049 0.099 -0.13 0.26 693.13 2226.15 -3580.61 5222.19 2160.81 1479.76 -1223.74 4907.76 
CA x Market Competition 
x (Yr1996-2002) 0.12 0.08 -0.05 0.27 -90.47 3666.31 -7842.75 6852.89 4727.22 * 1753.04 1073.27 8195.15  
TX x Market Competition 
x (Yr1993-1995) 0.069 0.069 -0.061 0.207 -466.19 2366.07 -4733.13 4156.10 66.25 2091.44 -4247.31 4407.42 
TX x Market Competition 
x (Yr1995-1997) 0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.25 3259.52 2795.72 -1804.56 8820.30 3283.43 2113.48 -467.04 7478.97 
TX x Market Competition 
x (Yr1997-2002) 0.070 0.091 -0.177 0.216 4486.44 3738.26 -2207.74 12401.71 1093.95 2695.28 -5072.58 6047.28 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
* significant at 5% level.  
 
 Uncompensated Care per bed Percent Medicaid Inpatient Days 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  Mean 
Standard 
Error  
95 % Confidence 
Interval  
CA x Market Competition 
x (Yr1994-1996) 3059.41 2784.01 -2060.96 8721.92 0.011 0.035 -0.058 0.081 
CA x Market Competition 
x (Yr1996-2002) 6132.48 3639.83 -303.58 13824.94 -0.018 0.032 -0.080 0.046 
TX x Market Competition 
x (Yr1993-1995) -788.43 2891.08 -6434.69 5245.91 0.019 0.028 -0.038 0.077 
TX x Market Competition 
x (Yr1995-1997) 5831.55 3574.13 -1624.33 12199.99 0.021 0.031 -0.047 0.074 
TX x Market Competition 
x (Yr1997-2002) 4790.79 4682.27 -4330.27 13447.33 0.0035 0.0290 -0.0527 0.0588 
* standard errors and 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping 500 times.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
THE SPILL-OVER EFFECT 
 
 
This chapter investigates the spill-over effect of state community benefit laws on for-
profit hospitals’ willingness and ability to provide community benefit.  In response to the 
excessive health care needs imposed by the growing population of uninsured and 
underinsured, not-for-profit hospitals in California and Texas are now mandated to provide 
community benefit.   Private for-profit hospitals in these two states face virtually identical 
market forces and competitive pressures.  It is likely that they also experience community 
demands for the same types of community benefit services.     
Empirical research on hospital ownership differences, especially in relations to 
charity and uncompensated care provision, are ample.  Yet, studies on whether not-for-profit 
hospitals influence for-profit hospital behaviors are rare.  In 2002, Clement et al. posited that 
for-profit hospitals, in pursue of a good neighbor’s image, would provide more charity care 
as not-for-profit hospitals increase the same services to meet community demand.  This 
analysis furthers this line of research to explore whether for-profit hospitals would increase 
their provision of community benefit as not-for-profit hospitals do as a result of state 
community benefit laws.  Specifically, the regression models aim to test the hypothesis that 
for-profit hospitals’ provision of community benefits activities (in term of programs, 
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financial expenditures and Medicaid and Medicare inpatient days) will be positively 
correlated with not-for-profit hospital provision of community activities.   
 
7.1.  Study Sample 
A total of 2,951 hospital-year observations are used in the spill-over analysis of the 
programmatic aspect of hospital community benefit activities.   These are for-profit hospitals 
that responded to the AHA Annual Hospital Survey as well as state sponsored hospital 
surveys between 1991 and 2002.  Texas has the largest number of for-profit hospitals, 
followed by California and Florida (Table 7.1).  In contrast to the full sample of private 
hospitals (n=7,099) used in the previous chapter, for-profit hospitals tend to provide a lower 
percentage of community oriented programs (Table 7.2).  They are also smaller in size with 
only 143 staffed beds (vs. 192 staff beds in the overall private hospital sample).  Further, for-
profit hospitals are less likely to have managed contracts or have affiliation with a hospital 
alliance, network or system.   Even though most of these for-profit hospitals reside in urban 
counties, they share similar socio-demographic characteristics as those seen in the overall 
private hospital sample.  Contrary to prior research results (Norton and Staiger 1994; 
Chakravarty et al., 2006), this particular sample of for-profit hospitals does not reside in 
counties with a higher average per capita income or a noticeably more saturated hospital 
market.   
Of the for-profit hospital study sample, 20% (n=596) of observations report zero 
values for community-oriented programs.  This leaves 2,355 for-profit hospital-year 
observations with positive programmatic dependent variable entries.  These for-profit 
hospitals that do offer some community-oriented program average between 6 and 9 programs 
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(45% of the service inventories) throughout the study period (Table 7.3).  They are more 
likely to associate with having HMO and PPO contracts.  Preliminarily, the summary 
statistics indicate that these for-profit hospitals also reside in counties where the average not-
for-profit contributions to these programs are lower (37% vs. 41%) than that of the full for-
profit hospital population.   
In the financial dependent variables analyses, the study sample was reduced to 2,684 
hospital-year observations due to missing variables (Table 7.4).  Not all for-profit hospitals 
reported their bad debt and charity care figures in all years.  Of this sample population, 2% 
(n=49) and 29% (n=786) of hospital observations report zero values for bad debt and charity 
care, respectively.  Combined, approximately 1.5% (n=40) of the study sample yield zero 
values for uncompensated care.  The demographic characteristics of those for-profit hospitals 
that do report positive bad debt remain very similar to the full sample.  In contrast, for-profit 
hospitals that report positive charity care are larger (163 staff beds vs. 147 staff beds).  They 
also reside in states with larger SCHIP allocations.   
A total of 2,951 hospital-year observations is used for the special populations spill-
over analysis (Table 7.5).  Approximately 7.5% (n=222) of observations record zero 
Medicaid inpatient days.  For-profit hospitals demographic characteristics do not appear to 
differ with the availability of Medicaid inpatient care.   
 
7.2.  Model Specification 
The spill-over effect of state community benefit laws on for-profit hospital behavior 
is estimated using regression analysis according to the following specifications:  
FP Community Benefitsth  = f [NFP Community Benefit Indexh, Timet, States, 
NFP CB Index ·Timest, State·NFP CB Indexsh, Time· States t,  
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Economic Factorssth, Socio-demographic Factorssth,  
Organizational Factorsth, µst, νsth]                (7.1)  
             
Similar to the previous analysis, community benefit behaviors, such as percent of 
community oriented programs, three measures of financial variables, and percent special 
population, are abbreviated as dependent variable Yhst. The h subscript indicates individual 
hospital; the s subscript indicates treatment or control state group; and the t subscript 
indicates policy change time periods.  Contrary to the previous analysis, each of these three 
continuous dependent variables is modeled as a function of a not-for-profit community 
benefit index, time, state, the interactions between the treatment states, time dummies and the 
not-for-profit community benefit contribution, and time-varying organizational, demographic 
and environmental factors. The coefficients for the not-for-profit community benefit index 
and its 3-way interaction terms will indicate the influence of not-for-profit hospital behavior 
on that of for-profit hospitals. 
More specifically, the primary independent variable of interest, not-for-profit 
community benefit index, is defined as not-for-profit hospitals’ relative contributions to 
community benefit in the same county as the for-profit hospital of interest.  This variable is 
operationalized by dividing the sum of community-oriented programs offered by all not-for-
profit hospitals in a county by the total number of community benefit programs provided by 
all hospitals in the same county (equation (7.2)).  The resulting measure is a scaler, ranging 
from 0 to 1, reflecting the proportion of community benefit provided by not-for-profit 
hospitals in a county.  
 
 
(7.2)            )
pgs bftcmty 
 programs bftcmty (   Programs BenefitCommunity  of  ShareNFP 
 hosp all 
 nfp
j
i
∑
∑
=
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Similarly, to examine the spill-over effects in terms of hospital provision of bad debt, 
charity care and uncompensated care, the independent variables of interest are altered to 
match the financial nature of the dependent variable.  For example, in the case of bad debt, 
not-for-profit hospitals’ contribution to the indigent is represented by the sum of bad debts 
reported by all not-for-profit hospitals by the sum of bad debts reported by all hospitals in the 
county (equation (7.3)).  This financial ratio is reconstructed to yield not-for-profit share of 
charity care and uncompensated care in the subsequent spill-over effect analyses of the other 
two additional financial dimensions.  
 
 
In the analysis of Medicaid inpatient load, the overall not-for-profit contribution is 
measured as the sum of all Medicaid inpatient days divided by the sum of all Medicaid 
inpatient days in all hospitals in the same county, respectively (equation (7.4)).   
 
 
The estimation model includes time fixed effects, in terms of individual state law 
evolutions, to capture time trend.  Various economic, socio-demographic factors and 
organizational attributes are added as control variables.  For example, the potential 
confounding effect of size on hospitals’ abilities to offer the various community benefit 
activities is included as a control factor.  Unspecified time invariant and time-varying state 
heterogeneities are represented in the model as µst and νhst, respectively.  State specific 
regulations that extend beyond the beginning and the end of the study period, at the same 
time affect the implementation of community benefit laws may be one example of the time-
(7.3)                                    ) Debt Bad(
) Debt (Bad
   Debt Bad of  Share NFP
hosp all
hosp nfp i
∑
∑
=
j
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∑
∑
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j
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invariant heterogeneity.  Time varying heterogeneity may come from changes in the 
Medicaid or Medicaid-related policy, state macro-economy or the demographic distributions 
of the population during the study period.   
 
7.3. Estimation Methods  
This analysis uses the panel data regression estimators to examine changes in for-
profit hospital behavior over time.  The DDD modeling strategy is the primary estimation 
method, comparing changes of hospital community benefits provision behaviors in 
intervention states to changes of hospital community benefit provision behaviors in the 
control state.  The first difference compares the post-law and pre-law hospital community 
benefit activities in an intervention state.  The second difference compares the community 
benefit activities differentials between one of the study states (i.e. Texas or California) and 
the control state of Florida. The last difference compares for-profit hospitals community 
benefit activities with changes in not-for-profit behaviors.   
Diagnostic plots show the pattern of a large percentage of zeros alongside a distinct 
distribution of non-zero values in all dependent variables, except percent Medicare inpatient 
days.  To avoid assuming a censored normal distribution in these dependent variables with 
many zero entries, the two-part model (2PM) is employed as the primary analytical method.  
The first part of 2PM estimates the effect of not-for-profit hospital community benefit 
contribution on for-profit hospitals’ decision to provide any community benefits using a 
linear probability model (LPM). The binary outcome of whether community benefit activity 
is performed is predicted using ordinary least squares (OLS).   
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In the second part of the 2PM, OLS, random effects, fixed effects estimators are 
compared with the support of specification test statistics in order to get the most efficient and 
consistent estimates of the effects of community benefit laws that are not induced by 
unobserved individual hospital heterogeneity.   In the case of percent Medicare inpatient days, 
there are no zero values reported.  The full sample is used in the time-series regression 
analysis only.  Before implementing the time-series analysis of the 2PM, the Wooldridge test 
(Wooldridge 2000) is also used to compare goodness of fit with logged and unlogged models 
of bad debt, charity care and uncompensated care. Results of the test indicate that unlogged 
forms of all three variables are preferred to the logged forms.   
Upon application of the same battery of specification tests, all dependent variables 
yield the same results.  Random effects estimates are preferred to OLS in the Breusch-Pagan 
test of random effects.  Subsequent Hausman test rejects random effects estimates in favor of 
the consistent fixed effects estimates.  Finally, a White (1980) test indicates that the errors of 
the fixed effects estimates are heteroskadastic.  One source of such heteroskedasiticity could 
be potential omitted time-varying unobservables caused by state level hospital policy 
changes regarding certificate of needs, or free care legislations.  Therefore, robust standard 
errors are applied to correct for the downward biased standard errors in the final results. 
 
7.4. Results  
7.4.1   The Spill-Over Effect on Community Oriented Programs 
For-profit hospitals’ decision to provide community-oriented programs is not directly 
influenced by not-for-profit hospitals’ commitment to these activities.  However, the Texas 
state community benefit law does induce for-profit hospital to increase their provision of 
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community-oriented programs after 1995 (Table 7.6).  In both the OLS and fixed effects 
models, the coefficient estimates of not-for-profit community benefit index yields negative 
values, suggesting an inverse relationship between for-profit and not-for-profit community 
benefit activities.  However, these direct effects are not statistically significant.   
Based on the coefficient estimates from the subsequent three-way interaction terms 
between legislative time frames, treatment states and not-for-profit hospital community 
benefit index,  the California state community benefit law does not compel for-profit 
hospitals to imitate not-for-profit hospitals’ reinforced commitment to providing community-
oriented programs.  Both the OLS and fixed effects models yield negative coefficients but 
could not establish statistical significance for the interaction estimates.   
In Texas, however, evidence of spill-over effects on for-profit hospitals’ provision of 
community-oriented programs is seen after the first amendment of the law in 1995.  Fixed 
effects regression results show that between 1995 and 1997, for-profit hospitals increase their 
provision of community-oriented programs by 23 percentage points (p=0.003) as not-for-
profit hospitals elevate their proportional contribution to these programs county-wide.  After 
1997, this positive trend continues.  Texas for-profit hospitals demonstrate a positive 19-
percentage-point differential (p=0.007) in their provision of community-oriented programs 
with increases in not-for-profit hospital contribution to these same programs.   
 
 
7.4.2 The Spill-Over Effects on Bad Debt, Charity Care and Uncompensated Care 
On the financial front, for-profit hospitals’ decisions to contribute to bad debt, charity 
and uncompensated care are in fact influenced by the overall amount of not-for-profit 
contribution to these assistance options in the same county (Table 7.7).   However, evidence 
of spill-over effect as a result of state community benefit laws appears limited.   
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In the case of bad debt, a coefficient estimate of -0.068 (p=0.041) from the OLS 
regression indicates that an increase in the proportion of not-for-profit contribution to bad 
debt is negatively associated with for-profit hospitals’ likelihood to incur any bad debt in 
general.  However, the amount of bad debt incurred by for-profit hospitals is not shown to be 
affected by not-for-profit behaviors.  In terms of the effect of state community benefit laws, a 
statistically significant OLS coefficient estimate of -0.12 (p=0.088) shows that after the 
implementation of California legislation, augmentation in the overall not-for-profit share of 
bad debt impedes for-profit hospitals’ decision to incur any bad debt at all.  In Texas, there is 
no significant relationship between for-profit hospitals’ willingness and abilities to incur and 
not-for-profit hospitals’ contributions to bad debt.   
The direct effects of not-for-profit contribution to charity care on for-profit hospital 
behavior are statistically significant and negative.  The OLS regression coefficient estimate 
of -0.23 (p=0.005) indicates that for-profit hospitals are less willing to provide any charity 
care with increases in not-for-profit contribution to this financial service to the poor.  
Moreover, the fixed effects coefficient estimate of -2154.60 (p=0.049) shows that for-profit 
hospitals significantly reduce the amount of charity care they provide to the indigent as not-
for-profit hospitals’ ramp up their financial contributions.  State community benefit laws do 
not appear to change this behavioral relationship by ownership.  After the implementation of 
the California community benefit law in 1996, the OLS coefficient -0.29 (p=0.038) shows 
that increase in not-for-profit hospitals’ provision of charity care hindered for-profit hospitals 
decision to incur the same expenses.  Further, fixed effects estimates -2779.12 (p=0.034) 
indicated that, among for-profit hospitals that already offer charity care,  increases in not-for-
profit hospitals’ contributions to charity care negatively affect the level of financial allocation 
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for-profit hospitals devote in the area.  Finally, Texas law does not appear to have any effect 
on hospital provision of charity care by ownership.  
In terms of for-profit hospitals’ provision of uncompensated care, there appears no 
hint of the spill-over effect in either California or Texas.  However, regression outcomes do 
indicate a direct inverse relationship between not-for-profit contribution to and for-profits’ 
decision to offer any uncompensated care at all.  The OLS regression coefficient of -0.073 
(p=0.011) for the not-for-profit community benefit index suggests that increase in not-for-
profit hospitals’ provision of uncompensated care discourages for-profit hospitals from 
providing any uncompensated care at all.   
 
7.4.3. The Spill-Over Effects on Medicaid Inpatient Days  
There is direct positive relationship between not-for-profit hospitals’ Medicaid 
inpatient service load and for-profit hospitals’ decision to take on any Medicaid inpatients 
(0.13, p=0.004).  That is, in a county where not-for-profit hospitals shoulder an increased 
share of Medicaid inpatient days, for-profit hospitals are more willing to take on Medicaid 
inpatient days as well.  However, a coefficient estimate of -0.049 (p=0.003) from the fixed 
effects model indicates that, among for-profit hospitals that already carry Medicaid inpatient 
days, increased not-for-profit share of these services are associated with a lowered 
percentage of the same services provided by for-profit hospitals.   
Additionally, the influence of not-for-profit hospitals’ service to the Medicaid 
inpatients on for-profit hospitals’ commitment to the same services as a result of state 
community benefit laws are shown in the coefficient estimates of the three-way interaction 
terms between law timeline, treatment state and not-for-profit hospitals’ inpatient service 
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load (Table 7.8).  Results from the analysis show a limited amount of the spill-over effect on 
California and Texas for-profit hospitals.  In fact, increases in not-for-profit hospitals’ 
Medicaid inpatient days are associated with a decrease in for-profit hospitals’ Medicaid 
inpatient days after the enactment and before the implementation of the California 
community benefit law (-0.16, p=0.021).   No other statistically significant relationships are 
seen in California and Texas Medicaid inpatient service between not-for-profit and for-profit 
hospitals.   
 
7.5. Discussion 
 The role of ownership in hospital behavior has long been a subject of debate in health 
services research.  While past empirical studies have focused on determining ownership 
differences in hospital service provision (Herzlinger and Krasker, 1987; Gray, 1991; Lewin, 
Eckels and Miller, 1988; Norton and Staiger, 1994), few consider how for-profit and not-for-
profit hospitals influence each other’s behavior within the same market areas.  This analysis 
aims to examine the interactive relationship between not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals in 
their provision of community benefit as a result of state community benefit laws.  The results 
show that both California and Texas state community benefit laws have some but different 
spill-over effects on for-profit hospitals’ provision of community benefit.    
In California, for-profit hospitals respond to not-for-profit hospitals’ policy-induced 
increase in community benefit activities in a negative fashion. Even though the law 
prescribes to hospital’s programmatic options, the most prominent changes seen in California 
for-profit hospitals’ community benefit behavior is their reduction of charity care after the 
enactment and implementation of the law.  Without a significant increase in their provision 
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of community-oriented programs, it is difficult to explain where California for-profit 
hospitals are diverting their fiscal resources.  It is possible that they simply choose to 
maximize profit and rely on not-for-profit hospitals to meet most of the health care needs of 
the poor in the state.   
In contrast, the state community benefit law does have a positive spill-over effect on 
Texas for-profit hospitals.  However, the effect is seen in hospitals’ provision of community-
oriented programs, rather than in bad debt and charity care as prescribed by the law.   
Because the Texas legislation has resulted from a widely publicized litigation, its rules are 
specific, stringent and complemented with non-compliance penalties.  Under these 
circumstances, for-profit hospitals may choose to offer the more cost-efficient and visible 
community benefit activities in order to meet the heightened community expectations and 
maintain their good neighbor’s image.  
Additionally, several themes emerge from the outcome of this analysis.  First, the 
spill-over effects of state community benefit laws are not consistent across different types of 
community benefit activities.  In California, for-profit hospitals’ decisions about whether or 
how many community-oriented programs they would provide are unrelated to not-for-profit 
hospital behavior after both the enactment and the implementation of the law.  However, 
their decisions on whether to carry bad debt or offer charity care are negatively associated 
with not-for-profit hospitals’ contributions to these services after the implementation of the 
law.  Further, California for-profit hospitals’ Medicaid inpatient days are reduced by 
increases in not-for-profit service load after the enactment and before the implementation of 
state community benefit law.  Without defining community benefit multiple ways, it would 
have been difficult to distinguish the effect of the law on different aspects of hospital 
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behavior.  Moreover, it appears that the financial and special population aspects of 
community benefit offer stronger measurements for this spill-over analysis.  With only a 
compilation index reflecting the total number of community-oriented programs hospitals 
offer, it is not possible to delineate how for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals compete or 
compliment each other’s service options.    
Two, not-for-profit hospitals may influence for-profit hospital behavior through 
multiple mechanisms.  According to the results, California not-for-profit hospitals have 
influenced, directly and via regulation, for-profit counterparts’ community benefit behaviors 
through for-profit hospitals’ service provision decisions as well as the level of resources they 
commit to these activities.  That is, as not-for-profit hospitals increase their pooled 
contribution to meet community health needs, fewer for-profit hospitals would opt to 
participate in the same activities.  In the case of charity care and Medicaid inpatient days, 
California for-profit hospitals have dropped their commitment to these activities when not-
for-profit hospitals elevate their contributions.   
Finally, outcome of this study partially confirm previous research results that for-
profit hospitals generally do not compete with neighboring not-for-profit hospitals for a good 
public image by providing more charity care (Clement et al., 2002).  In the case of California, 
increased not-for-profit financial subsidies to the poor not only are associated with reduced 
for-profit hospitals’ provision of charity care, they also discourage for-profit hospitals from 
incurring any bad debt as well as charity care at all.  Given that these for-profit hospitals are 
also sensitive to within-county market competition, it is likely that for-profit hospitals tend to 
select markets where there is less need for uncompensated care.  Instead of keeping pace with 
not-for-profit hospitals’ financial contribution to the poor, it is likely that for-profit hospitals 
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take the opportunities to offer less uncompensated care.  However, in the case of Texas, there 
is some evidence of non-price competition or isomorphic pressure where for-profit hospitals 
choose to augment their community benefit activities in ways other than those delineated by 
the legislative language.   
In sum, whether and how not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals choose to respond and 
react to each other’s service provision and performance behaviors can not be interpreted in 
isolation of historical and current political socio-demographic factors and market forces.  
Hospitals’ financial health and management choices may also come into play.   Future 
research on policy spill-over effect and non-price competition needs to account for these 
factors as well as multiple definitions of community benefit. 
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Table 7.1.  Study Sample used in the Spill-Over Analysis from 1991 to 2002 (n=2,951) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
CA 88 83 81 81 82 79 79 71 67 66 63 63 
TX 110 107 111 115 117 110 115 106 105 104 103 104 
FL  66 65 67 65    64 63 61 59 58 58 58 57 
             
 
 
 
 
Table 7.2.  Comparative Summary Statistics on For-Profit Hospitals vs. All Private 
Hospitals  
For-Profit Hospitals Only  
(n=2,951) 
All Private Hospitals   
(n=7,099) 
 
 
Variable  Mean 
 
Standard Error Mean 
 
Standard 
Error 
Dependent Variables  
    
Percent of Community 
Oriented Services Available  
0.36 0.26 0.42 0.27 
Independent Variables  
    
Not-for-Profit Community 
Benefit Mean  
0.41 0.27 n/a n/a  
     
Control Variables 
    
Hospital Size 143.88 96.87 192.46 162.09 
Length of Stay 7.06 5.54 6.82 8.64 
Freestanding Hospitals 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 
HMO Contract  0.52 0.50 0.59 0.49 
PPO Contract  0.57 0.50 0.63 0.48 
Market Competition I 0.78 0.25 0.75 0.27 
Market Competition II 0.93 0.07 0.93 0.08 
Teaching Status 0.038 0.191 0.16 0.37 
Rural  0.068 0.252 0.08 0.26 
Education Level 75.73 6.86 75.95 6.87 
Percent Elderly 12.68 5.95 12.71 5.46 
Percent non-White  41.19 19.48 40.72 18.78 
Unemployment Rate 6.22 2.60 6.39 2.87 
Per Capita Income  24720.10 7076.76 24845.83 7606.45 
Public Hospitals  0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 
SCHIP * 94.60 194.00   
     
* value reported in 1,000,000 
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Table 7.3. Summary Statistics for Spill-Over Analysis on Hospital Provision of 
Community Oriented Programs  
All For-Profit Hospitals   
 
(n=2,951) 
For-Profit Hospital with CB 
Provisions Only 
(n=2,355) 
 
 
Variable  
Mean 
 
Standard Error Mean 
 
Standard 
Error 
Dependent Variables  
    
Percent of Community 
Oriented Services Provided 
0.36 0.26 0.45 0.21 
Independent Variables  
    
Average Not-for-Profit 
contribution of Community 
Oriented Programs  
0.41 0.27 0.37 0.25 
     
Control Variables 
    
Hospital Size 143.88 96.87 148.50 98.02 
Length of Stay 7.06 5.54 7.29 5.86 
Freestanding Hospitals 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 
HMO Contract  0.52 0.50 0.64 0.48 
PPO Contract  0.57 0.50 0.70 0.46 
Market Competition I 0.78 0.25 0.77 0.26 
Market Competition II 0.93 0.07 0.92 0.07 
Teaching Status 0.038 0.191 0.041 0.198 
Rural  0.068 0.252 0.075 0.263 
Education Level 75.73 6.86 75.45 6.95 
Percent Elderly 12.68 5.95 12.33 5.65 
Percent non-White 41.19 19.48 40.95 19.32 
Unemployment Rate 6.22 2.60 6.34 2.61 
Per Capita Income  24720.10 7076.76 24041.25 6894.78 
Public Hospitals  0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 
SCHIP * 94.60 194.00 85.60 191.00 
     
* values in millions 
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Table 7.4.  Descriptive statistics for Spill-Over Analysis on Bad Debt, Charity Care and 
Uncompensated Care 
 Total 
(n=2,684) 
Positive Bad Debt 
only  
(n=2,638) 
Positive Charity 
Care only 
(n=1,898) 
Positive 
Uncompensated 
Care only 
(n=2,644) 
Variable  Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean 
 
S.E. Mean 
 
S.E. 
Dependent Variables      
    
Bad Debt per bed * 9.01 8.13 9.17 8.12     
Charity Care per bed * 1.95 3.46   2.86 3.83   
Uncompensated Care 
per bed * 
10.96 9.14     11.13 9.10 
Independent 
Variables  
    
    
Not-For-Profit 
Contribution of Bad 
Debt  
0.41 0.29 0.40 0.28     
Not-For-Profit 
Contribution of 
Charity Care 
0.46 0.38   0.42 0.38   
Not-For-Profit 
Contribution of   
Uncompensated Care  
0.41 0.31     0.41 0.30 
Control Variables 
  
  
    
Hospital Size 147.55 9.79 149.16 98.08 163.83 101.74 148.87 97.98 
Length of Stay 6.83 5.36 6.79 6.29 6.20 4.30 6.80 5.31 
Freestanding Hospitals 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.31 0.074 0.262 0.11 0.31 
HMO Contract  0.54 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.50 
PPO Contract  0.60 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.60 0.49 
Market Competition I 0.78 0.25 0.78 0.25 0.75 0.26 0.78 0.25 
Market Competition II 0.93 0.07 0.93 0.07 0.92 0.07 0.93 0.07 
Teaching Status 0.036 0.187 0.037 0.188 0.038 0.192 0.037 0.188 
Rural  0.071 0.258 0.069 0.254 0.075 0.263 0.070 0.255 
Education Level 75.50 6.85 75.53 6.87 75.75 7.23 75.52 6.87 
Percent Elderly 12.46 5.77 12.48 5.79 12.97 6.16 12.47 5.78 
Percent Non-White  41.42 19.30 41.40 19.33 40.15 19.86 41.44 19.35 
Unemployment Rate 6.26 2.62 6.25 2.63 6.01 2.66 6.26 2.62 
Per Capita Income * 24.50 7.13 24.50 7.09 24.58 6.88 24.50 7.09 
Public Hospitals  0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.66 0.47 0.70 0.46 
SCHIP **   92.56 192.26 92.59 192.30 105.05 199.43 92.64 192.48 
         
* value reported in $1,000.   
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Table 7.5.  Variable names and descriptive statistics for the Spill-Over Effect on 
Medicaid and Medicare Inpatient Days 
 Total  
(n=2,951) 
Positive Medicaid Load  
(n=2,729) 
Variable  Mean 
 
Standard Error Mean 
 
Standard Error 
Dependent Variables  
    
% Medicaid Inpatient Days 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.11 
Independent Variables  
    
Weighted Mean of Not-for-
Profit Medicaid Inpatient 
Days 
0.46 0.28 0.42 0.28 
Control Variables 
    
Hospital Size 143.88 96.87 150.60 96.94 
Length of Stay 7.06 5.54 6.11 3.95 
Freestanding Hospitals 0.10 0.30 0.098 0.297 
HMO Contract  0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 
PPO Contract  0.57 0.50 0.55 0.50 
Market Competition I 0.78 0.25 0.77 0.25 
Market Competition II 0.93 0.07 0.93 0.07 
Teaching Status 0.038 0.191 0.040 0.195 
Rural  0.068 0.252 0.073 0.259 
Education Level 75.73 6.86 75.63 6.99 
Percent Elderly 12.68 5.95 12.93 6.07 
Percent non-White 41.19 19.48 40.96 19.85 
Unemployment Rate 6.22 2.60 6.26 2.63 
Per Capita Income *  24720.10 7076.76 24531.83 7012.51 
Public Hospitals  0.70 0.46 0.68 0.46 
SCHIP ** 94.60 194.00 91.80 188.74 
     
* value reported in $1,000 
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Table 7.6. Spill-over effect of state community benefit laws on hospital provision of 
community oriented programs from 1991 to 2002 
 
Variable  
OLS  
(n=2,951) 
Fixed Effects 
(n=2,355) 
CA 0.14  
 (0.09)  
TX 0.0011  
 (0.0560)  
Not-For-Profit Community Benefit Index -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.10) (0.07 
Year 94 to 96 · CA · NFP Community Benefit Index -0.33 -0.11 
 (0.25) (0.11) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA · NFP Community Benefit Index -0.20 -0.097 
 (0.20) (0.103) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX · NFP Community Benefit Index -0.014 0.020 
 (0.173) (0.082) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX · NFP Community Benefit Index -0.058 0.23 *** 
 (0.175) (0.08) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX · NFP Community Benefit Index 0.13 0.19 *** 
 (0.15) (0.08) 
Year 94 to 96  0.12 ** 0.11 *** 
 (0.05) (0.02) 
Year 96 to 02  0.11 0.12 *** 
 (0.07) (0.03) 
Year 93 to 95 -0.17 *** 0.0094 
 (0.06) (0.0259) 
Year 95 to 97 -0.37 *** 0.094 ** 
 (0.08) (0.040) 
Year 97 to 02  -0.31 *** 0.092 ** 
 (0.08) (0.040) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA 0.025 -0.00097 
 (0.136) (0.05870) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA 0.042 -0.029 
 (0.101) (0.050) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX 0.046 -0.011 
 (0.074) (0.030) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX 0.24 *** -0.085 ** 
 (0.07) (0.035) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX 0.10 -0.058 * 
 (0.06) (0.030) 
NFP Community Benefit Index · CA 0.070 -0.18 
 (0.181) (0.13) 
NFP Community Benefit Index · TX 0.094 -0.50 *** 
 (0.138) (0.12) 
Year 94 to 96 · NFP Community Benefit Index  -0.025 0.056 
 (0.041) (0.051) 
Year 96 to 02 · NFP Community Benefit Index 0.0077 0.12 * 
 (0.0549) (0.07) 
Year 93 to 95 · NFP Community Benefit Index 0.070 * 0.0033 
 (0.039) (0.0584) 
Year 95 to 97 · NFP Community Benefit Index 0.096 * -0.17 ** 
 (0.055) (0.08) 
Year 97 to 02 · NFP Community Benefit Index 0.070 -0.12 
 (0.061) (0.08) 
Hospital Size/100 0.011 *** 0.029 ** 
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 (0.003) (0.012) 
Length of Stay -0.0010 ** -0.0028 
 (0.0005) (0.0026) 
Freestanding Hospitals -0.015 * -0.070 *** 
 (0.008) (0.013) 
Teaching Status 0.00050 0.032 * 
 (0.01221) (0.019) 
Rural -0.027 ** -0.034 ** 
 (0.011) (0.016) 
PPO Contract 0.027 *** 0.0023 
 (0.009) (0.0110) 
HMO Contract -0.011 0.015 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
Market Competition I -0.055 *** 0.036 
 (0.018) (0.051) 
Market Competition II 0.14 *** 0.19 
 (0.05) (0.19) 
Education Level/100 0.17 ** -0.31 
 (0.08) (0.32) 
Percent Elderly/100 0.11 0.18 
 (0.07) (0.53) 
Percent non-Whites/100 0.055 ** -0.19 
 (0.028) (0.17) 
Unemployment Rate/100 0.11 0.14 
 (0.14) (0.32) 
Per Capital Income/1,000  -0.00068 -0.00028 
 (0.00056) (0.00181) 
Public Hospitals Presence  0.0053 -0.017 
 (0.0064) (0.018) 
SCHIP/1,000,000 0.0000075 -0.00000071 
 (0.0000146) (0.00002400) 
Constant 0.74 *** 0.54 
 (0.09) (0.38) 
   
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level;   
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Table 7.7.  Results of spill-over effect of state community benefit laws on financial 
community benefit activities between 1991 and 2002  
Adjusted  
Bad Debt  
per bed 
Adjusted  
Charity Care  
per bed  
Adjusted  
Uncompensated Care  
per bed 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
OLS 
(n=2,685) 
Fixed Effects  
(n=2,638) 
OLS 
(n=2,684) 
Fixed Effects 
(n=1,898) 
OLS 
(n=2,684) 
Fixed Effects 
(n=2.644) 
CA 0.011  -0.18 **  -0.0069  
 (0.035)  (0.07)  (0.0264)  
TX -0.034  -0.30 ***  -0.043 **  
 (0.023)  (0.07)  (0.021)  
Not-For-Profit Community 
Benefit  Index 
-0.068 ** -2807.74 -0.23 *** -2154.60 ** -0.073 ** -2826.61 
 (0.033) (2314.01) (0.08) (1093.31) (0.029) (2847.47) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA · NFP CB 
Index 
-0.017 -4321.62  0.23 -2434.77 ** -0.047 1009.28 
 (0.093) (3462.21) (0.19) (1238.46) (0.074) (2916.24) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA · NFP CB 
Index 
-0.12 * -4116.01 -0.29 ** -2779.12 ** -0.092 2739.58 
 (0.07) (3228.30) (0.14) (1311.32) (0.058) (2738.61) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX · NFP CB 
Index 
-0.0049 1139.61 -0.018 -147.40 -0.0070 474.63 
 (0.064) (1934.05) (0.153) (1092.69) (0.0560) (191.12) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX · NFP CB 
Index 
-0.061 510.19 -0.21 279.96 -0.051 403.78 
 (0.065) (1923.30) (0.16) (1159.05) (0.057) (2013.17) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX · NFP CB 
Index 
-0.074 3077.09 -0.11 1463.79 -0.074 2429.77 
 (0.056) (1916.92) (0.14) (1066.95) (0.048) (2030.14) 
Year 94 to 96  0.033 -499.98 0.028 692.08 * 0.0066 273.12 
 (0.021) (715.91) (0.063) (367.48) (0.0195) (745.74) 
Year 96 to 02  0.032 81.91 0.028 387.12 0.013 783.31 
 (0.029) (962.05) (0.089) (580.26) (0.027) (1008.57) 
Year 93 to 95 -0.027 -406.90 0.074 412.00 -0.020 -658.35 
 (0.026) (763.72) (0.076) (411.74) (0.023) (799.80) 
Year 95 to 97 -0.040 -805.86 0.022 459.88 -0.026 -815.65 
 (0.033) (1072.53) (0.099) (620.16) (0.030) (1118.39) 
Year 97 to 02  -0.054 976.54 0.037 1368.49 * -0.044 1442.75 
 (0.035) (1220.64) (0.106) (729.73) (0.032) (1288.44) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA -0.0093 1738.33 -0.15 1065.11 0.019 -1331.88 
 (0.0515) (1944.39) (0.15) (863.15) (0.043) (1739.97) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA 0.030 728.26 -0.087 2037.71 ** 0.030 -2605.12 
 (0.041) (2045.35) (0.092) (968.34) (0.032) (1832.85) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX 0.00086 95.29 0.15 492.67 0.0097 619.22 
 (0.03076) (912.52) (0.09) (595.30) (0.0276) (967.42) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX 0.11 86.81 0.32 *** 788.63 0.041 766.07 
 (0.06) (934.28) (0.09) (661.55) (0.028) (1001.24) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX 0.089 -1888.94 ** 0.24 *** 137.99 0.061 ** -1309.04 
 (0.069) (894.05) (0.08) (608.25) (0.024) (1010.43) 
CA · NFP CB Index 0.021 7348.10 ** 0.10 1132.88 0.024 -2580.01 
 (0.061) (3571.75) (0.11) (1242.59) (0.049) (3659.21) 
TX · NFP CB Index 0.075 2151.82 0.029 -533.38 0.068 * 1706.10 
 (0.048) (3521.84) (0.115) (2519.05) (0.041) (5932.22) 
Year 94 to 96 · NFP CB Index -0.031 2353.18 * 0.042 -118.01 0.013 872.03 
 (0.045) (1397.71)  (0.110) (592.95) (0.040) (1319.13) 
Year 96 to 02 · NFP CB Index -0.0034 2379.52 * 0.23 41.47 0.030 755.88 
 (0.0617) (1864.16) (0.15) (884.01) (0.053) (1849.71) 
Year 93 to 95 · NFP CB Index 0.076 -2429.19 * -0.019 -17.62 0.061 173.75 
 (0.047) (1323.30) (0.110) (607.52) (0.041) (1310.83) 
Year 95 to 97 · NFP CB Index 0.11 -3485.14 * -0.044 -329.27 0.067 -1578.59 
 (0.06) (1958.09) (0.147) (880.61) (0.055) (1911.08) 
Year 97 to 02 · NFP CB Index 0.089 -6227.85 *** 0.089 -1237.31 0.061 -4242.12 * 
 (0.069) (2159.87) (0.161) (1010.89) (0.060) (2187.36) 
Hospital Size/100 0.012 *** -4699.11 *** 0.087 *** -567.38  0.011 *** -5057.94 *** 
 (0.003) (601.71) (0.009) (364.93) (0.003) (718.67) 
Length of Stay -0.0013 ** 100.25  -0.010 *** 23.65 -0.00098 ** 126.48 
 (0.0005) (107.87) (0.002) (61.47) (0.00050) (119.47) 
Freestanding Hospitals -0.015 * 1827.41 *** -0.11 *** -149.66 -0.011 1386.52 ** 
 (0.008) (549.79) (0.03) (413.29) (0.008) (590.08) 
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Teaching Status 0.0030 23.23  -0.064 -2057.10 *** 0.0015 -1686.17 * 
 (0.0137) (746.13) (0.043) (444.03) (0.0127) (867.44) 
Rural -0.029 ** -1940.16 ** 0.0091 735.71 * -0.027 ** -1209.60 
 (0.012) (906.73) (0.0286) (416.44) (0.011) (913.50) 
PPO Contract 0.029 *** -178.12 0.081 ** -130.55 0.026 *** -154.44 
 (0.010) (639.09) (0.032) (314.90) (0.009) (645.77) 
HMO Contract -0.011 -18.12 -0.035 444.53 -0.010 199.87 
 (0.010) (613.89) (0.031) (322.04) (0.009) (626.23) 
Market Competition I -0.069 *** -2748.51 -0.17 *** -3033.00 * -0.073 *** -5176.06 * 
 (0.020) (2736.98) (0.06) (1568.19) (0.019) (2858.60) 
Market Competition II 0.18 *** 7285.98  0.34 ** 8413.94 0.21 *** 8343.56 
 (0.05) (7067.42) (0.17) (7421.86) (0.05) (8609.75) 
Education Level/100 0.19 ** 22165.17 ** 0.29 -30495.29 *** 0.19 ** 353.14 
 (0.09) (11011.93) (0.27) (7584.75) (0.08) (12948.68) 
Percent Elderly/100 0.094 35068.56 ***  0.16 -13503.81 0.11 30940.45 
 (0.077) (15379.96) (0.24) (10092.64) (0.08) (18840.32) 
Percent non-Whites/100 0.056 * 17611.49 *** 0.14 165.45 0.074 *** 20188.61 *** 
 (0.030) (5492.64) (0.10) (3431.83) (0.028) (6588.73) 
Unemployment Rate/100 0.11 -15923.40  -1.38 *** -32274.27 *** 0.052 -50241.90 *** 
 (0.16) (12715.04) (0.49) (8190.08) (0.146) (14654.82) 
Per Capital Income/1,000  -0.00095 160.39 *** -0.0087 *** -41.35 -0.0011 * 101.75 
 (0.00063) (61.49) (0.0019) (42.52) (0.0006) (73.25) 
Public Hospitals Presence  0.0073 -638.50 -0.011 -92.75 0.0077 -787.93 
 (0.0071) (433.16) (0.023) (339.71) (0.0067) (527.09) 
SCHIP/1,000,000 0.0000085 3.09 *** 0.00013 ** 4.77 *** 0.0000042 7.40 *** 
 (0.0000162) (1.04) (0.00005) (0.76) (0.0000149) (1.23) 
Constant 0.70 *** -19597.53 0.53 * 24851.97 ** 0.69 *** 3386.56 
 (0.10) (12501.68) (0.30) (10168.20) (0.09) (15326.87) 
       
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level  
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Table 7.8.  Spill-over effect of for-profit hospitals’ services to Medicaid and Medicare 
inpatient populations between 1991 and 2002  
Percent Medicaid  
Inpatient Days 
 
 
 
Variable  
OLS  
(n=2,951) 
Fixed Effects 
(n=2,729) 
CA 0.077  
 (0.053)  
TX -0.041  
 (0.035)  
Not-For-Profit Special Population Load   0.13 *** -0.049 *** 
 (0.04) (0.017) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA · NFP Service Load 0.12 -0.16 ** 
 (0.15) (0.07) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA · NFP Service Load 0.031 -0.012 
 (0.120) (0.041) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX · NFP Service Load 0.0031 0.0024 
 (0.0873) (0.0231) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX · NFP Service Load -0.051 0.019 
 (0.090) (0.025) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX · NFP Service Load 0.0030 0.031 
 (0.0761) (0.022) 
Year 94 to 96  -0.0025 0.030 *** 
 (0.0341) (0.009) 
Year 96 to 02  0.0068 0.039 *** 
 (0.0467) (0.013) 
Year 93 to 95 -0.015 0.018 * 
 (0.037) (0.010) 
Year 95 to 97 -0.038 0.024 
 (0.049) (0.015) 
Year 97 to 02  -0.063 0.029 
 (0.054) (0.017) 
Year 94 to 96 · CA -0.039 0.077 ** 
 (0.077) (0.035) 
Year 96 to 02 · CA 0.028 -0.011 
 (0.062) (0.021) 
Year 93 to 95 · TX 0.011 -0.00087 
 (0.046) (0.01189) 
Year 95 to 97 · TX 0.066 -0.021 * 
 (0.047) (0.012) 
Year 97 to 02 · TX 0.030 -0.033 *** 
 (0.040) (0.011) 
Year 94 to 96 · NFP Service Load -0.017 -0.0048 
 (0.062) (0.0159) 
Year 96 to 02 · NFP Service Load -0.087 -0.0072 
 (0.089) (0.0238) 
Year 93 to 95 · NFP Service Load 0.0059 0.012 
 (0.0693) (0.016) 
Year 95 to 97 · NFP Service Load 0.014 0.022 
 (0.092) (0.024) 
Year 97 to 02 · NFP Service Load 0.069 0.020 
 (0.102) (0.027) 
CA · NFP Service Load -0.27 *** 0.032 
 (0.10) (0.048) 
TX · NFP Service Load -0.18 *** -0.041 
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 (0.06) (0.030) 
Hospital Size/100 0.036 *** -0.0047 
 (0.004) (0.0065) 
Length of Stay -0.025 *** -0.0015 
 (0.001) (0.0012) 
Freestanding Hospitals -0.011 0.046 *** 
 (0.013) (0.009) 
Teaching Status 0.015 -0.0043 
 (0.020) (0.0076) 
Rural -0.0018 0.022 *** 
 (0.0186) (0.006) 
PPO Contract -0.020 0.011 * 
 (0.015) (0.007) 
HMO Contract -0.019 -0.00051 
 (0.015) (0.00639) 
Market Competition I -0.11 *** -0.065 *** 
 (0.03) (0.024) 
Market Competition II 0.15 * 0.12 * 
 (0.08) (0.06) 
Education Level/100 0.15 -0.45 *** 
 (0.13) (0.16) 
Percent Elderly/100 0.20 * -0.32 
 (0.11) (0.20) 
Percent non-Whites/100 0.15 *** 0.0041 
 (0.04) (0.0614) 
Unemployment Rate/100 -0.41 * 0.049 
 (0.23) (0.164) 
Per Capital Income/1,000 -0.0012 -0.0011 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Public Hospitals Presence  -0.0050 0.011 
 (0.0104) (0.009) 
SCHIP/1,000,000 -0.000054 ** 0.000064 *** 
 (0.000024) (0.000016) 
Constant 0.92 *** 0.44 *** 
 (0.14) (0.16) 
   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1. Summary of findings and study limitations 
The debate on the necessity and appropriateness of charitable tax exemption policy of 
not-for-profit hospitals is timely and will never be politically obsolete (California Healthline 
2005, GAO 2005).  As the number of uninsured reached a new height in recent years 
(California Healthline 2003), the demand for community accountability and needs for 
community benefits will only increase.  This dissertation study offers an in-depth 
investigation on whether and how community benefit laws improve hospital provision of 
community-oriented health services, uncompensated care as well as Medicaid inpatient 
services.  It takes a comparative approach to examine policy variations seen in the states of 
Texas and California before and after the enactment and implementation of the laws, 
compared to that of the hospitals in the control state of Florida.  It also explores market and 
organizational factors that influence hospital compliance with the state laws.  Results of the 
study show preferential evidence of impact from the Texas state community benefit law on 
not-for-profit hospitals’ community benefit activities.  They also reveal that factors 
influencing private hospitals’ willingness and abilities to provide community benefit are 
many and complex.   
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The central outcome of this study reveals that Texas not-for-profit hospitals increase 
their provision of charity care, but California not-for-profit hospitals decrease their 
community benefit activities in response to the enactment and implementation of respective 
state community benefit laws.  Sutton and Stensland (2003) found similar patterns of 
organizational behavior where private hospitals in Texas and Washington states provide 
substantially more charity care than California private hospitals do.  Combined, these two 
studies confirm and strengthen the argument that the prescriptive version of the state 
community benefit laws is more effective in influencing not-for-profit hospital behavior than 
the process approach.      
In addition, California not-for-profit hospitals’ negative reactions to the state 
community benefit law clearly contradict with the study hypothesis derived from the 
institutional theory.  Two possible scenarios may explain California not-for-profit hospitals’ 
reduction in community benefit activities.  One, the traditional regulatory view of institutions 
where organizations comply with rules out of expediency and based on coercion may be 
overly simplistic.  Rather, as Oliver’s organizational strategic response topology (1991) 
suggests, California not-for-profit hospitals have chosen to defy the requirements of the law 
due to perceived limited legitimacy and external enforcement.  It appears that hospitals assess 
and weigh their internal assets against external demands and perceived legitimacy before 
making decisions on whether and how they would respond to the state community benefit 
law.  Two, due to the broad nature of the California statue, not-for-profit hospitals may have 
responded to the law by focusing their resources on providing one or two community-
oriented programs, rather than by increasing the variety of activities available to the 
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community.  In this case, a different analytic approach may be needed to assess the impact of 
the law on California not-for-profit hospitals.   
Texas not-for-profit hospitals, in contrast, increase the amount of charity care 
contributions consistently upon the implementation of the law and throughout the study 
period, compared to that of Florida not-for-profit hospitals.  This outcome concurs with the 
predictions of institutional theory.  Yet, Oliver’s (1991) organizational strategic response 
topology offers a better interpretation of Texas’ hospitals’ acceding behavior.  Specifically, 
the stringency of the Texas legislation which articulates a heavy daily fine for delayed 
reporting and revocation of state property tax exemption for non-compliance poses a real 
threat to hospitals’ financial bottom-line.  Due to the public attention given to the law-suit 
which prompted the development and establishment of state community benefit law, not-for--
-profit hospitals may also interpret compliance behavior as a means to elevate their social 
legitimacy and avoid public criticism.  Comparatively, results from the main effects’ analysis 
does support the hypothesis that not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness and abilities to respond 
to state community benefit laws are dependent on the stringency of the laws.   
In terms of contingency factors attenuating not-for-profit hospitals’ abilities to 
comply with the state community benefit laws, hospital size is one organizational attribute 
that facilitates these healthcare organizations’ compliance with state community benefit laws.  
Large size often reflects hospitals’ financial health and subsequent resource flexibility.  This 
study finds consistently that large hospitals are more likely to offer any community benefit 
activities at all and are associated with increased contribution to these programs.   
Contrary to the study hypothesis, not-for-profit hospitals’ network status does not 
compel them to augment the quantity of their community benefit contributions.  In fact, it has 
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no significant effect on the amount of community benefit activities a not-for-profit hospital 
provides.  Further, it is negatively associated with these hospitals’ willingness to participate 
in community benefit activities after the enactment of the California law and after the second 
amendment of the Texas legislation.  Even though both institutional and resource dependence 
theories suggest that organizations’ interconnectedness with the environment and other 
organizations facilitate diffusion of values and shared information (Oliver, 1991; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), the theories do not 
predict organizations’ behavioral patterns given these new knowledge.  It is possible that 
information about network partner’s service inventory prevents not-for-profit hospitals from 
offering the same kinds of services.  For those hospitals that have not previously provided 
community benefit, they may simply rely on their network or systems partners to fulfill the 
requirements of the obligatory mandate. 
As predicted by the study hypothesis, market competition is an environmental 
contingency factor that positively affects not-for-profit hospitals’ willingness to provide 
community benefit.  In California, the within-county hospital market competition helps 
stimulate the variety of community-oriented programs and the amount of charity and 
uncompensated care they provide.  In Texas, the same kind of competition is associated with 
an increased level of bad debt and uncompensated care.  This outcome appears to agree with 
the theoretical assumption that competition invokes perception of market uncertainty, hence 
conformity.  Empirically, it again confirms Shortell and colleagues (1986) findings where 
systems hospitals offer more services when competition is high than when it is low.  Policy-
wise, it has profound implications on how hospital merger cases may affect the overall state 
of community benefit and charity care within a geographic area.   
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Possession of managed care contracts has a positive effect on California not-for-profit 
hospitals’ provision of community-oriented program after the initial enactment of the law.  In 
the case of Texas, managed care decreases the number of community-oriented programs 
hospitals offer.  But, it encourages hospitals’ provision of charity care after the second 
amendment of the law.  Unlike previous research outcomes (Gresenz et al., 2007), managed 
care is not found to unilaterally constrain health care price paid to hospital mainstream 
services and limit their ability to cross-subsidize free or discounted care for the uninsured.  
The mixed results, instead, reflect the complexity associated with the notion of managed care.  
Depending on the types of contracts, saturation of the market as well as the operational 
philosophy of the companies, the impact of managed care may be very different for not-for-
profit hospitals in different states.   
The last set of the analytical results show evidence of spill-over effect of state 
community benefit law onto for-profit hospitals.  However, the effects can not be 
characterized uniformly across states.  In California, for-profit hospitals seem to withdraw 
from offering community benefit services with increases in not-for-profit social investment.  
Without considering the impact of regulatory interventions, Clement and colleagues (2002) 
found that California for-profit hospitals provide significantly less charity care as not-for-
profit hospitals in the market provide more.  Given that the California state community 
benefit law fails to elevate not-for-profit hospitals’ community benefit activities, it is not 
surprising that for-profit hospitals continue the patterns of service withdrawal and have not 
experienced any spill-over effect during the study period.   
In contrast, Texas for-profit hospitals respond positively to not-for-profit hospitals 
increase in bad debt and charity care contributions as a result of state community benefit law.  
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However, these hospitals choose to respond to not-for-profit change of behavior by offering 
more community-oriented programs, rather than making financial contributions to bad debt 
and charity care as prescribed by the Texas law.  By doing so, Texas for-profit hospitals are 
able to maintain a good neighbor’s image by strategically balancing external demand for 
community accountability and internal objective of resource efficiency.   
One of the major strength of this study lies in the availability of the various pre-post 
and treatment-control group data.  They allows for a rare opportunity to address directly the 
policy question of whether community benefit laws have had an impact on hospital behavior.  
However, several scenarios may threaten the validity of this study.  For example, there may 
be other concurrent policy changes.  If these other changes affected the treatment and control 
groups differently and the corresponding variables were excluded from the estimation model, 
the results of the analysis may be biased.  From an up-to-date literature review, most relevant 
charitable tax policy changes have occurred before the proposed study period.  A recent 
change in Medicaid programs, i.e., the establishment of the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP), may affect the number of uninsured people in local community and 
therefore the demand for charity or uncompensated care.  Even though the program was 
implemented in California, Texas, and Florida in the same year, the impact of the program 
may vary across the studied states due to funding allocation differences.  Therefore, a 
variable indicating the year and amount of state SCHIP installments has been incorporated in 
the analytical models.  It serves to control for the non-random shocks that may have occurred 
before or after the implementation of state community benefit laws to attenuate hospital 
provision of community benefit laws differentially in these three study states.  The use of a 
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treatment group and the inclusion of multiple periods before and after the implementation of 
community benefit laws also reduce the bias caused by non-random shocks.   
Another limitation to the current estimation method is that it does not account for an 
adjustment time that hospitals may need to gear up for the new regulation, resulting in 
slightly biased downward results after the initial implementation of the laws.  An alternative 
means to assess the impact of the laws and correct the bias would be to create an additional 
transitional time dummy in the estimation models.  Sensitivity tests would be conducted to 
determine the length of the transitional period.    
The effect of the community benefit laws may also be confounded by incidences of 
hospital conversions.  In the event that hospitals change their ownership status due to their 
inabilities to offer or desire to avoid provision of community benefit services or activities, 
parameter estimates for the impact of the laws may be biased towards zero.  In the study 
period between 1991 and 2002, there was a reported elevated rate of hospitals ownership 
conversion.  However, prior research showed that at the height of hospital conversion 
movement, an average of less than 1 percent of hospitals in the country changed their 
ownership status.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the number of hospitals involved in 
conversion may not be sufficient to cause bias or introduce endogeneity in the analysis. 
Measurement errors are another concern in the proposed study.  As state governments 
tighten requirements for charitable tax exemption, it is speculated that hospitals may become 
more deliberate in documenting community benefit activities and related accounting efforts.   
While the purposed study will not be able to distinguish community benefit gain caused by 
the new laws and that caused by accounting changes, it is anticipated that accounting changes 
alone are not likely to result in a statistically significant gain in community benefit activities 
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from a longitudinal perspective. To alleviate the effect of false community benefit gain 
caused by accounting changes alone, hospital community benefit activity trends, gaps and 
potential jumps, in according to legislative progressions, will be carefully observed and 
documented.  Although it is not the original intent of state community benefit laws, an 
improved accuracy and consistency in charity accounting mechanism may be a welcomed 
unintended consequence to the new laws (Sutton and Stensland, 2004).   
   
8.2. Policy Implications 
The policy relevance and timeliness of assessing community benefit laws is clear. 
While the House Ways and Means Committee conducts research on hospital uncompensated 
care and community benefits in general, this study takes on a specific perspective to examine 
one of the root causes to hospital behavior in the same vain.  Results of this study 
complements the recent GAO study on not-for-profit uncompensated care (2005) and inform 
policy makers that different regulatory designs of state community benefit laws (procedural 
vs. prescriptive) have differential impact on hospitals.  More specifically, not-for-profit 
hospitals respond positively to the prescriptive approach to the community benefit law.  Two 
features of the Texas legislation may be the primary contributors to its effectiveness.  One, 
the Texas legislation defines community benefit clearly in measurable financial terms.  Two, 
the law delineates concise, enforceable non-compliance penalties.  As a result, Texas not-for-
profit hospitals’ bolstered the provision of charity care consistently after the implementation 
of the law.  Their for-profit counterparts also respond positively by offering more 
community-oriented programs during the same time period.  Thus, a clear stipulation of what 
constitutes community benefit in accordance to the intent of the law is critically important.  It 
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is also important that the law defines community benefit in measurable terms.  Finally, 
specification of a non-compliance penalty provides additional incentive for conformity.  
Since community health needs are often vast and nebulous, no regulatory measure could 
possibly resolve all the health needs of communities and the rising number of uninsured and 
underinsured at once.  As not-for-profit hospitals heed regulatory control according to its 
legislative language and definition of community benefit, policymakers must first consider 
thoroughly and carefully the legislative intent and priorities, desired outcome and target 
audience before drafting the law.   
Past research has found that hospital provision of uncompensated care is influenced 
by policy and market changes and these patterns vary by ownership groups (Davidoff et al., 
2000).  Results of this study confirm that hospital size positively attenuates their provision of 
various community benefit activities.  In this case, should the government subsidize small 
hospitals for their community benefit activities?  Both network and managed care statuses 
yield opposite effects on California and Texas not-for-profit hospitals compliance behaviors.  
Policy makers cannot unilaterally characterize the effects of these factors on hospital 
behavior.  Finally, market competition compels not-for-profit hospitals to boost their 
provision of charity care in both states.  Promoting a healthy level of market competition in 
fact helps to elevate services for the poor.  Insights about how organizational and market 
conditions affect hospitals’ compliance with regulatory demands allow policy makers and 
health services researchers to understand and predict hospital behaviors.  They also provide 
information about how states may capitalize on their environmental as well as organizational 
assets in the design and modification of community benefit laws and other hospital-related 
policies.  In particular, the positive association between market competition and charity care 
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also offers valuable insights to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, the Antitrust Division of 
the U.S. Department of Justice and federal courts that decide hospital merger cases. 
 State community benefit laws’ indirect influence on for-profit hospital supply of 
community benefit is evident, however unpredictable.  Depending on historical and current 
local politics, contemporary market conditions, and the state legislative languages, for-profit 
hospitals are seen to reduce their provision of community benefit in California or 
complement their not-for-profit counterparts by offering alternative forms of community 
benefit activities in Texas.  Outcomes of this study indicate that it is critical to acknowledge 
and understand the interactive relationship between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.  
This knowledge provides a more complete and well-rounded framework for policy and 
decision makers from which to understand the hospital industry and its inner workings.  It 
also facilitates the policy formulation process where laws and regulations can be crafted to 
optimize the potentially complementary relationship between for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals.    
Finally, state community benefit laws are an important health policy whose impact 
can be extended beyond its current form.  Concerning the recent billing and collection 
practice controversy surrounding not-for-profit hospitals around the country (Unland, 2004; 
Moroney et al., 2004; Geyer, 2004), state community benefit laws may be one avenue where 
policymakers could standardize these hospital financial practices with regard to indigent care.   
As states strive to regulate and potentially raise the level of community benefit provided by 
hospitals, they also need to help hospitals balance and manage the demand as well as the cost 
of these services.   Setting a definition and measurable guideline for hospital provision of 
community benefit as well as a standard for hospital financial and billing practices will not 
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only help these institutions better manage their community benefit resources, but also 
facilitate future research in this area of health services.  
 
8.3. Directions for Future Research 
This study on the effect of state community benefit laws on hospital provision of 
community benefit offers one unique and important perspective to the perpetual hospital 
charity care debate.  More importantly, its interesting outcomes bring forth additional 
inquiries and opportunities for future empirical and theoretical research.  For example, the 
states of California and Texas are selected to represent generally the procedural and 
prescriptive approaches to state community benefit laws in this study.  There may be unique 
characteristics about these two particular versions of the law within the general approaches 
that are not shared by other state policies.  Therefore, the effect of state community benefit 
laws may be explored in many other ways in greater detail.  As more states begin to enact 
and implement their community benefit laws, there will be more nuances and variations 
added to these regulatory policies.  This study can be replicated to examine the effect of these 
laws in different localities and settings.   
Under the current study design, community-oriented programs are aggregated into a 
composite index.  However, each program may have its unique community and hospital 
appeal as well as profit margin. It may be interesting to examine the relationship between 
each program’s profit margin and hospitals’ willingness to offer such service in response to 
community benefit laws. 
Several unexpected outcomes from this study also raise future empirical research 
opportunities.  First, California not-for-profit hospitals are found to decrease their provision 
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of community-oriented programs in reaction to the law.  It is possible that they have devoted 
resources to fewer high-impact community health programs.  A qualitative study on the 
annual community benefit reports submitted to the OSHPD office may be able to provide 
further insight on how California not-for-profit hospitals allocate their community benefit 
resources.   Second, hospitals’ network status is found to impede their participation in 
community benefit activities.  It may be interesting to test how organizations utilize shared 
values and information obtained from their networked partners.   
The notion of relative trustworthiness may add an interesting dimension to the spill-
over analysis.  In 2005 Schlesinger et al. studied the relative trustworthiness of not-for-profit 
and for-profit health plans.  They found that not-for-profit hospital presence must reach a 
minimum threshold in order to influence for-profit hospital behavior and performance in the 
same locale.  Applying the same theory, there may be an optimal not-for-profit hospital 
presence required in order that for-profit hospitals would respond to state community benefit 
laws in a positive fashion.  Future research on the subject can also incorporate the threshold 
effects theory to explore the differential impact of varying market share conditions on 
hospital behavior.   
Theoretically, outcomes of this study highlight the inadequacies of institutional 
theory alone in describing hospitals’ response to community benefit laws.  Rather, they 
intimate organizations’ proactive interactions with external environmental pressures, partially 
validating Oliver’s typology of strategic response to institutional processes (1991).  
Capitalizing on variations in social political environments and community benefit laws, 
states’ experimental efforts with these new regulations afford an ideal scenario to further test 
Oliver’s (1991) theory empirically.    
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Finally, studies on hospital tax exemption status cannot avoid evoking several 
fundamental policy questions.  One, how is community benefit defined?  Two, what is the 
right or optimal amount of community benefit necessary to merit tax exemption?  Three, is it 
fair to ask only not-for-profit hospitals to share the burden of the under- and uninsured? 
While it is difficult to answer these questions directly, this study results show that hospitals 
strategically offer various aspects of community benefit to meet local health needs as well as 
fulfill regulatory requirements.  A singular dimensional examination of community benefit 
often lacks depth and does not provide full insight into hospitals’ service intentions and 
contribution.  In terms of hospitals’ financial expenditure on community benefit, some states 
have used tax savings to benchmark and evaluate their social commitment.  More studies are 
needed to examine its advantage and disadvantages, as well as to explore alternative formula 
for community benefit accounting.  The role of not-for-profit hospitals in sharing and 
alleviating the burden of the under- and uninsured is not merely academic, but largely 
philosophical.  Some have advocated for not-for-profit entities based simply on virtue.  
Others insist on a more functional existence.  As the debate continues, future health services 
researchers must think more creatively and contextually about the problems of the uninsured, 
their lack of access to health services, as well as hospital’s roles in filling such service gaps.    
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